Centre for Policy Alternatives on 17 July, 2018

A Brief Guide to the Judicature (Amendment) Act No 9 of 2018

This brief guide is prepared by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) to raise awareness on salient points in relation to the Judicature (Amendment) Act No 9 of 2018 enacted in May 2018. As the guide indicates, if fully implemented, the present legislation can address delays with justice with specific cases in Sri Lanka. While this is legislation addresses several areas requiring reforms, CPA also notes several concerns that require further attention and urges the authorities to also consider addressing delays in relation to other areas.

Download in English here.

  1. What is the Judicature Act?

The Judicature Act is an act of Parliament which provides the legal basis to establish the system of courts of first instance in Sri Lanka. The Act also defines the jurisdiction of these courts.

  1. What is a court of first instance?

A court in which a case will be first heard is a court of first instance. Legal proceedings begin in courts of first instance and these courts will often hear evidence and make the first ruling about a case.

  1. What was the recent amendment to the Judicature Act?

The Judicature (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 2018[1] was passed by Parliament in May 2018. This Act allows for certain High Courts to function as “Permanent High Courts at Bar”.

  1. What is the Permanent High Court at Bar?

It’s a permanent High Court consisting of three Judges sitting together to hear and determine cases relating to a number of financial and economic offences. The cases will be heard on a day to day basis (i.e. on consecutive dates). The Act provides for more than one Permanent High Court at Bar to be set up.

  1. What do “financial and economic offences” mean?

The Act does not define these terms. Instead it provides a schedule (the Sixth Schedule) which contains a list of offences which could be tried by the Permanent High Court at Bar.

  1. Will every case where a person is charged for an offence mentioned in the Sixth Schedule of the Act get heard by the Permanent High Court at Bar?

No. After considering several criteria, the Attorney General or the Director General for the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption (when directed by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption) can refer such cases to the Chief Justice to ask whether criminal proceedings for such offences should be taken in a Permanent High Court at Bar or elsewhere.

If the Chief Justice is satisfied that one or more of the criteria has been satisfied, s/he can direct the Attorney General or the Director General for the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption to institute criminal proceedings in the Permanent High Court at Bar. [Section 12A(4a)]

  1. What are the criteria to be considered by the Attorney General or the Director General for the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption, and then the Chief Justice?
  • the nature and circumstances of the offence
  • the gravity of the offence
  • the complexity of the offence
  • the impact on the victim or the impact on the State [Section 12A(4a)]
  1. Who nominates the judges sitting in the Permanent High Court at Bar?

The Chief Justice nominates the judges who will sit in this court [Section 12A(1)]

  1. Did Sri Lanka already have provision for Trials at Bar?

Yes, it did.

Prior to the present amendment the Sri Lankan legal system had already recognised Trials at Bar. The Judicature Act allows for Trials at Bar to be held by the High Court for offences punishable under the Penal Code and other laws. The Chief Justice has the power to nominate a Bench of three Judges of the High Court to these Trials at Bar. [Section 12]

Under section 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, the Chief Justice can decide to hold a Trial at Bar for any offence punishable under Sections 114, 115 or 116 of the Penal Code[2], taking into consideration:

  • the nature of the offence
  • the circumstances relating to the commission of the offence
  • in the interests of justice

The person accused of the offence will be tried before a Trial at Bar by three Judges without a jury.

  1. How are the Permanent High Court at Bar different from Trials at Bar?

Unlike Trials at Bar, which are established on a case by case basis, the Permanent High Court at Bar will be permanent and will hear the cases referred to it by the Chief Justice (See answer to question 4)

  1. Do we have enough High Court judges to have dedicated Permanent High Courts at Bar? Will other cases get delayed?

The Judicature (Amendment) Act, No. 26 of 2017[3] increased the maximum number of High Court judges from 75 to 110. With this increase of the number of High Court Judges, the Permanent High Court at Bar can be established without diverting judges from existing High Courts. This would allow the existing workload of the High Court to be spread among more judges in more court rooms.

  1. Is there a problem of delays in High Court cases ? Is there a backlog of cases?

A report of Parliament’s Sectoral Oversight committee on Legal Affairs (anti-corruption) & Media, found that:[4]

  • The actual period between the date an indictment was filed and the date the prosecution commenced (Average) – 3.7 years
  • The period between commencing recording evidence and the ruling of the case at High Court (Average) – 1.8 years
  • The period for the completion of the two appeals in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court (Average) – 0.7 years

According to the Ministry of Justice, there is a considerable backlog of cases in the High Courts.

Date No of Cases Pending in High Court
30th September 2017 17,143[5]
31st December 2016 16,366[6]
31st December 2015 16, 259[7]

However it has to be noted that this represents ALL cases before the High Courts and not just criminal cases.

  1. Is the backlog of cases only due to the delays in the Courts?

No. Some of the problems that cause these delays are related to investigation agencies and the Attorney General’s Department, whilst at least part of the problem is the delays caused by the heavy workload of existing courts and postponement of cases.

Some problems that cause these delays can be solved through increasing resources available to the investigation agencies and the Attorney General’s Department and judiciary. This would mean recruiting more skilled personnel, providing more training, investing in equipment and technology to increase efficiency and streamlining administrative procedures.

Other problems require legislative fixes. These include streamlining court procedures and providing for more judges and court rooms (see answer to question 14).

These solutions are not mutually exclusive.

  1. How do these amendments to the Judicature Act hope to ensure cases are concluded faster?
  • By setting up court rooms to exclusively hear a particular category of cases, progress on these cases is sped up.
  • By taking away a particular category of cases from the other High Courts, the workloads in those courts are reduced.
  • The cases in the Permanent High Court at Bar are expected to be heard on a day to day basis (i.e. on consecutive dates), this prevents long gaps between dates and would help to ensure cases are progressed quickly. [Section 12A (5)]
  • As opposed to having two appeals (one to the Court of Appeal and one to the Supreme Court) there is only one appeal from the Permanent High Court at Bar. This appeal is heard by five judges of the Supreme Court (the same as Trials at Bar) [Section 12B]
  1. What are the other benefits of having a dedicated Court hearing a particular category of cases?
  • During their tenure in the Court, the judges will be able to focus on a specific category of cases. Considering that these crimes are highly technical and require specialised knowledge this would help judges focus on developing the necessary skills to adjudicate such cases.
  • Having dedicated Court rooms makes it easier to allocate specialised resources (i.e. specialised translators, audio visual equipment etc.)
  1. What guarantees are there that the Permanent High Court at Bar will be independent?
  • The Judges in the Permanent High Court at Bar are High Court judges. High Court judges are appointed by the President[8] on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC)[9]. The JSC in turn makes its recommendations in consultation with the Attorney General.
  • The Chief Justice appoints Judges to the Permanent High Court at Bar from among existing High Court Judges.
  • The Chief Justice decides (based on cases forwarded by the Attorney General and the Director General for the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption) which cases get referred to the Permanent High Court at Bar.
  • Despite these safeguards to prevent against political interference there still continues to be concerns (see below) in this regard.
  1. Why does the Chief Justice have such an important role to play in the entire process?

The Chief Justice appoints judges to the Permanent High Court at Bar and makes the final decision on which cases are heard by the Permanent High Court at Bar.

In the original gazetted Bill it was up to the Attorney General or the Director General for the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption to decide which cases would be referred to the Permanent High Court at Bar.[10] However based on several Petitions filed challenging the constitutionality of this, the Supreme Court said that this power should be with the Chief Justice.[11]

The gazetted Bill also enabled the JSC as well as the Chief Justice appointing judges to the Permanent High Court at Bar.[12] However the Supreme Court determined that this power should solely be with the Chief Justice.[13]

  1. What are the risks associated with having a dedicated Permanent High Court at Bar?
  • The main risk is that the Permanent High Court at Bar would not have the desired impact and would not be able to conclude cases within a short period of time. This could happen if;
    • The necessary resources are not allocated to these courts;
    • Causes for delays within investigation agencies and the Attorney General’s Department are not adequately addressed;
    • The judges do not adhere to the requirements specified in the amendment act including of day to day trial and not granting postponements unless in exceptional circumstances.
  • The role of the Chief Justice is also less than ideal in that it gives one individual a lot of power (see answers to question 16 and 17 above). There could be a situation where these powers are misused to scuttle attempts to prosecute financial crimes or to target political opponents. The original proposal of giving this power to the JSC[14] would have been an improvement. However it should be remembered that with the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, the executive wields much less influence over the Chief Justice than before but there continues to be a need for greater safeguards to protect the integrity of the judiciary and other key state structures.
  • Concerns have also been raised with specialised courts that there is the risk of stereotypes being developed which can be prejudicial to either the prosecution or to the accused. This could result in more verdicts of such courts being more likely to be overturned in Appeal. Therefore in order to ensure that there is a fair trial process there should be specially trained judges hearing cases on rotation.
  • There is only one appeal from a verdict of the Permanent High Court at Bar and five judges of the Supreme Court will hear such an appeal. This will add to the workload of the Supreme Court and could potentially create more backlogs in the Supreme Court.

 

[1] The Judicature (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 2018, certified on 15th May 2018, Available at  http://www.documents.gov.lk/files/act/2018/5/09-2018_E.pdf

[2] Offence punishable under sections 114, 115 or 116 of the Penal Code are waging or attempting to wage war,  or abetting the waging of war against the State, Conspiracy to waging of war against the State and Collecting arms with the intention of waging war against the State

[3] The Judicature (Amendment) Act, No. 26 of 2017, certified on 17th November 2017, available at   http://www.documents.gov.lk/files/act/2017/11/26-2017_E.pdf

[4] “Recommendations Pertaining to the Expeditious and Efficient Administration of Criminal Justice”, Sectoral Oversight committee on Legal Affairs (anti corruption) & Media, 20 September 2017, at pg 3, available at http://www.parliament.lk/uploads/comreports/1510738363068517.pdf

[5] Progress Report, Ministry of Justice , January – September 2017, pg 42, available at http://www.moj.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/progress_report/14.11.2017/English.pdf

[6] Progress Report, Ministry of Justice , January – December 2016, pg 41, available at http://www.moj.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/progress_report/pr_january_december_2016_en.pdf

[7] Ibid.

[8] See Article 111(2)(a) of the Constitution.

[9] The Judicial Service Commission comprises of the Chief Justice and the two most senior Judges of the Supreme Court appointed by the President. See Article 111D of the Constitution.

[10] Clause 12A(7), Judicature Amendment Bill, Published in the Gazette on 6th February 2018, available at http://www.parliament.lk/uploads/bills/gbills/english/6082.pdf

[11] SC SD 7 – 13 of 2018 , available at http://www.parliament.lk/uploads/bills/scdet/6082.pdf

[12] Clause 12A(2), Judicature Amendment Bill, Published in the Gazette on 6th February 2018, available at http://www.parliament.lk/uploads/bills/gbills/english/6082.pdf

[13] SC SD 7 – 13 of 2018 , available at http://www.parliament.lk/uploads/bills/scdet/6082.pdf

[14] Judicial Service Commission comprises of the Chief Justice and the two most senior Judges of the Supreme Court appointed by the President. See Article 111D of the Constitution.

Centre for Policy Alternatives on 6 July, 2018

Civil Society Raises Concerns with the Office for Reparations Bill

The undersigned civil society activists and groups in Sri Lanka express our deep concern with aspects of the draft Bill titled ‘Office for Reparations’ (the Bill) gazetted on 25th June 2018. While the undersigned have several concerns with the process and content of the draft Bill, two issues regarding the powers and functions of the proposed Office stand out as the most pressing concerns. If these are not addressed forthwith, further engagement with the process will be moot. Therefore, we request amendments to the draft Bill to address these issues. We also urge any future action to be preceded by meaningful consultations on the content of the draft Bill allowing civil society and other stakeholders to make further submissions regarding other outstanding concerns.

Paramount concerns regarding the draft Bill are as follows:
1) The proposed Office has no decisional power with respect to policies and guidelines on reparations. In fact, policies and guidelines formulated by the proposed Office will only be adopted upon approval by the Cabinet of Ministers (clause 11(1)(g)). This unnecessary requirement of designating the Cabinet of Ministers as the key decision-maker on the adoption of reparations policies and guidelines is hugely problematic as the latter may delay or even refuse approving the recommended policies on reparations. It can also lead to cabinet approving policies and guidelines in an ad hoc manner, as done in the past, potentially undermining the coherence of the scheme proposed by the Office.

2) Furthermore, according to the draft Bill, policies and guidelines approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and authorizing the disbursement of funds must be placed before Parliament for its approval (clause 22(4)). This procedural requirement is unnecessary and redundant given that the proposed Office has its own Fund for the carrying out of its mandate. Therefore, this adds another unnecessary layer of Parliamentary oversight and thereby further dilutes the Office’s input on reparations policies and guidelines.

These two clauses are cause for grave concern as they take away any decision-making power from the proposed Office regarding the adoption of reparations policies and guidelines. In essence, the inclusion of such problematic clauses reduces the proposed Office to a another bureaucratic layer in the adoption of policies, a far cry from what the proposed Office was meant to be in terms of defining and implementing reparations policies and programmes.

Reparations are a critical component to rebuild the lives of those whose rights have been violated. As such, if properly implemented, reparations will have a significant impact across Sri Lanka. However, for reparations to be transformative, they must be prompt, effective, and inclusive and the process must be transparent. Thus, an independent Office, free from political interference and vested with powers to define and implement reparations is essential. It is in this context that we call on the government to use this opportunity to fulfil their commitments made in 2015, taking note of the findings of the Consultations Task Force (CTF) and enact legislation establishing a mechanism that can fully address the needs of victims across Sri Lanka.

Signatures

Institutions
1. Centre for Equality and Justice
2. Centre for Human Rights and Development
3. Centre for Policy Alternatives
4. Families of the Disappeared
5. Institute of Social Development
6. International Centre for Ethnic Studies
7. Law and Society Trust
8. Mannar Women’s Development Federation
9. Muslim Women Development Trust Puttalam
10. National Fisheries Solidarity Movement
11. National Peace Council
12. Northern Muslim Civil Society
13. Rights Now Collective for Democracy
14. South Asian Centre for Legal Studies
15. Women’s Action Network

People
1. Anushani Alagarajah
2. Asma Rahman
3. Bhavani Fonseka
4. Chulani Kodikara
5. Daya Somasundaram
6. Deanne Uyangoda
7. Dinushika Dissanayake
8. Dylan Perera
9. Isabelle Lassee
10. Juwaira Mohideen
11. Louise Dargan
12. Mahalaxumy Kurushanthan
13. Mario Gomez
14. Medhaka Fernando
15. Nigel Nugawela
16. Nilshan Fonseka
17. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
18. Periyasamy Muthulingam
19. Prabodha Rathnayake
20. Sahira Lafeer
21. Sarah Arumugam
22. Shreen Abdul Saroor
23. Sumika Perera
24. Tanuja Thurairajah
25. Thyagi Ruwanpathirana
26. Uween Jayasinha
27. Father Veeresan Yogeswaran
28. Visaka Dharmadasa

Download in English, Sinhala & Tamil and the list of signatures.

For inquiries or more information on this statement, contact Bhavani Fonseka – [email protected]

Centre for Policy Alternatives on 29 June, 2018

CPA Urges Swift Action in Adherence to the Rule of Law to Address Increase in Violence

29th June 2018, Colombo, Sri Lanka: The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is alarmed by the recent spate of violence in Sri Lanka, including the custodial death this weekend, the death of a police constable and the inability of the authorities to contain the violence and bring perpetrators to justice. These incidents are evocative of a time when excessive force and extrajudicial practices was commonplace, with a complete disregard towards the guarantees provided in the Constitution of Sri Lanka and procedural safeguards. In the absence of swift action where the rule of law is upheld, we fear a slide back towards a society engulfed in violence with a thriving culture of impunity.

According to media reports the most recent custodial death occurred when the victim/accused, under police custody, was shot by the police when he allegedly attempted to throw a hand grenade. This incident is a reminder of several such unsolved incidents of custodial deaths in the past, some dating for over a decade, with similar reports of victims either attempting to attack or escape and being shot at in the process. As reported in the joint civil society submission for Sri Lanka’s Universal Periodic Review in 2017 and other reports, incidents of extrajudicial killings, while reduced from the previous regime, still continue with much work to be done to bring perpetrators to justice.

The present incident also comes at a time when media reports indicate a spike in the number of attacks by underworld gangs alongside the now much-publicised ethno-religious violence in parts of Sri Lanka. Both these phenomena raise the question of the effectiveness of the law and order authorities in Sri Lanka. It is against this backdrop that we were also alarmed to witness a senior member of the Buddhist clergy asking the former Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa to return to power and initiate military rule along the lines of Hitler. Such a reference is a chilling reminder of Sri Lanka’s own dark years when civil liberties were cast aside in the name of national security and public order. As such, the condemnation of this statement by both President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe is welcome, however, inaction in addressing law and order at this juncture will likely see sentiment supportive of authoritarianism resonating among segments in society who prioritise security and order over rights and freedoms.

CPA thus calls on the authorities to demonstrate their commitment towards upholding the rule of law and due process in line with Sri Lanka’s Constitutional and international obligations. This includes not only upholding security and public order, but in ensuring due process to suspects and those under custody. We call on the Inspector General of Police to take full responsibility for the death of a person under the custody of the Police. We further request independent institutions such as the National Police Commission and the National Human Rights Commission to investigate the recent custodial death and initiate necessary action. We reiterate yet again our call to the Attorney General’s Department to hold perpetrators to account with this incident and the many others that are before them. Inability, unwillingness or inertia to take swift action now will not merely reinforce dangerous statements made by others but also send a message that violence and impunity thrive under the Yahapalanaya government.

Download this statement here.

Centre for Policy Alternatives on 23 June, 2018

Civil Society Opposes the Nomination of Dr. Dayan Jayatilleke as Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to Russia

22nd June 2018

Secretary to the High Post Committee
Parliament of Sri Lanka
Sri Jayawardenapura, Kotte

Representations on the Nomination of Dr. Jayatilleke as Ambassador to Russia

The following Sri Lankan civil society activists and organisations are deeply concerned by public reports indicating that the Government of Sri Lanka has proposed the name of Dr. Dayan Jayatilleke to the post of Ambassador to the Russian Federation. We write in response to the public notice dated 12 June 2018 issued by the Committee of the High Post of Parliament of Sri Lanka calling for representations regarding nominations including that of Dr. Jayatilleke.

At the outset it must be noted that Sri Lanka has a rich history of diplomatic engagement with the international community and cultivated standing and respect among its allies across the globe including in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. With the escalation of violence in the early 1980s, the then United Nations Human Rights Commission, and subsequently the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) which replaced the Commission, discussed Sri Lanka’s human rights record where victim groups and civil society were able to make representations and successive governments of Sri Lanka engaged in constructive discussions.

A marked shift in this stance was evident under the Rajapaksa regime when we experienced unprecedented levels of violence targeting civilians, civil society, media and other dissenting voices. It was during this period we witnessed a shift in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. Dr. Jayatilleke who served as Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva at the time, took an aggressive and triumphalist line on the violence unfolding back home. For example, in 2009 a Special Session was called to discuss Sri Lanka and it was under his leadership we witnessed a hostile position taken and the deliberate targeting of those who held a different view to his own. Such a stance created divisions within the UNHRC and undermined Sri Lanka’s reputation of being able to diplomatically engage with the international community. The divisive line has had a lasting impression among missions and other entities in Geneva who remain dismayed by the negative impact the session had on the unity of the UNHRC and its impact on human rights globally.

We also note that the line taken at the Special Session ultimately ran counter to Sri Lanka’s national interests. Professional diplomats have argued convincingly that the line espoused by Dr. Jayatilleke at the 2009 session, and triumphalism about his ability to ‘win’ a resolution congratulatory of Sri Lanka’s execution of the war, galvanised Geneva actors whose concerns had been cast aside by the Sri Lankan delegation. The 2009 Special Session debacle ultimately had a significant impact in convincing the international community including the members of the UNHRC that grave violations took place in Sri Lanka and that an independent international investigation was required. This hostile and triumphalist line was counter productive as it subsequently led to several resolutions being adopted by the UNHRC in 2012, 2013 and 2014. We also note that Dr. Jayatilleke who was subsequently appointed Ambassador to France was unable to prevent the French Government from voting against Sri Lanka in these resolutions, demonstrating his ineffectiveness as a head of mission.

With the political change in 2015, we were relieved to see President Sirisena and the coalition government reverting to a more conciliatory tone where there was recognition of past abuses and the need for genuine reforms towards reconciliation. This was based on human rights being fundamentally a domestic issue, in recognition of the rights of all of Sri Lanka’s citizens rather than a game played with the international community. We were also heartened to see the Government of Sri Lanka rebuilding bridges with the international community and engaging in a constructive manner to further the interests of Sri Lanka, not the whims of particular individuals. This was also welcomed by the international community and in recognition invited President Sirisena to events such as the prestigious Group of Seven (G7) summit in Japan and Anti-Corruption Summit in the United Kingdom both in 2016.

This hard work of rebuilding Sri Lanka’s image and reputation to be a truly democratic and plural country where all citizens are equal and a country that values its international standing can be damaged with the promotion of individuals who were not only apologists of the previous Government but also, to date, its most ardent champions.

We note that Dr Jayatilleke’s ideology and the ideology that shaped the January 8 2015 movement for change are poles apart. Dr. Jayatilleke has denounced the very concept of Yahapalanaya and members of this administration. He has stood stoically against democratic reform and reconciliation initiatives, repeatedly attacking progressive ministers and leaders of the current Government for making concessions to victims of the war, as seen when privately owned land is released by the military or a permanent office to investigate thousands of cases of disappeared is established. Where we fear the violence perpetuated by the previous regime, Dr Jayatilleke openly extols the virtues of ex-President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and his ‘strong-man’ tactics.

On both previous occasions when Dr. Jayatilleke was sent on diplomatic postings, to Geneva and Paris, he furthered a personal agenda which had detrimental consequences to Sri Lanka among its most important allies. If that was the case under the Rajapaksa administration, where Dr. Jayatilleke’s ideological inclinations found resonance, then the potential for damage to this current administration which seemingly does not align with his ethno-nationalist views will be significantly greater.

It is in this context we question the nomination of Dr. Jayatilleke to a senior diplomatic post and urge the High Post Committee to reject the nomination. We also request President Sirisena, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and the coalition government to acknowledge the work done since 2015 to rebuild Sri Lanka’s image and standing internationally and to nominate individuals who are able to best represent the reforms promised in 2015 and not those who deliberately seek to undermine them.

Thank you,

Signatures

Individuals

  1. C. Mohamed Rumaiz
  2. D.J Rajani
  3. L. Ratnayake
  4. Anurasiri Hettige
  5. R.A Ramees
  6. Bennette Ratnayake
  7. Bhavani Fonseka
  8. Bishop Kumara Illangasinghe
  9. Brito Fernando
  10. Ranitha Gnanarajah- Attorney-at-law
  11. Chandra Jayaratne
  12. Chandra Hewa Gallage
  13. Chandraguptha Thenuwara
  14. Cyril Pathiranage
  15. Danesh Casie Chetty
  16. Deekshaya Illangasinghe
  17. Dharmasiri Bandaranayaka
  18. Dileep Rohana
  19. P. Saravanamuttu
  20. Ranjith Pathirana
  21. Faaiz Ameer- Attorney-at-law
  22. Faheema Begum Marsook
  23. Fathima Fayaza
  24. Freddy Gamage
  25. Gamini Viyangoda
  26. Gnaweera Dissanaike
  27. M Premasilee
  28. Harsha Gunasena- Charted Accountant
  29. Harshana Makalanda
  30. Helen de Alwis
  31. Herman Kumara
  32. Subashini
  33. Jayatilleka Bandara
  34. Jayanta de S Wijeratne
  35. Jeanne Samuel
  36. Jeyakanthi Jena
  37. Juwairiya Mohideen
  38. M.D Nilasini
  39. W Janaranjana
  40. Kaushalya Fernando
  41. Keerthi Kariyawasam
  42. Lakshman Gunasekara
  43. Lal Wijenayaka
  44. Lala Hegoda
  45. Lionel Guruge
  46. Lucian Bulathsinhala
  47. Lukshman Mendis
  48. D Mahindapala
  49. Mahaluxmy Karushanthan
  50. Mahesh Senanayaka- Senior Lecturer, Colombo University
  51. Mahinda Ratnayaka
  52. Mangalika Fernando
  53. Marian Pradeepa
  54. Marshal Fernando
  55. Mohammed Dilshan
  56. Mujeebur Rahman
  57. Nigel Nugawela
  58. Nihal Attapattu
  59. Noel Christine Fernando
  60. Manoharan
  61. D. Dissanayake
  62. D. Gunathilaka
  63. Padmini Weerasooriya
  64. Philip Dissanayake
  65. Prabodha Rathnayaka
  66. Prasanga Fernando
  67. Priyadarshani Ebenezer
  68. Arjuna Parakrama
  69. Camena Guneratne
  70. Desmond Mallikarachchi
  71. Jayadeva Uyangoda
  72. Kumar David
  73. Sarath Wijesuriya
  74. Raisa Wickrematunge
  75. Roshaan Hettiaratchi- Attorney-at-law
  76. Saman Ratnapriya
  77. Sampath Samarakoon
  78. Sandun Thudugala
  79. Sandya Ekneligoda
  80. Sanjana Hattotuwa- Senior Researcher, Centre for Policy Alternatives
  81. Sarah Arumugam- Attorney-at-law
  82. Seetha Gamage
  83. Shaheera Lafeer
  84. Shanthi Dissanayaka
  85. Shreen Saroor
  86. Sumika Perera
  87. Sumathipala Kariyawasam
  88. Sunil Perera- Gypsies
  89. Titus Fernando
  90. Tharanga L. Patabandhi
  91. Upul Kumarapperuma
  92. Dhambara Amila Thero
  93. Mahagalkadawala Pungnasara Thero
  94. Visaka Dharmadasa

Organisations

  1. Association of War Affected Women
  2. Centre for Policy Alternatives
  3. Families of the Disappeared
  4. Janasansadaya
  5. Mothers and Daughters of Lanka
  6. Muslim Women’s Development Trust, Puttalam
  7. Northern Muslim Civil Society
  8. Northern Muslim Forum
  9. Platform for Freedom
  10. Rights Now Collective for Democracy
  11. South Asian Centre for Legal Studies
  12. Women’s Action Network
  13. Women’s Centre
  14. Women’s Resource Centre, Kurunegala

 

Download the statement in English and Sinhala, and the full list of signatures here.

Centre for Policy Alternatives on 6 June, 2018

Meeriyabedda to Makaldeniya: Life after the Landslide

The Meeriyabedda-Koslanda landslide of October 2014 drew national attention both for the massive destruction it caused and for the gaps it exposed in Sri Lanka’s disaster response mechanisms.

The subsequent resettlement efforts and updating of relief and response protocols have been hailed by the government as comprehensive and effective. More than three years after the disaster took place, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) spoke with government officials, relief officers and affected families who have been resettled in Makaldeniya during a visit to the Badulla district. Their experiences highlight the attempts to improve the system, but also expose the challenges that remain.

A new report published by CPA highlights the current ad-hoc nature of reparations and stresses the need for a comprehensive response mechanism. This should incorporate victim concerns and also streamline the activities of the relevant authorities for faster action in an emergency. Until such a system comes into place and is fully implemented, victims of disasters – natural or man-made – will continue to face more hardship in the aftermath.

Access the story directly on Adobe Spark here or view embedded below.

Meeriyabedda to Makaldeniya

Centre for Policy Alternatives on 4 June, 2018

Making the Case for an Office for Reparations

June 4th 2018, Colombo, Sri Lanka: Reparations are an essential part of transitional justice and focus on recognising and repairing past abuses. In 2015, the Government of Sri Lanka recognised the right to reparations by committing to the establishment of an Office for Reparations through at the 30th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) through UNHRC Resolution 30/1. Despite this commitment, there has been no real movement on this issue with limited discussions on reparations and the scope of such an entity.

In this paper, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) focuses on the need for reparations in Sri Lanka and areas to consider in the establishment and operationalizing of a future Office. CPA makes the case that the design and implementation of a future Office and a reparations programme must be reflective of the Sri Lankan context and the grievances of its multiple and diverse victims. This is critical in a context where CPA’s research demonstrates discrepancies in the process and amounts allocated for compensation previously. Equally important is for reparations to be designed in a transparent and inclusive manner, being explicit about its purpose and ensuring that it is not a substitute to the other pillars of transitional justice. Finally, CPA urges a reparations programme be based on a rights framework to ensure cohesion.

Download the report in English here.

Centre for Policy Alternatives on 30 May, 2018

Survey on the Implementation of Official Languages Policy at Ministerial Level in Sri Lanka – 2017

May 30th 2018, Colombo, Sri Lanka: Language is fundamental to human communication and a key marker of identity. Accordingly, it is essential that the language rights of every citizen of Sri Lanka is upheld. The failure to do so will adversely impact the enjoyment of full and equal citizenship, meaningful reconciliation and national unity as well as the quality of governance and the legitimacy of government.

The active involvement and effective contribution of all ministries, departments, and the administrative structure of the local government authorities are essential for the effective and efficient implementation of Sri Lanka’s Official Languages Policy. This policy ensures that Sri Lankan citizens have access to services and institutions in their own language.

The foremost responsibility for proper implementation of the Official Languages Policy has been placed on officials identified in each institution, including Chief Secretaries, Secretaries, departmental heads, and Municipal Commissioners, as outlined by the Extraordinary Gazette notification No. 1620/27 dated 2009.09.25 and the Administrative Circular No. 18/2009 dated 2009.11.25 respectively.

Accordingly, the Ministry of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official Languages has designed a guideline for developing ‘Language Plans’ for all government institutions. This focuses on four key lenses through which the proper implementation of Official Languages Policy can be ensured.

These are Visibility and Ambiance, Administration and Documentation, Service Delivery and Institutional Commitment and Support Mechanism.

This survey focused on the extent to which each of the ministries adopted these lenses when implementing the Official Languages Policy, and the core challenges and issues faced in doing so.

Download this report in English Tamil Sinhala.

For more information around the report, please contact Mr. Lionel Guruge – [email protected]