Colombo, 15 June 2026
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is deeply concerned by recent reports concerning purported proposals by the NPP Government to amend the Constitution, which raise profound questions about the integrity of Sri Lanka’s constitutional order, including the independence of the judiciary and the proper use of constitutional amendment powers.
In a report by its News Editor (Sinhala version published on 10 June 2026, followed by an English version on 11 June), entitled “The Recurring Drama of Constitutional Amendments for Personal Gain,” the Anidda newspaper states:
“President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government is reportedly planning to introduce a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of superior court judges. This amendment is expected to allow the current Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena to remain in office for another two years. If passed, it would become the 22nd Amendment to the 1978 Constitution. The proposal has already drawn strong opposition from lawyers concerned about judicial independence and constitutional traditions.”
CPA notes that the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) has already rightly decried this move in strong and unambiguous terms. We share and endorse these concerns.
A constitutional amendment that alters a core institutional feature of the judiciary, particularly one designed to affect tenure, is not a neutral or technical adjustment. Security of tenure is a central pillar of judicial independence in our common law tradition, originating in principles established in key cases such as the Case of Prohibitions del Roy (1607), Dr Bonham’s Case (1610), Case of Proclamations (1611), Bushell’s Case (1670), and Entick v Carrington (1765), and subsequently enshrined in statute and constitutional instruments, including in Sri Lanka since the Charter of Justice (1801). In numerous cases, including Attorney General v Silva (1953), Liyanage v The Queen (1967), Joseph Perera v Attorney General (1992), Premachandra v Jayawickrema (1994), Chandrasoma v Senathirajah (1997), and various special determinations on constitutional amendment bills, our courts have consistently reaffirmed the main principle of judicial independence and impartiality, and its several supplementary principles, such as security of tenure.
These constitutional principles, which work not merely to restrain the dismissal of judges who displease the executive but also to extensions in office of judges who do the bidding of the executive, ensure that judges are insulated from political pressure and can decide cases impartially, without fear of reward or sanction. When the tenure of a sitting Chief Justice is extended through a constitutional amendment tailored to benefit specific individuals in office or their policy for the time being (in this case the incumbent President and Chief Justice), it inevitably gives rise to the perception – and risk – of executive influence over the judiciary. It suggests that continuance in office may depend on political favour rather than constitutional principle, thereby undermining public confidence in judicial impartiality.
Moreover, such an amendment would fundamentally alter the established understanding that constitutional provisions governing judicial tenure are general, prospective, and impersonal. Departing from this norm to enact a measure that benefits an incumbent office-holder transforms a constitutional mechanism into an instrument of personalisation. This damages not only the independence of the individual office but also the integrity of the institution as a whole.
CPA is also deeply concerned by the use of the executive presidency and its parliamentary majority to effect such a change. While the Constitution provides procedures for amendment, these procedures are not intended to be used as tools for advancing narrow or personalised objectives. Constitutional amendment powers are entrusted to the political branches for the purpose of responding to genuine institutional or societal needs, and must be exercised in good faith and in accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism. The use of these powers to secure the extension of tenure of a particular office-holder constitutes an illegitimate use of constitutional authority. It represents a distortion of the amendment process, undermining its normative legitimacy and eroding constitutional culture.
Such a measure would also be wholly inconsistent with Commonwealth principles on judicial independence, to which Sri Lanka, as a founding member of the modern Commonwealth in 1949, has repeatedly committed itself. Foundational Commonwealth instruments – including the Latimer House Principles (2003) – affirm that judicial appointments, tenure, and removal must be governed by transparent, principled processes that safeguard independence and avoid both actual and perceived political interference. The Latimer House Principles emphasise that security of tenure must be preserved and that any changes to judicial conditions of service must not be made in a way that compromises judicial independence or benefits particular individuals. These principles are widely affirmed in case law from across the Commonwealth and across time, including McCawley v The King (1920), Hinds v The Queen (1977), Valente v The Queen (1985), Re The Remuneration of Judges (1997), and Mackin v New Brunswick (2002).
The reported proposal would also damage the institutional fabric of the Supreme Court, the oldest continuously functioning branch of the Sri Lankan state, whose origins date back to the aforementioned Charter of Justice (1801), and continued without interruption in subsequent imperial as well as post-colonial constitutional instruments. Over more than two centuries, as a result, the Sri Lankan people have become accustomed to seeing the courts as their principal institutional guardian of the rule of law and constitutional government. Measures that introduce uncertainty, politicisation, or personalised considerations into the tenure of its leadership risk undermining its authority, legitimacy, and historical continuity.
Both the process and the substance of the reported amendment are deeply violative of the republican values on which the 1978 Constitution is based. The republican principle underpinning our constitutional order requires public power to be exercised in trust for the common good of the people of Sri Lanka, in accordance with law, and without arbitrariness or personalisation. It demands institutional integrity, the separation of powers in terms established by Article 3 and 4, and checks against the concentration or abuse of authority. Executive-driven manipulation of constitutional amendment procedures, particularly for the purpose of influencing the tenure of the head of the judiciary, is fundamentally inconsistent with these values. Equally, any interference – direct or indirect – with judicial independence strikes at the heart of the republican ideal of a government of laws, not of persons.
Indeed, the effects of a constitutional amendment in terms currently contemplated could have wider and unintended ramifications beyond the judiciary. In a recent essay for the Jaffna Monitor, Professor G.L. Peiris has argued that the stability and independence of the public service as well as the principle of equality and non-discrimination may be adversely affected by this proposed change.
It was precisely because Sri Lankans were fed up with the unconstitutional and self-aggrandising behaviour of past Presidents and Governments that Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP were elected to implement the Aragalaya’s call for “system change” and restore good governance in 2024. To witness this Government also – so soon and so effortlessly – going down the path-dependent patterns of previous governments is therefore a particularly appalling example of hypocrisy.