The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is deeply concerned about the emerging institutional deadlock between the President and the Constitutional Council in respect of the appointment of the Auditor General. Sri Lanka has not had a permanent Auditor General since the retirement of Chulantha Wickramaratne in April 2025. In the period since, according to reports, the President has made four nominations to the post, which have all been rejected by the Constitutional Council.
The office of Auditor General is pivotal to the institutional framework of public financial integrity established by Articles 153 and 154 of the Constitution and the National Audit Act No 19 of 2018 (as amended by National Audit (Amendment) Act No 19 of 2025). The absence of a stable office-holder in the post for a period of over nine months causes serious concerns about the functionality of our system of public financial accountability. The absence of an Auditor General not only disrupts the normal processes of the national audit, but it also affects the capacity of Parliament and its committees on public accounts and public enterprises to carry out their constitutionally fundamental scrutiny and accountability functions. This concern is heightened in the context of the need for rigorous supervision of public expenditures, and methods of reception and allocation, involved in rebuilding efforts in the wake of Cyclone Ditwah.
The function of the Constitutional Council is to ensure the President’s nominations to the office of Auditor General meets the formal standards of independence, integrity, and professional competence established by the Constitution and the National Audit Act. The Constitutional Council is a collegiate body composed of cross-party political representatives and independent civil society representatives appointed, except for the ex officio members, predominantly by consensus. Its composition is designed to protect its decision-making from being hijacked by either the Government or the Opposition for partisan purposes. The expectation of respect for the decisions of the Constitutional Council by the President is not only central to the de-politicisation logic that underpins our ‘fourth branch’ institutions. It is also a rare but significant corrective to the overcentralisation of power and authority in the person and office of the President in our semi-presidential system of government. In view of its consensual and inclusive composition and its decentralised procedures of decision-making, the public can assume with a high degree of confidence that the Constitutional Council’s repeated rejections of the President’s nominations to fill the vacancy in the office of Auditor General were because such nominations did not meet the required constitutional and statutory standards.
In our system, the constitutional and moral responsibility for ensuring a successful and expeditious appointment, by securing the mandatory approval of the Constitutional Council, to a vacancy in the office of Auditor General lies squarely with the President. The President’s failure to secure the approval of the Constitutional Council through four unsuccessful nomination attempts over the course of nine months suggests a lack of constitutional competence in the advice he has so far received in the making of such nominations. If deadlock persists, it may even give rise to suspicions of bad faith on the part of the President.
This would be a regrettable outcome, not only for the quality of our public financial governance, but also for the reputation of a President elected on an explicit mandate to implement a ‘system change’ towards greater transparency and accountability in our culture of governance, and whose official biography proudly proclaims that in 2001 he “played a pivotal role in the adoption of the [Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution]” which first established the Constitutional Council and the independent commissions.