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The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is an independent, non-partisan organization that focuses primarily on issues of governance and conflict resolution. Formed in 1996 in the firm belief that the vital contribution of civil society to the public policy debate is in need of strengthening, CPA is committed to programmes of research and advocacy through which public policy is critiqued, alternatives identified and disseminated.
Map of Sri Lanka
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Centre for Policy Alternatives
The challenge facing post-war Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE is to move to a post–
conflict situation defined as one in which at a basic minimum, the causes of conflict are not
sustained and certainly not re-produced. This requires the prioritisation of establishing a
democratic peace with governance and reconciliation between the peoples of Sri Lanka, which
will cement national unity amongst them. Accordingly a political settlement of the ethnic conflict
is a necessary condition for this and given the focus of current debate on the Thirteenth
Amendment, the system of provincial devolution it provides for is particularly pertinent to Sri
Lanka overcoming this challenge.

In recognition of this, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in its research on constitutional
reform and peace has focused on provincial councils with the objective of recording the
experience of devolution and of identifying ways in which it can be strengthened, if it is to be the
basis for a durable and democratic peace in Sri Lanka. In 2008, CPA published a study titled
Strengthening the Provincial Council System, which recorded the views and suggestions of
key provincial actors including Chief Ministers, Leaders of the Opposition and Chief Secretaries.
This study expands on it through a legal and constitutional analysis of provincial devolution with
reference to the Eastern Province by Asanga Welikala, Senior Researcher in the Legal and
Constitutional Unit of CPA. Part 2 of the study presents the views and perspectives of elected
officials, the bureaucracy and public of the Eastern Province on their experience of devolution.

The Eastern Provincial Council is significant for a number of reasons in the context of the
challenge of moving to a post-conflict situation. The Thirteenth Amendment and the devolution it
provided for was meant fundamentally as a mechanism to resolve the ethnic conflict within the
unitary state of Sri Lanka. It was established throughout the country in 1988, including in the
merged Northeastern Province. The experience of provincial devolution there resulted in the
Council unilaterally declaring independence and as a consequence being dismissed by the
President. For years the Northeastern Province did not have an elected Council and the province
itself was de-merged by a decision of the Supreme Court in 2006. Following the defeat of the
LTTE in the East in 2007, elections to the Eastern Provincial Council were held in 2008, giving
rise to expectations that provincial devolution in the post-LTTE and significantly multi-ethnic East
would prove to be a show case of provincial devolution and democratic governance in a post-
war, post-LTTE Sri Lanka set firmly on the path of peace, reconciliation and unity.

This has yet to be demonstrated. In the East as elsewhere in the country, the experience of
devolution has had mixed results, largely on account of the political culture of centralisation and
its impact on the political commitment to devolution – its design and operation. There are
particular problems in the East compounding this generic challenge to devolution in Sri Lanka,
resulting in a sense of frustration. This frustration has to be addressed and prevented from
compounding in turn, the post-conflict challenge delineated above. A repetition of this in the
North where elections are widely expected to be held over the course of the next year, will result
in the two provinces of the North and East being politically unsettled and adversely impact on reconciliation and unity.

The CPA studies on the provincial council system are presented as constructive contributions to the ongoing debate on constitutional reform and peace in Sri Lanka in the firm belief that the present post-war situation provides an unprecedented opportunity for the honest and unbiased appraisal of our structures of governance and their reform that is necessary if we are to realise the post-conflict promise.

Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
Executive Director
PART I – Devolution within the Unitary State

A Constitutional Assessment of the Thirteenth Amendment with reference to the experience in the Eastern Province

Asanga Welikala

1 Thanks to my colleagues Manjula Gajanayake, Nigel Nugawela, and Lionel Guruge, and several others in Trincomalee.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With the conclusion of Sri Lanka’s war, attention has focused on the prospects for a new constitutional settlement addressing the political aspirations and grievances of all Sri Lankans that lay at the heart of the conflict. Several constitutional and legal reform issues were raised in the *Mahinda Chinthana Idiri Dekma*, President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s manifesto for the presidential election of January 2010. The manifesto set out an unequivocal commitment to the maintenance of the unitary structure of the state; which therefore affirmed that any future changes in relation to the devolution of power would be within the parameters of the unitary state. It is not clear, however, whether the government intends introducing a new constitution with these changes or whether they will be enacted by way of amendments to the existing constitution and laws. The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) appointed by the President in 2006 to generate a consensus on constitutional reform recommendations has reported to the President. Following the overwhelming majority obtained by the UPFA in the parliamentary election in April 2010, there have been some indications in the press that the government intends initiating some reforms but the exact nature of these remain unclear.

The elected Eastern Provincial Council has now been in operation for a period of two years. The government declared the Eastern Province cleared of the LTTE in July 2007, and elections to the Eastern Provincial Council were held in May 2008. Earlier in October 2006, the Supreme Court had held that the arrangement under which the Northern and Eastern Provinces had functioned as one administrative unit (as the North-Eastern Province) since 1987 to be invalid. Consequently, the two Provinces were administratively separated in January 2007. In any event, since the dissolution of the elected North-Eastern Provincial Council in July 1990 in controversial circumstances, there had been no elected Council, and the provincial administration of the two Provinces functioned through the exercise of powers by the Governor. In the May 2008 elections, the UPFA won the majority of seats (returning 20 members) in the new Eastern Provincial Council (comprising 37 elected Provincial Councillors) entitling it to form the provincial administration. Accordingly, Mr. Sivanesathurai Santhirakanthan became Chief Minister of the new provincial administration. The Eastern Provincial Council assembled for the first time in June 2008. The Governor, Rear Admiral (Retd.) Mohan Wijewickrema, continued in office.

President Rajapaksa’s government has showcased the Eastern Province both as an example of the post-war re-establishment of democracy and devolution in the war-torn areas as well as a site of its major development and reconstruction programmes. It has stated that the Eastern Province is a model for the establishment of the Northern Provincial Council in the near future. For these reasons, the experience of devolution in the Eastern Province assumes special significance, both as an indication of the government’s intentions, as well as for assessing the wider implications of the Provincial Councils system as a constitutional framework for devolution.
and power-sharing. While the system of devolution to the provinces was introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1987 (and attendant legislation) primarily as a response to the demands for autonomy from the North and East, it is in those areas that it remained mostly unimplemented during the period between 1990 and 2008.

The implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment in other provinces has yielded a mixed experience of devolution during the past 22 years, and it is therefore both necessary and relevant that an assessment is made of the experience of the Eastern Province in the last two years in the light of the longer history. Such an assessment can be expected to provide insights not only in relation to the Thirteenth Amendment structure, and comparison and contrast with the experience of the older Provincial Councils, but also help identify the challenges and opportunities present in the anticipated extension of this scheme to the Northern Province.

In 2008, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) facilitated a major project of evaluation of shared and individual experiences of devolution by the Provincial Councils themselves. That project culminated in a comprehensive publication outlining the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and the means of overcoming them as articulated by the Provincial Councils. The present study focusing on the Eastern Province is very much a continuation of that interest in the function of devolution, although the methodology used is different from the 2008 project. Unlike in 2008 when CPA functioned primarily as a facilitator and resource provider, the present study is an independent analysis and assessment by CPA of the devolution experience in the Eastern Province. However, the central presumption and focus of both is the same: the better implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which contemplates legislative and administrative changes, but without any further constitutional changes or the introduction of an altogether new system of devolution.

The study is comprised of two parts representing qualitative and quantitative components. The first part is a legal and constitutional assessment of the structural framework of the Thirteenth Amendment and the animating practices through which it functions. It is therefore not merely a textual consideration of the applicable laws and constitutional provisions, and their judicial and administrative interpretation over time, but also a political appraisal of practices and patterns of behaviour of the relevant institutional actors, on the basis of which recommendations for changes in the statutory framework and administrative practices will be made. The concrete experience of the Eastern Province, constituting the basis for the analysis and the recommendations, was gathered through a comprehensive series of interviews with provincial officials in mid to late 2009. Views expressed in these interviews are not attributed individually.

A note of explanation with regard to the purposes of the first part is necessary. During the course of the CPA's interactions with provincial officials and civil society in the Eastern Province during 2009, two rationales for a constitutional study became clear. The first was an independent, analytical report of the functioning of devolution in the Province; second, the need for an accessible, yet comprehensive guide to the constitutional and legal framework which governs devolution, especially in the Sinhala and Tamil languages. While there have been a number of recent publications dealing with the Thirteenth Amendment, they have all been lawyerly treatises.
presupposing a measure of technical knowledge in their readers rather than being directed at the general public or political practitioners of devolution. Moreover, these are available only in the English language. Finally, while there is a sound body of institutional knowledge with regard to the legal, political and administrative issues relating to devolution especially among more experienced members of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service serving at both provincial and national levels, this expertise is not evenly distributed.

These two motivations do not necessarily constitute a coherent basis for a single publication. Since there was no possibility of two separate publications, the best attempt has been made to unite the two objectives here. As a result, however, much of the commentary on the constitutional and legal provisions on devolution would be of intrinsic use to those interested in the system of devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment more generally and beyond the Eastern Province.

The second part of this study is an examination, using a combination of survey methods, of perceptions and attitudes to the structures and practices of devolution on the part not only of institutional actors – elected and administrative officials – concerned with the implementation of devolution, but also the general public of the Eastern Province for whose benefit, in the final analysis, the system should actually function. The methodology of the survey is provided at the beginning of Part II.

As CPA’s previous publication, *Strengthening the Provincial Council System* (2008) showed, notwithstanding disparities in the political and economic contexts between provinces, there is a remarkable similarity of devolution issues, encompassing constitutional, legislative, administrative and political matters that confront all Provincial Councils. Therefore, it could be expected that lessons from the experience of the Eastern Province would have wider relevance and application in other provinces as well.
CHAPTER 2
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: DEVOLUTION WITHIN THE UNITARY STATE

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the structure of devolution as established by the Thirteenth Amendment in outline, and to place it in its political context. This involves a consideration not only of the institutions established by the Thirteenth Amendment at the provincial level and their powers and functions, but also the way in which they relate to and interact with the central government institutions which pre-exist Provincial Councils. A more complete understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment also calls for a consideration of the constitutional principles and values that underpin the broader scheme of the Constitution of 1978, in particular the relationship between the principle of devolution and that of the unitary state. The political context of competing ethno-territorial claims, as an aspect of which devolution came to be introduced in Sri Lanka, including the rationale for the ‘merger’ and subsequent ‘de-merger’ of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and how that context shaped the system embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment and its accompanying legislation, is central to a fuller understanding of devolution.

The Thirteenth Amendment: Devolution within the Unitary State

The second republican Constitution of 1978, like its predecessor the first republican Constitution of 1972, expressly provides in Article 2 that ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka is a Unitary State.’ While there are many definitions of ‘unitary state’, it is generally meant to describe a state, or category of constitution, that centralises sovereignty and power in a single institution or level of government. Federations, which involve the sharing of sovereignty and power between multiple orders of government, are traditionally understood by lawyers and political scientists as being the conceptual opposite of the unitary state. However, measures for the decentralisation of power are to be found in almost all unitary states nowadays, although the rationales for decentralisation differ between countries. They continue to be distinguishable from federations because the central government in unitary states remains the pre-eminent level of government in day-to-day administration and, critically, retains the power to revoke any devolution or decentralisation unilaterally. Thus unlike in federations, which typically require the consent of both central and provincial governments for constitutional changes affecting the distribution of powers between them, in a unitary state the central government has the power to do so on its own, and even against the wishes of the provinces. The Supreme Court dealt with these major constitutional questions in its determination on the constitutionality of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1987.
Prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, Sri Lanka was an archetypal unitary state, in which legislative power was exercised by Parliament, executive power by the President, and judicial power through courts.\(^2\) While Sri Lanka has a long tradition of local government dating from the colonial period,\(^3\) there had never been a tier of government established for the provincial level even for administrative purposes. Therefore the principle of devolution, involving elected institutions of government at the provincial level empowered to exercise legislative and executive powers, was something that was novel to the centralised, unitary constitutional tradition in Sri Lanka.

The rationale for centralising power and authority was initially dictated by colonial policy considerations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the unitary form of the state was continued after independence. However, soon after independence, the principal demand for the decentralisation of power came in the form of the desire of the Tamil people for territorial autonomy in the northern and eastern areas of the island within the framework of a federal Sri Lankan constitution. Throughout the post-independence years this issue dominated politics in Sri Lanka, and by the 1970s, in the absence of any success in securing federal autonomy, Tamil nationalism had taken to the espousal of a separate Tamil state in the North and East. By 1980s the unresolved claims to power-sharing reached a situation of serious armed conflict between the state and Tamil militant groups.

In one Indian facilitated initiative to find a political resolution to the conflict, in Thimpu, Bhutan, in July 1985, Tamil nationalist groups collectively articulated a set of four ‘cardinal principles’ as the basis of a new constitutional settlement. These were:

1. The recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality;
2. The recognition of a Tamil traditional homeland in the North and East;
3. Based on (1) and (2), the recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; and
4. The recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the island as their country.

While these demands (which came to be known as the ‘Thimpu Principles’) were rejected by the government of Sri Lanka as constituting a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, Indian facilitated initiatives involving both governments and Tamil groups aimed at a political resolution to the conflict continued. These Indian initiatives culminated in 1987 in the Indo-Lanka Accord between the two governments.

While the political pressure for devolution came from the dynamics of Tamil nationalism, when pursuant to the Indo-Lanka Accord devolution was introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it was felt by President Jayewardene’s government that it would be politically more feasible to introduce devolution to all provinces rather than as a special arrangement for

\(^2\) Article 4 of the Constitution

\(^3\) And indeed as it has been pointed out, an even older pre-colonial tradition of village level governance: see for e.g., Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms (1999), Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1999 (Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka), also known as the ‘Abhayewardhana Report’ after its chairman.
the Northern and Eastern Provinces alone. It was thus that Provincial Councils were established for all provinces, even though there had been no desire for devolution in areas outside the North and East.

It is important to note, however, that the Provincial Council system has now become an accepted part of the structure of the state in all parts of the island. Even parties that are opposed to devolution participate in elections and governance at the provincial level. While a critical debate continues in post-war Sri Lanka – both about the broader principle of devolution as well as the particular form and extent of devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment – there seems to be little likelihood at this point of constitutional reforms, either to enhance provincial autonomy, or as some argue, for the abolition of Provincial Councils.

2.1 The Indo-Lanka Accord

The ‘Indo-Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka’ was signed by the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and the President of Sri Lanka, J.R. Jayewardene, on 29th July 1987 at Colombo. Commonly known as the Indo-Lanka Accord, this international bilateral agreement addressed a number of issues pertaining to the resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka. In regard to constitutional reforms, it contained a joint declaration of the broad principles of a new settlement, and it committed Sri Lanka to establish a system of devolution to Provincial Councils. This was enacted by way of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987, on 14th November 1987, and other enabling legislation that followed.

Given that the Indo-Lanka Accord set out the political rationales and principles of the new settlement of devolution, it is useful to recapitulate what it contemplated. Clauses 1.1 to 1.5 set out the basic principles as follows:

1. To preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;
2. Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors), and Burghers;
3. Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;
4. Recognising that the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;
5. To strengthen the forces of unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations.

These principles taken together articulate a certain constitutional vision for Sri Lanka. It recognised the legitimate concern of the state, and indeed, the majority Sinhalese and even the
Muslims, that Sri Lanka should remain a united country. However, it also recognised the fundamentally plural character of Sri Lankan society, comprised of diverse ethnicities, cultures, languages and religions, which require protection on a basis of equality. Together with the proposed devolution of powers allowing for a measure of self-government in the North and East, the major concession to Tamil nationalism (although not all Tamil nationalists saw it that way) was in Clause 1.4 in which it was recognised that, “the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples”. This was an attempt to accommodate the concept of the Tamil traditional homeland, but in a way which made it more acceptable to the Sinhalese and Muslims.

The Indo-Lanka Accord made official the various proposals that had already been under discussion between the two governments and Tamil groups in 1986 as to the shape and form of devolved institutions in the North and East, with a commitment to their expeditious finalisation. It also provided for the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into one administrative unit, subject to the ratification of such merger by the people of the Eastern Province in a referendum. The two merged provinces would constitute the territorial basis of a single North-Eastern Provincial Council, with one Governor, one Chief Minister and Board of Ministers. This was the concrete institutional form by which the contiguous areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples was recognised.

While India secured the support of most of the Tamil parties and groups for this framework, it would soon become clear that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was not committed to it. The LTTE subsequently militarily engaged the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) sent to guarantee the implementation of the Accord. While the main Tamil political party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) asked the Tamil people to participate in the forthcoming elections to the new North-Eastern Provincial Council, it did not itself participate in the process, and also pointed out various deficiencies in the proposed system. In particular, it was concerned about the impermanent nature of the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which was a fundamental principle of Tamil nationalism. In the circumstances, it fell to the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF, together with its ally, the ENDLF) to contest the elections and give leadership to the implementation of the new devolved institutions. Elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council took place on 19th November 1988, and the new Provincial Council assembled in Trincomalee on 17th December 1988, at which the first policy statement of the new EPRLF administration headed by Chief Minister A. Varatharajaperumal was presented.

The short experience of the EPRLF in seeking to implement devolution proved to be unsuccessful due to a variety of reasons, including the absence of political will on the part of the central government to meaningfully share power and implement the constitutional provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, and a deterioration of the security situation and its political ramifications in Tamil politics, including in terms of pressures on the EPRLF provincial administration. On 1st March 1990, Chief Minister Varatharajaperumal, moved a resolution in the North-Eastern Provincial Council which sought in effect to convert the Council into a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution for an ‘Eelam Democratic Republic’. The government of Sri Lanka regarded this as an attempt at a unilateral declaration of independence. In July 1990,
Parliament passed an amendment to the Provincial Councils Act, which provided for the dissolution of a Provincial Council in which more than half its members had expressly repudiated or manifestly disavowed obedience to the Constitution, upon a communication to that effect from the Governor to the President. With this the first elected North-Eastern Provincial Council stood legally dissolved.

Among the Sinhalese, it was clear that there was vehement opposition not only to the content of the proposals in the Indo-Lanka Accord, but also what was perceived to be Indian interference in Sri Lanka’s internal conflict. Except for some Left parties and human rights organisations, all of the main political parties in the South including the principal parliamentary opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) opposed both the Accord and devolution. Even within the governing United National Party (UNP), the Accord created deep divisions with senior members of the government including Prime Minister R. Premadasa and Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali conspicuously dissociating themselves from the initiative. The SLFP led the legal challenge before the Supreme Court to the Thirteenth Amendment in October 1987.

2.2 In Re the Thirteenth Amendment: the Supreme Court Determination

The proposed scheme of devolution and other matters such as changes to the official language policy were embodied in two Bills: the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill and the Provincial Councils Bill. The devolution framework and consequential amendments to the Constitution were set out in the Thirteenth Amendment Bill. The more detailed statutory framework of devolution was set out in the Provincial Councils Bill.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of the two Bills was invoked by the President and 48 other petitioners. Under Article 121 of the Constitution, the President or any citizen may invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine whether any Bill is inconsistent with the Constitution. Ordinary laws may be made, amended or repealed by a simple majority in Parliament. However, the amendment of the Constitution requires special majorities to be obtained. These special procedures exist to ensure that constitutional amendment is not taken lightly, and that a high degree of consensus is obtained before changes are made to the supreme law of the land.

Before the special procedure in Article 154G (2) was introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment, the Constitution of 1978 set out two procedures for its valid amendment. The first procedure requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The second procedure requires the approval of the people at a referendum in addition to a two-thirds majority in Parliament. In other words, all amendments to the Constitution require to be passed by a two-thirds majority, and some types
of amendments also require a referendum (except the category of constitutional amendments falling within the ambit of Article 154G (2) (a)).

In terms of Article 120, in the case of a Bill expressly seeking to amend the Constitution, the Supreme Court must determine whether the Bill requires to be approved by the people at a referendum, in addition to it being passed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The Supreme Court must determine whether the Bill has the effect of amending any of the ‘entrenched’ provisions mentioned in Article 83. If in the opinion of the Supreme Court the Bill affects any of those entrenched provisions, a referendum becomes necessary.

Among the provisions entrenched in Article 83 are Articles 2 and 3, which some petitioners in the Thirteenth Amendment case argued were affected by the provisions of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment and Provincial Councils Bills. Article 2 provides that ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka is a Unitary State’. Article 3 states that ‘In the Republic of Sri Lanka, sovereignty is in the People and is inalienable. Sovereignty includes the powers of government, fundamental rights and the franchise.’ Thus two of the main questions put to the Supreme Court in this case were whether devolution in the form set out in the two impugned Bills was inconsistent with Sri Lanka being a unitary state, and whether the devolution of legislative and powers to Provincial Councils was an unconstitutional alienation of the sovereignty of the people. If the Supreme Court determined that devolution in terms of the two Bills affected the unitary state and the sovereignty of the people in a material way, then a referendum would become necessary in addition to a two-thirds majority in Parliament to validly enact them.

In view of the political and constitutional significance of the matter, the Chief justice nominated a full bench of all nine judges of the Supreme Court to hear the case. Chief Justice Sharvananda and two other judges, Justices Colin-Thomé and Atukorale, held that the Thirteenth Amendment Bill did not require a referendum and once the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted by Parliament, the Provincial Councils Bill would also be constitutional. One judge, Justice Ranasinghe, agreed with this view, but held that two clauses of the Thirteenth Amendment Bill would require a referendum. Three other judges, Justices Wanasundera, de Alwis, Seneviratne and de Silva, held that the two Bills required a referendum. The government deleted the two clauses which Justice Ranasinghe held to require a referendum, thereby securing a majority for the view that neither Bill required a referendum, and proceeded to enact both Bills, which were both certified as validly enacted on 14th November 1987.5

Thus the requirement of a referendum was averted only with the narrowest of majorities in the Supreme Court. It was widely regarded that, given the hostility among the Sinhalese in particular to both measures as well as the Indian role, the devolution measures had a high possibility of being defeated in a referendum. The argument was that the introduction of such a fundamental restructuring of the state without consulting the people at a referendum was anti-democratic. Another factor that eroded the legitimacy of the Thirteenth Amendment was that the two-thirds majority that the government of President Jayewardene enjoyed in Parliament, which enabled it to pass the Thirteenth Amendment, was itself questionable. While the UNP had won a landslide

5 The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987
five-sixths majority in the general elections of 1977 (under the previous first-past-the-post electoral system), the life of that Parliament had been extended in 1982 by way of a referendum rather than fresh elections in what was universally regarded as a wholly indefensible act of democratic manipulation.

In coming to their conclusion that the system of devolution sought to be introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment was consistent with the Constitution, the majority of judges had to interpret Articles 2 and 3 – and define the concept of the unitary state and the location of sovereignty – in view of the argument that the proposed structure was federal or quasi-federal in nature. The judgment of the majority provided the following definitions:

“The term ‘unitary’ in Article 2 is used in contradistinction to the term ‘Federal’ which means an association of semi-autonomous units with a distribution of sovereign powers between the units and the centre. In a Unitary State the national government is legally supreme over all other levels. The essence of a Unitary State is that the sovereignty is undivided, in other words, that the powers of the central government are unrestricted. The two essential qualities of a Unitary State are (1) the supremacy of the central Parliament and (2) the absence of subsidiary sovereign bodies. It does not mean the absence of subsidiary law-making bodies, but it does mean that, they may exist and can be abolished at the discretion of the central authority.”

On the other hand, in a Federal State the field of government is divided between the Federal and State governments which are not subordinate one to another, but are co-ordinate and independent within the sphere allotted to them. The existence of co-ordinate authorities independent of each other is the gist of the federal principle. The Federal government is sovereign in some matters and the State governments are sovereign in others. Each within its own spheres exercise its powers without control from the other and neither is subordinate to the other. It is this feature which distinguishes a Federal from a unitary Constitution. In the latter sovereignty rests only with the central government.”

Considering the structure of devolution set out in the two Bills against this conceptual definition of unitary and federal constitutions, the majority judgment concluded that:

“The question that arises is whether the 13th Amendment Bill under consideration creates institutions of government which are supreme, independent and not subordinate within their defined spheres. Application of this test demonstrates that both in respect of the exercise of its legislative powers and in respect of exercise of executive powers no exclusive or independent power [is] invested in the Provincial Councils. The Parliament and President have ultimate control over them and remain supreme.”

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6 In Re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill (1987) 2 SLR 312 at 319
7 Ibid
8 Ibid at 320
With regard to legislative power, the majority held that although there is a ‘sphere of competence’ in which Provincial Councils are empowered to legislate (i.e., in relation to the subjects set out in the Provincial Council List and the Concurrent List), this power is neither exclusive nor co-ordinate with that of the central Parliament. The legislative power that was devolved, as well as the subjects over which that power could be exercised, it was held, was entirely subordinate to the ‘sovereignty of Parliament’. Therefore, Parliament could at any time alter or take away the legislative powers devolved to Provincial Councils. Moreover, although Parliament had to follow certain special procedures in doing so, such as prior consultation with Provincial Councils, these were held to be merely procedural restraints.

With regard to executive power, the majority held that the President remains supreme in regard to all executive functions. The Governor exercised executive powers in relation to subjects that were devolved as a ‘delegate’ of the President, and in consideration of all the functions of the Governor and the Board of Ministers, it was held that, “…the President remains supreme or sovereign in the executive field and the Provincial Council is only a body subordinate to him.”

The majority also held that the Bills do not devolve judicial power on the Provincial Councils and that they, “…do not effect any change in the structure of the Courts or the judicial power of the People.” They observed that the proposed High Courts of the Provinces have only limited jurisdiction, that the appellate authority of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal remain unimpaired, the administration of the judicial service remains with the centre and that, “Vesting of this additional jurisdiction in the High Court of each Province only brings justice nearer home to the citizen and reduces delay and cost of litigation.”

The other major argument put to the Supreme Court by the petitioners was that devolution was inconsistent with Article 3 of the Constitution (which stated that sovereignty vested with the people and was inalienable) read with Article 4 (which provided the manner in which that sovereignty was to be exercised). Article 4 provides that legislative power shall be exercised by Parliament, executive power by the President and judicial power through the courts, which was argued as being the basic institutional structure of the state for the exercise of the sovereignty of the people.

It was contended that devolving legislative and executive powers to the proposed Provincial Councils would be an unconstitutional alienation of sovereignty contrary to Article 3, and a contravention of the basic structure of the Constitution, since Article 4 did not contemplate any institutions (such as Provincial Councils) other than Parliament, the President and the courts as being entitled to exercise sovereign power. It should be noted that Article 4 is not one of the

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9 Article 154G (2) and (3)
10 Ibid at 323
11 Ibid at 323
12 Ibid
13 The Thirteenth Amendment Bill did not seek to add Provincial Councils as a separate category of (devolved) institution to those already mentioned in Article 4
provisions entrenched by Article 83, and therefore the petitioners were asking the court to regard Article 4 as an inseparable part of Article 3 (which is entrenched).

The majority rejected this argument. It referred to the drafting history of Article 83 to conclude that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude Article 4 from entrenchment, and therefore it was not open to the court to interpret Article 4 itself as an entrenched provision, or as a part of the entrenched Article 3, when the framers had expressly excluded it. The majority of judges also argued that it was possible to introduce new institutions for the exercise of legislative and executive power, other than those mentioned in Article 4, so long as this did not impinge on the sovereignty of the people as provided in Article 3. In the view of the majority, the Provincial Councils system proposed in the Bills, which exercised only powers delegated by Parliament and the President, did not affect the sovereignty of the people.

Drawing on the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ set out in Chapter VI of the Constitution, the judges in the majority defined devolution in the following way:

"Healthy democracy must develop and adopt itself to changing circumstances. The activities of central government now include substantial powers and functions that should be exercised at a level closer to the People. Article 27 (4) has in mind the aspirations of local people to participate in the governance of their regions. The Bills envisage a handing over of responsibility for the domestic affairs of each province, within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. They give new scope for meeting the particular needs and desires of the people for each province. Decentralisation is a useful means of ensuring that administration in the provinces is founded on an understanding of the needs and wishes of the respective provinces. The creation of elected and administrative institutions with respect to each province, that is what devolution means, gives shape to the devolutionary principle."

The concept of devolution is used to mean the delegation of central government powers without the relinquishment of supremacy. Devolution may be legislative or administrative or both. It should be distinguished from decentralisation which is a method whereby some central government powers of decision making are exercised by officials of the central government located in various regions."  

The judges in the minority, especially the main dissenting opinion of Justice Wanasundera, offered a powerful critique of these findings of the majority. In their view, the structure of devolution proposed by the two Bills would establish a federal or quasi-federal form of government that was contrary to the unitary state and the basic structure of the Constitution of

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14 In Re the Thirteenth Amendment (1987) 2 SLR 312 at 326-327

15 Ibid at 333-383
1978. They therefore concluded that the approval of the people at a referendum was necessary to validly enact the two Bills. However, as noted above, the government made changes to the Thirteenth Amendment Bill so as to address Justice Ranasinghe’s concerns, and thereby secured a majority in the Supreme Court for the view that a referendum would not be necessary.

In reconciling the devolution of power with the existing structure of a centralised unitary state as envisaged by the Constitution of 1978, the majority in the Supreme Court had to stress that ultimate power and supremacy continued to be vested with the central Parliament and the President. This meant that Provincial Councils came to be regarded from the outset as subordinate bodies to central institutions. This certainly had implications for the way in which devolution was implemented, with administrative practices and subsequently enacted central legislation clearly being based on a notion of central supremacy and superiority. While perhaps at the level of constitutional interpretation the choices available to the judges in the majority in the re the Thirteenth Amendment case were limited, it did not have to follow that the central government also had to act in ways that undermined the autonomy of the Provincial Councils. Unfortunately, this has largely been the case in the experience of all Provincial Councils since 1988.

2.3 The De-Merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces

As noted above, the ‘merger’ of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single territorial, political and administrative unit was one of the undertakings of the Indo-Lanka Accord. This commitment was reflected in Article 154A (3), introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment, which stated that Parliament may by law provide for two or three adjoining Provinces to form one administrative unit with one elected Provincial Council, one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers and for the manner of determining whether such Provinces should continue to be administered as one administrative unit or whether each such Province unit should constitute a separate administrative unit.

The specific procedures for the merger of Provinces were set out in Section 37 of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987. The relevant essence of the provisions of Section 37 empowered the President to declare by Proclamation for two or three adjoining Provinces to be constituted as one administrative unit. In a special provision applicable to the Northern and Eastern Provinces, however, it was stipulated that the President shall not issue such a Proclamation.

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17 See discussion in Ch. 2.1, above

18 Section 37 (1) (a)
unless he was satisfied that arms, ammunition, weapons, explosives and other military equipment held by terrorist militant or other groups having as their objective the establishment of a separate state, have been surrendered to the government of Sri Lanka or to authorities designated by it, and that there has been a cessation of hostilities and other acts of violence by such groups in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.¹⁹

Thus the political agreement underlying these constitutional and legal provisions arrived at between the governments of Sri Lanka and India, and Tamil political parties and militant groups in the process of negotiations was as follows: that the Tamil nationalist claim to an area of historical habitation (or traditional homeland) would be accommodated, not explicitly as such, but by merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single administrative unit for the purposes of devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment, with one Provincial Council and provincial executive representing and governing thereby the entire region. There would be an acknowledgement of the apprehensions of the Muslim and Sinhala communities in the (ethnically more heterogeneous) Eastern Province concerning the numerical superiority of the Tamils in a territorially merged North and East, by offering a referendum on continuing the merger or opting to ‘de-merge.’ However, as many commentators believe but never officially acknowledged, the intention seems to have been to indefinitely keep postponing the referendum in the East (allowed by Section 37 (2) (b)), in the hope that eventually, the North-Eastern merger would become a permanent feature rather than the interim measure suggested by the elaborate provisions of Section 37.²⁰ From the initial Proclamation in August 1988 to November 2005, the referendum was annually postponed by successive Presidents.²¹

President Jayewardene issued the Proclamation merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces on 8th August 1988 and elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council were held on 19th November 1988. As we have seen, the elected Provincial Council and administration of Chief Minister Varatharajaperumal ceased to exist in March 1990.²² Thereafter, until 4th June 2008 when the elected Provincial Council of the Eastern Province assembled for the first time, the North-Eastern Province was administered by the Governor.²³

The legal challenge to the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the postponement of the statutorily stipulated referendum, and the consequent deprivation of a lawfully elected Provincial Council for the Eastern Province, was made by way of fundamental rights applications to the Supreme Court by three residents of the Eastern Province. The petitioners challenged the

¹⁹ Section 37 (1) (b)
²¹ See the table setting out the successive Proclamations, their dates, and dates of postponement in the Supreme Court judgment on the de-merger in 2006, reproduced in Edrisinha et al (2008): p.748
²² See discussion in Ch. 2.1, above
²³ The Supreme Court judgment on the de-merger was delivered on 16th October 2006, pursuant to which the two Provinces commenced functioning as two separate entities from 1st January 2007. The Northern Province continues to be administered by the Governor. See also the Governor’s Address at the second meeting of the Eastern Provincial Council, Official Report of the Debates of the Eastern Provincial Council, Vol.01, No.02, 11th June 2008.
legality of the initial Proclamation of 1988 merging the two Provinces by relying on what had hitherto been a virtually unknown fact. As we saw earlier, Section 37 (1) (b) of the Provincial Councils Act required the President to be satisfied as to the existence of certain facts before issuing a Proclamation in the case of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This was the satisfactory cessation of hostilities and the decommissioning of arms by separatist groups in those areas.

The petitioners revealed to court that President Jayewardene had, immediately prior to issuing the merger proclamation in August 1988, made an emergency regulation under the Public Security Ordinance, amending Section 37 (1) (b) of the Provincial Councils Act by adding to it the words ‘or that operations have commenced to secure complete surrender of arms.’ This amendment was brought to take into account of the fact that a complete cessation of hostilities had clearly not occurred. As is well-known, the LTTE had rejected the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord and, following a token surrender of arms, begun a military engagement with the IPKF.

The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners’ contention that the impugned emergency regulation was invalid because it was a statutorily unauthorised used of emergency powers by the President for a collateral purpose (i.e., ultra vires Section 5 of the Public Security Ordinance). Since the emergency regulation seeking to amend the relevant section of the Provincial Councils Act was invalid, there had been no legal amendment of the Provincial Councils Act. The President had therefore not satisfied the statutory requirement set out in that Section 37 (1) (b) regarding decommissioning, which rendered the subsequent Proclamation merging the two Provinces also invalid. This was the legal basis on which the Supreme Court declared the ‘de-merger’ of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Following the end of armed hostilities in the East in July 2007, elections to the Eastern Provincial Council were held on 10th May 2008, in which the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA, and under which the Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) contested) won the majority with 20 out of 37 seats. Governor Mohan Wijewickrama summoned the Eastern Provincial Council to meet on 4th June 2008 in Trincomalee, at which inaugural session the Council elected its Chairman and Deputy Chairman. The policy statement of the new provincial administration outlining its proposed programme over five years was presented to the Council by Chief Minister Sivanesathurai Santhirakanthan on 11th June 2008.

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24 Article 155 (2) of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Public Security Ordinance empower the President to promulgate emergency regulations having the effect of overriding any law except the provisions of the Constitution.

25 Wijesekera v. Attorney General (2007) 1 SLR 38, also known as the ‘North-East Demerger Case’


2.4 Institutional Structure: the Actors and their Functions

Before considering the distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces, it is useful to have a preliminary idea of the various institutions and their functions in the system of devolution embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment, which introduced the new Chapter XVIIA to the Constitution of 1978, provides the constitutional framework of these institutions and their roles. There is also a body of central legislation that governs devolution of which the two most important pieces of legislation for the present discussion are the Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987 (as amended by Acts No. 27 and 28 of 1990), and the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act No. 12 of 1989.

The political institutions that play a role in this system of devolution are the President, Parliament, the Governors, the Chief Ministers and Boards of Ministers, and the Provincial Councils. Supporting these political institutions are the public service and the police, and the administrative bodies which regulate the public service, police and public finance. The Thirteenth Amendment establishes a Finance Commission, which recommends allocations of funds to Provincial Councils to the central government, and Provincial Public Service Commissions and Provincial Police Commissions to work together with their national counterparts. The Supreme Court plays a central role in this framework as the final arbiter of disputes and in the authoritative, binding interpretation of the Constitution.

The Thirteenth Amendment establishes a Provincial Council for each of the nine Provinces of Sri Lanka that are listed in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution. The Provincial Council is the legislature of the Province, and enjoys law-making powers over the subjects enumerated in the Provincial Council List and the Concurrent List. A Provincial Council has no power to legislate in respect of any subject in the Reserved List, on which only Parliament may legislate. Provincial Councils are elected for a term of five years, unless sooner dissolved. Unlike the central Parliament, the law-making power of Provincial Councils is circumscribed by the Constitution, and provincial statutes are judicially reviewable at any time. Within this constitutional and legal framework, ‘law’ means Acts of the Sri Lankan Parliament, whereas laws made by Provincial Councils are referred to as ‘statutes’.

29 Parliament is empowered to provide by law for all necessary measures to implement the Thirteenth Amendment by Article 154Q. With regard to the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act, No. 12 of 1989, and the Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 1990, see the Supreme Court determinations in Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Bill, SCSD No. 11 of 1989, and Provincial Councils (Amendment) Bill, SCM 14th June 1990, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): pp. 138 and 173, respectively.

29 Article 154A (1)

30 Article 154G (1) and (5) (b)

31 Article 154G (7)

32 Article 154E

33 Article 170
Executive power at the provincial level is exercised by the Governor and the Board of Ministers, and in certain situations, directly by the President.\textsuperscript{34} The Governor is appointed by the President and exercises his powers as an agent of the President within the Province.\textsuperscript{35} The Governor exercises executive power within the Province in respect of the subjects in the Provincial Council List and the Concurrent List, generally with the advice of the Board of Ministers, except where he is required to act in his own discretion, which is usually under instructions from the President.\textsuperscript{36} In practice the Board of Ministers, who are the elected political executive representing a majority in the Provincial Council, exercise their powers through the Governor, for which they are collectively responsible to the Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{37} However, the Governor possesses some significant powers and functions relating to day-to-day administration (for e.g., finance, the public service, assent to provincial statutes), which confine or restrict the powers and responsibilities of the elected Ministers. All executive action of the Governor, whether taken on the advice of Ministers or otherwise, are to be expressed as taken in the name of the President.\textsuperscript{38}

The Thirteenth Amendment does not devolve judicial power to the Provinces, but in establishing a High Court for each Province, it decentralises the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{39} Within the Province, the High Court exercises original criminal jurisdiction, appellate and revisionary jurisdiction over Magistrates Courts, and the power to issue prerogative writs. The judicial service at the provincial level continues to be administered by the central Judicial Services Commission.

As we noted above, the structure of devolution established by the Thirteenth Amendment is very much within the framework of the unitary state. This means that the central government has overall pre-eminence or supremacy within the structure. Devolved institutions are subordinate to the central government,\textsuperscript{40} and devolution can be suspended or revoked by the centre when the circumstances so require without consultation with or consent of the Province. This is clear from the special provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act dealing with the various situations in which the central government can suspend devolution altogether or takeover devolved functions: states of emergency;\textsuperscript{41} the failure of a Governor or a Provincial Council to comply with directions, and the failure of administrative machinery within the

\textsuperscript{34} Articles 154B (2), 154C and 154F
\textsuperscript{35} Article 154B (2) and Section 15 (2) of the Provincial Councils Act
\textsuperscript{36} Articles 154C and 154F
\textsuperscript{37} Article 154F (6)
\textsuperscript{38} Section 15 (2) of the Provincial Councils Act
\textsuperscript{39} Article 154P
\textsuperscript{40} The Supreme Court has described Provincial Councils, together with local government authorities, as ‘organs of decentralised government’: see the Supreme Court determination on the National Transport Commission Bill (1991), SCSD No. 8 of 1991, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.195 at p.199. See also the Supreme Court determination in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148
\textsuperscript{41} Article 154J
Province, financial instability, or where the majority of the members of a Provincial Council have expressly repudiated or manifestly disavowed obedience to the Constitution; or if a Provincial Council has for all intents and purposes ceased to function. Many of these special powers of the central government are vested in the President, with Parliament and the Governor also having certain functions in some cases.

The constitutional procedural safeguards built into protecting the provincial sphere in respect of legislative power are weak (with experience demonstrating that even those safeguards have been observed in the breach), and the framework for the exercise of executive power weaker. While the exceptional circumstances under which the special powers of intervention (for e.g., to prevent attempts at secession) may seem unobjectionable and legitimate central government concerns that even federal states reflect, it is the particular manner in which the provisions are designed that permits an unrestrained scope for unilateral intrusion by the central government (and especially, the powerful office of the executive presidency). This is compounded by the absence of constitutional institutions at the central level for the representation of the provincial interest, such as traditionally provided through a second chamber of the central legislature.

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42 Articles 154K, 154L and 154M
43 Article 154N
44 Section 5A (a) of the Provincial Councils Act
45 Section 5A (b) of the Provincial Councils Act
CHAPTER 3

LEGISLATIVE POWER

Prior to the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, the only law-making body in Sri Lanka was Parliament. Although local government authorities have powers to make bylaws, these are only rule making powers that are strictly limited in both scope and substance by the legislation governing them. The legislative powers devolved on the Provincial Councils are broader than those given to local authorities, but the Supreme Court in the In re Thirteenth Amendment case clearly described provincial statutes as ‘delegated legislation.’ Generally the power to make ‘delegated legislation’, or ‘subordinate legislation’, describes the power that is delegated by the legislature to the executive (or other subordinate bodies such as local governments) to make rules in the implementation of legislation. Such regulations cannot exceed the authority given by Parliament as expressed in the relevant law. However, Provincial Councils, unlike local authorities, are legislative bodies established by the Constitution, the legislative powers of which are also enumerated in the Constitution. Therefore, they can be regarded as institutions that are subordinate to Parliament, but with a status higher than local authorities. Bylaws made by local government authorities and statutes made by Provincial Councils are subject to judicial review, but laws made by Parliament, once made, are not.

The Ninth Schedule to the Constitution introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment contains three lists of subjects: the Provincial Council List (List I), the Reserved List (List II), and the Concurrent List (List III). The subjects over which Provincial Councils may make statutes are contained in the Provincial Council List and the Concurrent List (over which law-making power is shared, but with central pre-eminence), while the Reserved List contains the subjects over which Provincial Councils have no law-making power and on which only Parliament may legislate. The three lists of subjects in the Ninth Schedule should not be regarded as an exhaustive enumeration of the legislative powers of the state, because Parliament retains the residual legislative power to legislate on any matter whatsoever. While the three lists taken together delineate the scope

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46 In re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill (1987) 2 SLR 312 at 325

47 For e.g., regulations made by the Minister for Transport under the Motor Traffic Act

48 Article 124, The scope for pre-enactment judicial review for constitutionality is set out in Articles 120, 121 and 122. All provincial executive and administrative action is subject to the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 17 and 126: Parameswary Jayathevan v. Attorney General (1992) 2 SLR 356

49 154G (10)
and limits of the legislative power of Provincial Councils, they do not similarly restrict Parliament.\(^{50}\)

3.1 Institutional and Procedural Framework: Parliament and the Provincial Councils

The legislative powers of the Provincial Councils are defined in territorial and functional terms. Legislative power is devolved on Provincial Councils to make statutes in respect of any matter in the Provincial Council List.\(^{51}\) A Provincial Council may also make statutes in respect of matters in the Concurrent List, after such consultations with Parliament as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of each case.\(^{52}\) In both cases, the territorial jurisdiction of the Provincial Council is confined to the respective Province. The Provincial Councils have no power to make statutes in respect of the Reserved List.\(^{53}\)

Where there is a pre-existing law made by Parliament concerning any subject in the Provincial Council List, a Provincial Council may make a subsequent statute which, if inconsistent with the law, suspends the operation of that law within the Province for as long as the provincial statute remains in force.\(^{54}\) For it to have this overriding effect, the long title of the provincial statute must describe itself as being inconsistent with the relevant law. As the Supreme Court has held, the purpose of this requirement of an express description of inconsistency in the long title is to bring such inconsistency to the notice of Parliament.\(^{55}\)

Where there is a pre-existing law made by Parliament concerning any subject in the Concurrent List, a Provincial Council may make a subsequent statute which, if inconsistent with the law, suspends the operation of that law within the Province for as long as the provincial statute remains in force.\(^{56}\) However, with regard to the Concurrent List, Parliament has the power to pass a resolution to the contrary, so that pre-existing central legislation would prevail over any

\(^{50}\) That is, its plenary legislative power is not affected although Article 154G (2) and (3) impose certain procedural requirements to be followed.

\(^{51}\) Article 154G (1)

\(^{52}\) Article 154G (5) (b). The Supreme Court has held that this duty of the Provincial Council to consult Parliament is mandatory: Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148 at pp.164–167. Article 154G (5) (a) provides that Parliament may make laws on subjects in the Concurrent List after such consultations with all Provincial Councils as it may consider appropriate in each case. In Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), the Supreme Court did not expressly state whether the duty of Parliament to consult Provincial Councils was also mandatory since the issue was about the requirement of consultation with Parliament when a Provincial Council was making a statute in relation to the Concurrent List, but it seems implicit in the reasoning that the duty to consult is mandatory for both Parliament and Provincial Councils, given the identical wording of Article 154G (5) (a) and (b).

\(^{53}\) Article 154G (7)

\(^{54}\) Article 154G (8)

\(^{55}\) The Supreme Court determination in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148 at pp.165-166

\(^{56}\) Article 154G (9)
provincial statute. The exercise of statute-making power on a concurrent subject by a Provincial Council is mandatorily subject to the requirement of prior consultation with Parliament.\footnote{Article 154G (5) (b); the Supreme Court determination in Re Transport Board Statute of the Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148}

The importance of Articles 154G (8) and (9) must be underscored. Whereas the power-conferring Articles 154G (1) and (5) (b) set out the positive scope of the legislative powers of Provincial Councils, Articles 154G (8) and (9) constitute the essence of that legislative autonomy. Unless Parliament deliberately overrides a provincial statute,\footnote{In relation to a concurrent subject, by a resolution under Article 154G (9), or in relation to a provincial subject, by virtue of any of the provisions that empower Parliament to legislate in those areas, for e.g., legislation under the ‘National Policy’ clause of the Reserved List} these two provisions ensure provincial legislative autonomy to the extent Province Councils enjoy legislative powers under the Thirteenth Amendment. By exercising these powers, the application of central legislation is excluded within the Province. However, both the constitutional scope for intervention by Parliament, as well as the superior nature of central legislation, mean that this legislative autonomy is highly restricted.

By passing a resolution, a Provincial Council may request Parliament to legislate on any matter in the Provincial Council List.\footnote{Article 154G (4)} Legislation passed by Parliament under this provision is only applicable within the Province making the request. A Provincial Council may also, by resolution, decide not to exercise its legislative power in respect of any matter, in whole or in part, in the Provincial Council or Concurrent Lists.\footnote{Article 154S (1)} Where such a provincial resolution to renounce law-making power has been accepted by Parliament, Parliament assumes the power to legislate for that Province, in respect of the matters specified in such resolution.\footnote{Article 154S (2)} In these circumstances, Parliament does not have to follow the special procedures set out in Article 154G to make law, and enacts laws by the ordinary simple majority.

The ways in which the devolution of legislative powers to Provincial Councils would restrict, if at all, the plenary and supreme quality of the legislative power of Parliament were strenuously argued in the \textit{In re the Thirteenth Amendment} case. A main ground of argument in this regard was as to the extent to which the provisions of Article 154G (2) and (3) affected Parliament’s supremacy. These two provisions set out special procedures for the exercise of Parliament’s power of constitutional amendment,\footnote{Article 154G (2)} and its continuing legislative power in respect of the subjects devolved on the Provinces by the Provincial Council List.\footnote{Article 154G (3)} It is clear, however, that the procedural requirements of these provisions do not affect the ultimate supremacy of Parliament. As the judges in the majority in the \textit{In re the Thirteenth Amendment} case opined, “...Articles
Article 154G (2) and (3) do not limit the sovereign power of Parliament. They only impose procedural restraints.⁶⁴

In terms of Article 154G (2), Parliament cannot amend or repeal the Thirteenth Amendment or the three lists of competences in the Ninth Schedule unless the proposed amendment has been referred by the President to every Provincial Council for the expression of its views thereon. Where all Provincial Councils agree to the proposed amendment or repeal, Parliament may pass it with a simple majority.⁶⁵ Where one or more Provincial Councils do not agree to the amendment, Parliament is required to pass it with a two-thirds majority.⁶⁶

In terms of Article 154G (3), a Bill (i.e., draft parliamentary legislation) in respect of any matter in the Provincial Council List must be referred by the President to every Provincial Council for the expression of its views thereon.⁶⁷ Where all Provincial Councils agree to the passing of the Bill, Parliament may pass it by a simple majority, whereupon the Act becomes applicable to all Provinces.⁶⁸ Where one or more Provincial Councils do not agree to the passing of the Bill, then Parliament must pass it by a two-thirds majority for the Bill to be validly enacted in all Provinces.⁶⁹ If the law is passed by only a simple majority rather than a two-thirds, then it becomes applicable only in the Provinces that have agreed to it.⁷⁰

These crucial procedural safeguards for devolution were put in place to ensure that Parliament acts in a consultative and consensual manner in exercising its legislative power, both with regard to ordinary legislation and in the enactment of constitutional amendments affecting devolution. The applicable procedure, however, was unfortunately not followed on the one occasion in which Parliament expressly amended certain provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Council List. This was when Parliament enacted the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution in 2001 which, among other fundamental changes to the Constitution affecting the central level of government, also made changes to the devolution framework by amending the manner of appointment of some members of the Finance Commission, the composition of the

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⁶⁴ In re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill (1987) 2 SLR 312 at 320

⁶⁵ Article 154G (2) (a). It should be noted that this is the only situation in which Parliament may amend the Constitution by a simple majority. This is presumably for the reason that the necessary rigidity of the procedure for constitutional amendment is supplied by the requirement of the agreement of every Provincial Council, rather than by a two-thirds majority in Parliament or a referendum. See also discussion in Ch. 2.2, above.

⁶⁶ Article 154G (2) (b)

⁶⁷ The Supreme Court has opined, obiter, that this requirement to consult Provincial Councils is mandatory in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148 at p.164–165. See also Ghany v. Dissanayake (2004) 1 SLR 17 at 30, in which the Supreme Court indirectly expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution (2001) which was passed in violation of this procedure. Both opinions were of Mark Fernando, J.

⁶⁸ Article 154G (3) (a)

⁶⁹ Article 154G (3) (b)

⁷⁰ Proviso to Article 154G (3)
National Police Commission, and the replacement of the President with the National Police Commission in the exercise of provincial police powers.\(^{71}\)

Due to its amendments of the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Ninth Schedule, the procedure to be followed in the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment was plainly Article 154G (2), with its requirements of consultation with Provincial Councils. This important procedure was not followed, but rather, the procedure for Bills urgent in the national interest.\(^{72}\) No Provincial Council challenged the procedure adopted, and in its special determination under Article 122 the Supreme Court also did not order that the Seventeenth Amendment Bill required to be passed by the procedure set out in Article 154G (2).\(^{73}\) It can therefore be argued that the Seventeenth Amendment was passed by following a wrong procedure that was inconsistent not only with the provisions of the Constitution, but also the concept of devolution. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court (indirectly) indicated that the failure to follow the procedure in Article 154G (2) rendered the constitutionality of the Seventeenth Amendment questionable.\(^{74}\)

However, a more recent attempt to amend the law relating to local government authorities was successfully challenged in the Supreme Court under Article 121. The impugned Bill sought to establish ‘Ward Committees’ as a further tier of representation within existing local government bodies and to introduce a mixed electoral system at local government level. The Supreme Court held that the changes proposed in the Bill affected the legislative competence of the Provincial Councils as set out in Items 4:1 and 4:3 of the Provincial Council List. Therefore the Bill could not become law unless it was passed by the procedure in Article 154G (3) and it had been referred by the President to every Provincial Council for the ascertainment of its views.\(^{75}\) Pursuant to this decision by the Supreme Court, the central government did not proceed with the Bill.

Article 154Q empowers Parliament to enact legislation to provide for the election of members to Provincial Councils and related matters,\(^{76}\) the procedure for the transaction of business in

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\(^{71}\) Article 154R amended by Section 19 of the Seventeenth Amendment, and Items 3, 6, 7 and 9:2 of Appendix I of List I of the Ninth Schedule amended by Section 19 of the Seventeenth Amendment.

\(^{72}\) Article 122

\(^{73}\) The Supreme Court determination on the Seventeenth Amendment Bill is unreported

\(^{74}\) Ghany v. Dissanayake (2004) 1 SLR 17 at 30; see also the Supreme Court determination in SCSD No.1 of 1992 in relation to the Bill that was enacted as Greater Colombo Economic Commission (Amendment) Act, No. 49 of 1992 (unreported). It should be noted that the Constitution only allows pre-enactment judicial review of parliamentary Bills as provided under Articles 120, 121 and 122 (read with Articles 123 and 124), and Article 80 (3) prohibits any judicial review of validly enacted law for constitutionality. This means that unless the Supreme Court declares a Bill unconstitutional upon a reference by the President or Cabinet of Ministers, or such a Bill is successfully challenged prior to enactment, the validity of a law once made, may not be questioned in any court, even if it is wholly inconsistent with the Constitution.

\(^{75}\) The Supreme Court determination on the Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill, SCSD Nos. 6 and 7 of 2006 reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.516. For a similar outcome, see Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill, SCSD No. 12 of 2003 reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.421

\(^{76}\) Article 154Q (a); provided for in the Provincial Councils Elections Act, No. 2 of 1988; Elections (Special Provisions) Act, No. 35 of 1988; Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 55 of 1988; Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 1990; Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 1993.
Provincial Councils, salaries and allowances of members of Provincial Councils, and a general power to legislate for “any other matter necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the principles of provisions [sic] of this Chapter [i.e., the Thirteenth Amendment], and for any matters connected with, or incidental to, the provisions of this Chapter.” It is noteworthy that the Constitution contemplates the intervention of Parliament in such minute matters as salaries and internal procedure of Provincial Councils, but it is the general power in Article 154Q (d) that is even more significant. It has been relied upon in the enactment of two crucial pieces of legislation: the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act, No. 12 of 1989, and the Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 1990.

The Consequential Provisions Act, although enacted as a temporary measure, continues to be in force and has assumed an air of permanence in the context of the sparse legislative activity of Provincial Councils even in the more politically stable Provinces in the last two decades. The basic purpose of the Act was to extend the discretionary powers of central Ministers and officials, conferred by existing legislation pertaining to matters in the Provincial Council List, to provincial Ministers and officials, so that executive powers at the provincial level could be exercised under those laws until such time as the Provincial Councils themselves made their own statutes. In its determination on the constitutionality of this law at Bill stage, the Supreme Court agreed with the submission of the Attorney General that Article 154Q (d) was meant to provide exactly for the kind of intervention proposed in the Bill, in order to promote the exercise of devolved executive power.

The amendment to the Provincial Councils Act enacted in 1990, in the wake of the attempt at a unilateral declaration of independence in the North and East, has obvious political significance as an aspect of the broader political problem of the aspirations, and resistance, to an accommodation of ethno-political pluralism through devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment. In a charged political context of escalating antagonism, it reflected the political response of the central government by terminating the operation of devolution in the North and East.

From the perspective of constitutional law, the Supreme Court’s determination on the constitutionality of this amendment Bill reflected the importance of Article 154Q (d), and the wide possibilities for central intervention it allows. The Bill provided for both the disqualification from office of elected members of a Provincial Council, and for dissolution of a Provincial Council,

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77 Article 154Q (b); provided for in Part II of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987
78 Article 154Q (c); provided for in Provincial Councils (Payment of Salaries and Allowances) Act, No. 37 of 1988; Provincial Councils Pensions Act, No. 17 of 1993.
79 Also known as the Consequential Provisions Act.
81 See discussion in Ch. 4, below. See also CPA (2008) Strengthening the Provincial Council System.
83 See discussion in Ch. 2.1, above
upon a communication of the Governor that members of the Council had expressly repudiated or manifestly disavowed obedience to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{84} The petitioners in the case argued that the Bill was in effect an amendment of the Constitution by augmenting the powers of the Governor, and that the existing constitutional provisions regarding the Governor’s powers in the dissolution of a Provincial Council were sufficient to deal with the extraordinary situation that had arisen in the North-Eastern Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{85} The Supreme Court did not agree, and instead focussed on the fact that one of the impugned clauses dealt with the oath of office of members of a Provincial Council, which being provided for in the Provincial Councils Act, was susceptible to amendment by ordinary procedure.\textsuperscript{86}

In addition to the subjects in the Reserved List in relation to which Parliament has exclusive legislative powers (by virtue of Article 154G (7) expressly excluding any provincial competence over those matters), Parliament has the power to legislate on any matter on the Concurrent List, after such consultations with Provincial Councils as it may consider appropriate.\textsuperscript{87} The procedural restraints of Article 154G (3) do not apply when Parliament legislates on any subject of the Provincial Council List in fulfilment or implementation of any international obligation undertaken by Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, Article 154G (10) provides that nothing in Article 154G shall be read or construed as derogating from the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution to make laws (i.e., under Articles 75 and 76), in accordance with the Constitution, with respect to any matter, for the whole of Sri Lanka or any part of it. Laws validly enacted by Parliament prevail over any inconsistent provincial statute, which are void to the extent of the inconsistency.\textsuperscript{89}

Parliament is also vested with certain functions in relation to the special situations contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment when devolution may be suspended (or lesser forms of intervention imposed) by the central government.\textsuperscript{90} These are mainly parliamentary oversight functions over the executive. Article 154J refers to the emergency powers of the President, which are subject to parliamentary control and oversight in terms of Article 155. Under Article 154L, if the President is satisfied that a failure of administrative machinery has occurred in a Province, he may declare that the legislative powers of the Provincial Council is to be exercised by, or under the authority of, Parliament. Article 154L empowers Parliament to confer on the

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\textsuperscript{84} Sections 2 and 3 of the Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 1990, adding a new subsection (3) to Section 5 and a new Section 5A to the principal enactment, the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987

\textsuperscript{85} See also discussion in Ch. 4.1, below

\textsuperscript{86} Supreme Court determination on Provincial Councils (Amendment) Bill, SCM 14\textsuperscript{th} June 1990, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p. 173 at p.175

\textsuperscript{87} Article 154G (5) (a); Parliament has laid down the procedure for consultation with Provincial Councils in Standing Order 46A (generally, that copies of the Bill are forwarded to Provincial Councils, which would report their views to Parliament within a month). See also the Supreme Court determination in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010); p.148 at pp.164-166; discussed above.

\textsuperscript{88} Article 154G (11)

\textsuperscript{89} Article 154G (6)

\textsuperscript{90} Articles 154J, 154K, 154L, 154M and 154N
President the law-making powers of the Provincial Council, and to authorise expenditures from the Provincial Fund. Article 154N empowers the President to control the finances of a Province through the Governor when it is necessary to do so in the interests of financial stability. Proclamations made by the President bringing into operation these provisions require parliamentary approval.

3.2 Legislative Procedure in the Provincial Council

Unlike law-making at the central level where the President has no role in the parliamentary process, the Governor plays an important role in law-making at the provincial level through the requirement of his assent for provincial statutes. The general procedure for legislation is by simple majority. The rules with regard to assent are set out in Article 154H.

When a statute passed by the Provincial Council is presented to the Governor for assent, he may either give or withhold his assent. If he assents, then the statute comes into force. However, the Governor may also withhold assent, in which case he must, as soon as possible, return it to the Provincial Council requesting it to reconsider the statute or any of its specified provisions. In doing so, the Governor may recommend specific amendments to the statute. When the Governor returns a statute to the Provincial Council, it must reconsider the statute in the light of the Governor’s communication. If it agrees with the Governor, it can pass the statute again with such amendments as are necessary to address the Governor’s concerns. If not, the Provincial Council has the power to pass the statute again without any amendment and present it for assent by the Governor.

When such a re-passed statute is presented to the Governor, he may assent to it, or reserve it for reference by the President to the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of the statute. The President must refer the statute to the Supreme Court within one month. If the Supreme Court determines that the statute is consistent with the Constitution, then the Governor must assent to the statute. If not, assent must be withheld and the statute cannot come into force.

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91 Article 154H (1)
92 Section 10 of the Provincial Councils Act
93 A convention has developed that the Governor submits statutes presented for his assent to the Attorney General for an opinion on constitutionality. This is based on a Presidential Directive of 8th July 1991. While this may seem unobjectionable and even desirable, the experience in practice has been delays, conflicts of interest in the giving of legal advice (with a tendency for the Attorney General’s advice to favour the central government), and at times even contradictory advice on the same matter. See the Asoka Gunawardane Committee Report: p.7.
94 Article 154H (2)
95 Article 154H (3)
96 Article 154H (4)
Section 10 of the Provincial Councils Act sets out the basic voting procedure including the quorum in Provincial Councils, and Section 11 empowers Provincial Councils to make their own rules of procedure for the conduct of business within the Council. The Act also provides a detailed framework of rules with regard to financial statutes in Part III.

Provincial statutes are subject to judicial review for consistency with the Constitution and other central legislation at any time. This is unlike central legislation which may be challenged only prior to enactment.97

### 3.3 Distribution of Subjects: Provincial, Reserved and Concurrent

As noted above, the distribution of subjects between the centre and the Provinces are listed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment. The Ninth Schedule contains three lists of subjects: the Provincial Council List (List I), the Reserved List (List II), and the Concurrent List (List III). The subjects over which Provincial Councils may make statutes are contained in the Provincial Council List and the Concurrent List, while the Reserved List contains the subjects over which Provincial Councils have no statute-making power and on which only Parliament may legislate. Both Parliament and Provincial Councils may legislate on the Concurrent List.

The three lists of subjects in the Ninth Schedule should not be regarded as an exhaustive enumeration of the legislative powers of the state, because Parliament retains the residual legislative power to legislate on any matter whatsoever.98 Parliament expressly retains the right to legislate on the Provincial Council List, albeit subject to the procedural restraints of Article 154G (3). Moreover, the first subject in the Reserved List – ‘National Policy on all Subjects and Functions’ – empowers Parliament to enact national policies even on those subjects in the Provincial Council List into law, which then bind Provincial Councils. This is altogether an easier method by which the central government may make inroads into the provincial sphere. This provision has been used by the central government to enact laws in relation to devolved subjects such as agrarian services and surface transport. These actions are clearly contrary to the principle of devolution.99

While the three lists taken together delineate the scope and limits of the legislative (and executive) power of Provincial Councils, they do not similarly restrict Parliament. Parliament’s

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97 Article 80 (3) read with Articles 120, 121, 122, 123 and 124.

98 Articles 75, 76 and 154G (10)

99 In *Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission, North-Western Province* (2001) 1 SLR 1 at 5, the Supreme Court upheld the ‘national policy’ with regard to the transfer of teachers declared in a administrative circular issued by the central Ministry of Education, against a decision of a provincial authority in violation of that circular. Compare *Ranjani Priyalatha v. Provincial Public Service Commission, Central Province* (2009), CA Writ App. No. 775/07, 3rd November 2009, reported in *Marasinghe & Wickramaratne* (2010): p.522, in which it was held by the Court of Appeal that a provincial statute on a matter in the Provincial Council List prevails over a central administrative circular on the same matter (in this case the regulation Ayurveda medical services). See also CPA (2008) *Strengthening the Provincial Council System* for the perspectives of Provincial Councils on the use of this reserved power.
plenary legislative power is not affected, although Article 154G (2) and (3), and Article 154G (5) (a) impose certain procedural requirements to be followed in its exercise in relation to the subjects in the Provincial Council and Concurrent Lists and in constitutional amendments impacting on devolution. Likewise, the executive powers devolved to the provincial level and which are exercisable by the Governor, Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers are executive powers only in relation to those subjects in the Provincial Council and Concurrent Lists over which Provincial Councils are empowered to make statutes. In addition to the specified powers of the President, and those of the Governor who acts under the President's instructions, the executive power of the state as exercised by the President are in no way constrained by this devolution of executive power.

It is important to remember that the Thirteenth Amendment does not contemplate a wholesale or plenary devolution of all legislative and executive powers over the subjects in the Provincial Council List to the provincial level. As discussed in the preceding section, the exercise of devolved powers is subject to institutional and procedural restrictions. In the interaction of central and provincial institutions in this devolution framework, the Provincial Council is clearly the subordinate player.

Similarly, the substantive subjects which are devolved (Provincial Council List), or shared (Concurrent List), are also framed in such ways as to define and confine the scope of provincial competence. In an early case, the Supreme Court observed that, “…the ‘headings’ in the three Lists are of different kinds…In Lists I and III, it is only where there is a ‘heading’ with no description that the entire subject can be regarded as devolved: in other cases, the ‘heading’ merely serves to identify the subject but not to define it. Thus several items in Lists I and III have the same ‘heading’, but different descriptions, and obviously the content of the devolved subject has to be determined from those descriptions.”

Another factor that has served to complicate the determination of reasonable boundaries of central and provincial competence is the imprecise and often conflicting manner in which subjects are distributed among the three lists. Of course it is not possible to avoid all doubt in designing lists of competences between multiple levels of government. Disputes about competence are always likely to arise in the implementation of devolved systems, and these require resolution through administrative processes at first instance, and finally through the courts. However, it can be said that the design of the three lists in the Ninth Schedules leaves much to be desired in terms of precision and clarity. The result has often been that courts

100 See discussion in Ch. 4, below.

101 Greater Colombo Economic Commission Law (Amendment) Bill (1992), SCSD No. 1 of 1992

102 It is perhaps a measure of the conceptual clarity which informed the design of the distribution of competences, and indeed the broader process of constitutional amendment with regard to the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, that what is clearly a drafting oversight appears at the end of the Provincial Council List. The phrase ‘Above based on the recommendations of Committee I of the Political Parties Conference’ appears in parenthesis in the text of the Constitution. On the Political Parties Conference summoned by President Jayewardene, see Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch. 15
have resorted to the convenience of settling questions of competences by resolving them in favour of the centre.\textsuperscript{103}

The Provincial Council List (List I) enumerates 37 subjects or ‘items’ (many of which contain ‘sub-items’ further specifying the scope and limits of the itemised subjects) over which legislative and executive powers are devolved on Provincial Councils. Three of the most important subjects are further elaborated in three appendices that form part of the Provincial Council List. These are Law and Order (Appendix I), Land and Land Settlement (Appendix II), and Education (Appendix III).\textsuperscript{104} Powers over land and policing have prominently featured as areas over which Tamil nationalists in particular have claimed autonomy for the North and East. However, now with the experience of over twenty years with functioning Provincial Councils elsewhere in the country, there is a clear desire at the provincial level across all Provinces for the full implementation of autonomy over policing, land, finance and other areas such as health, education and agrarian services.\textsuperscript{105}

In addition to law and order, land and education, other important areas over which powers have been devolved include local government (Item 4),\textsuperscript{106} housing and construction (Item 5), roads, bridges and ferries (Item 6, except national highways) social services and rehabilitation (Item 7), regulation of surface transport within the Province (Item 8),\textsuperscript{107} agriculture and agrarian services (Item 9),\textsuperscript{108} health and indigenous medicine (Items 11, 12), co-operatives (Item 17), irrigation (Item 19), industrial development (Item 21, subject to national policy), regulation of mines and mineral development (Item 26, to the extent permitted by central legislation) and energy

\textsuperscript{103} See for e.g., Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission, North-Western Province (2001) 1 SLR 1; the Supreme Court determination in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148. The latter was the first devolution case to come up before the Supreme Court, and arose from the exercise of legislative power by the North-Eastern Provincial Council. The case therefore had considerable political, historic, and symbolic significance. Both the Provincial Council List (Item 8) and the Reserved List contain entries relating to surface transport thereby raising questions as to the boundaries of provincial and central government competence on this subject. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that items in the Provincial Council List must be interpreted subject to those in the Reserved List, thereby clearly reinforcing the hierarchical constitutional framework of devolution. Notwithstanding that procedural flaws in violation of Article 154G would have made the statute unconstitutional in any case, the Supreme Court’s attitude was politically significant, and was not lost on the North-Eastern Provincial Council and the broader Tamil political community.

\textsuperscript{104} The three appendices envisage the establishment of several special bodies: the National Police Commission, Provincial Police Commissions, National Land Commission, and Provincial Boards of Education.


\textsuperscript{106} The extent of which competence was dealt with in the Supreme Court determinations on the Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill, SCSD No. 12 of 2003 reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.421, and Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill, SCSD Nos. 6 and 7 of 2008 reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.516. Item 4:1 gives legislative competence to Provincial Councils over local authorities except to alter their constitution, form and structure, which shall be determined by central legislation. Item 4:3 affirms the powers of local authorities according to existing law, and states that while provincial legislation may confer additional powers on local authorities, it may not take them away. See also the discussion of this case in Ch. 3.1, above.


generation (Item 34). Provincial debt is a provincial responsibility (Item 31), and borrowing to the extent permitted by central legislation (Item 35). The range of fees and taxes that may be imposed by a Provincial Council is enumerated in Items 33 and 36 (36:1 to 36:20).

The Concurrent List (List III) enumerates 36 subjects, once again with some items further elaborated in sub-items. It includes planning (Item 1), education, educational services and higher education (Items 2, 3 and 4, except to the extent specified in Items 3 and 4 of List I), housing and construction (Item 5), acquisition and requisitioning of property (Item 6), social services and rehabilitation (Item 7), agricultural and agrarian services (Item 8), health (Item 9), co-operatives (Item 15), irrigation (Item 17), fisheries within territorial waters (Item 19), tourism (Item 22), food and drug standards (Items 30 and 31), and prevention of infectious diseases (Item 35).

The concept of concurrency in the Thirteenth Amendment is one of ‘central field pre-emption’. That is, central legislation over concurrent subjects prevails when Parliament unilaterally deems it so. Both Parliament and Provincial Councils are empowered to legislate in respect of concurrent subjects.\(^\text{109}\) Provincial Council statutes on concurrent subjects may prevail over pre-existing central legislation, but Parliament can by resolution override the application of such statutes.\(^\text{110}\) Any future central legislation on a concurrent subject has pre-eminence over a provincial statute.\(^\text{111}\) This is obviously an extremely vulnerable framework that renders the notion of ‘concurrent’ competence virtually meaningless by allowing Parliament to legislate over Provinces at will. Even the weak safeguard in Article 154G (5) (a) that Parliament should consult Provincial Councils before legislating on the Concurrent List has almost entirely been observed in the breach.\(^\text{112}\) It is for this reason that many provincial level officials feel that the Concurrent List should be abolished.\(^\text{113}\)

However, it is important to bear in mind that while criticisms of the particular design of concurrent powers as reflected in the Thirteenth Amendment are valid, it does not follow that the concept of concurrency itself is something that is necessarily contrary to devolution. The question of pre-eminence in the concurrent field need not be resolved by constitutionally privileging legislation of one or other tier of government (as in the case of the Thirteenth Amendment, where central legislation has pre-eminence over provincial statutes). A framework of genuine concurrence or shared competence would enable a decision on which tier should prevail to be made on a case by case basis, by reference to broad constitutional principles such as subsidiarity, effectiveness, efficiency and so on. Even if concurrent powers are not designed by reference to a federal logic, it is possible to build in better safeguards for provincial autonomy.

\(^{109}\) Article 154G (5) (a) and (b)  
\(^{110}\) Article 154G (9)  
\(^{111}\) Article 154G (6), read with Article 154G (5) (a)  
\(^{112}\) The Supreme Court determination in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148, upheld the mandatory duty of Provincial Councils to consult Parliament when legislating on the Concurrent List (Article 154G (5) (b) and Article 154G (9)), but it did not expressly say whether the corresponding duty on Parliament to consult Provincial Councils under Article 154G (5) (a) was mandatory.  
\(^{113}\) See CPA (2008) *Strengthening the Provincial Council System*
Such safeguards may be both substantive and procedural (i.e., through a better articulation of concurrent responsibilities and a more balanced method of determining pre-eminence within the concurrent field), as well as institutional (for e.g., by providing for formalised roles for the provincial level in central legislative and policy-making processes such as through a second chamber and inter-ministerial councils). Within the framework of the Thirteenth Amendment, a more considerate attitude to provincial autonomy and devolution, and correspondingly a more circumspect and consensual approach to the exercise of its own powers, is required on the part of the central government.

The subjects in the Reserved List (List II), which are exercisable exclusively by the central level, are framed in noticeably more general and broader terms than the subjects in the two other lists. Presumably for the same reason, they are also not numbered. The Reserved List includes all the traditional powers, responsibilities and competences that are associated with the government of a sovereign state, including defence and national security; foreign affairs; financial powers over national revenue; monetary policy; external resources; customs; foreign and inter-provincial trade and commerce; national transport, ports and aviation; citizenship; and important natural resources.

It also contains, however, two unusual clauses which have been argued to be inconsistent with devolution, and which have in fact been used regularly by the central government to undermine devolution.114 The first is the well-known ‘National Policy on all Subjects and Functions’ clause. The other is an adjunct of the vesting of residual power in the central Parliament by Article 154Q (10), which states that ‘All Subjects and Functions not Specified in List I or List III…’ belong to the centre. Even in the context of a unitary state, it is possible to vest residual power in the centre without harming devolution, but the existence of this provision in the Reserved List buttresses the scope for interventions already provided for in the Thirteenth Amendment.

While it would seem that the national policy clause relates only to law made by Parliament, it has in practice been interpreted as conferring both a legislative and an executive power: ‘policy’ may be enacted as an Act of Parliament, but it is more commonly made in the form of executive orders, Cabinet decisions, Administrative Circulars, statutory instruments and so on.115 This means that this provision in the Reserved List allows the central government to pre-empt the exercise of legislative power by Provincial Councils by executive fiat.

Moreover, it seems never to have been thought possible to interpret the national policy clause in the Reserved List as applying only to the Reserved List, rather than all three lists and thereby providing an avenue for a wholesale encroachment on the provincial sphere. Such a narrow interpretation would have been a crucial safeguard for devolution. In this way, the national policy clause allows the central government to, relatively effortlessly, usurp the competences of the Provincial Councils, and it has in fact been repeatedly used by the central government to denude...

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114 Another potentially problematic provision is Article 154Q (d), discussed in relation to the Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 1990 in Ch. 3.1, above.

115 See Asoka Gunawardane Committee Report: Chs. 2, 3
devolution. From a devolution viewpoint, the national policy clause is without doubt one of the most prominent weaknesses of the Thirteenth Amendment.

While it was perhaps possible to interpret the national policy clause as only empowering the centre to impose ‘national policies’ in the form of an Act of Parliament rather than by executive or administrative action, the Supreme Court has endorsed the broader approach to the national policy clause. In *Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission, North-Western Province* (2001), in which the competence at issue was over the subject of education and the measure purporting to be national policy was an administrative circular of the relevant central ministry, the Supreme Court stated that, “While powers in respect of education have been devolved to the Provincial Councils, those powers must be exercised in conformity with national policy. Once national policy has been duly formulated in respect of any subject, there cannot be any conflicting provincial policy on that subject.”

3.4 Statute-making in the Eastern Provincial Council

The election and constitution of the Eastern Provincial Council in 2008 carried with it considerable expectations. The central government expressed a commitment towards a full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and presented the restoration of devolved institutions in one half of the war-torn areas as a victory for democracy against terrorism as well as a showcase of its programme of post-war reconstruction. Moreover, the UPFA controlled a majority of the Eastern Provincial Council, and thus the elected provincial administration. There was cause therefore for optimism that devolution in at least a part of the area for which it was originally addressed would take root, and even flourish.

Viewed against such expectations, the experience with regard to the exercise of devolved legislative power by the Eastern Provincial Council has been somewhat less than ideal. There is no doubt about both the desire and the determination on the part of elected members of the Council, irrespective of party affiliations, to exercise devolved powers. This cross-party enthusiasm accounts in large part for what success there has been in the record of statute-making in the Eastern Provincial Council.

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116 Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission, North-Western Province (2001) 1 SLR 1 at 5. Note that the relevant ‘national policy’ in this case was declared in a mere circular issued by the central Ministry of Education, which means that the central executive may make policy which will be upheld against an express provincial legislative competence in contravention of the national policy. Note, however, that in this case the issue was not of conflict between a provincial statute and the national policy in the central ministry circular, but a decision of a provincial authority acting under delegation from the Provincial Public Service Commission. Compare *Ranjani Priyalatha v. Provincial Public Service Commission, Central Province* (2009), CA Writ App. No. 775/07, 3rd November 2009, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.522, in which it was held by the Court of Appeal that a provincial statute on a matter in the Provincial Council List prevails over a central administrative circular on the same matter (in this case the regulation Ayurveda medical services). On agrarian services, see the Supreme Court determinations in Agrarian Services (Amendment) Bill (1990), SCSD No. 9 of 1990, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148; and Agrarian Services (Amendment) Bill (1991), SCSD No. 2 of 1991, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.177. Compare with the Supreme Court judgment in *Madduma Banda v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services* (2003) 2 SLR 80. On passenger transport, see the Supreme Court determination in National Transport Commission Bill (1991), SCSD No. 8 of 1991, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.195; and *Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council* (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.148
The Council adopted its rules of procedure on 7th October 2008, which were approved by the President on 3rd December 2008. The initial period following the summoning of the Council into session in June 2008 saw several administrative challenges, such as getting the Secretariat into a fully functional state and the provision of facilities necessary for members to perform their functions. In this context, the period of four months taken to enact its own rules of procedure is understandable. Nonetheless, the legal requirement of presidential approval took two months, which is less understandable.

The first piece of substantive legislation passed by the Eastern Provincial Council was the Finance Statute, No. 1 of 2008. The draft statute was presented to the Council in the budget speech of the Chief Minister on 18th November 2008, and was passed on the same day. The Finance Statute establishes the legal and institutional framework for the exercise of the fiscal powers of the Eastern Provincial Council. In conformity with Article 154G (8), the Finance Statute lists the existing central legislation with which it is inconsistent. It provides for the administration of the fiscal regime by the appointment of a Provincial Commissioner of Revenue, Assessors and other officers, and assessment, revenue collection and appeals. The legal basis of the imposition and collection of the taxes that Provincial Councils are entitled to raise – turnover tax, stamp duty, excise revenue, lotteries, prize competitions and court fines and fees – is established by the statute in respect of the Eastern Province, and the exclusion of other authorities collecting such revenues at the time and recovery of dues by the provincial administration.

By enacting the Finance Statute, the Eastern Provincial Council was seeking to claim the devolved executive powers in relation to revenue-raising which, even within the limited framework of such powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, is an important assertion of provincial autonomy. The remarkable point to note, however, about the passage of this statute was the inordinate time that it took for the Governor to give his assent, and thereby to complete the process of valid enactment. After processes of consultations with the central government, assent was eventually granted on 5th March 2009, but the absence of assent to the Finance Statute for a period of almost four months was a major cause of tension between the Governor and the Board of Ministers. What is also significant to note here was that, during this period, assent was forthcoming expeditiously (i.e., within as little as three days) in relation to statutes

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117 As required by Section 11 of the Provincial Councils Act, No 42 of 1987; Secretary to the President’s Letter No.CSA/10/B/11 dated 3rd December 2008, and Governor’s Letter No.G/EPC/B/23 dated 4th December 2008.


119 The Turnover Tax Act, No. 69 of 1981 as amended; the Stamp Duty Act, No. 43 of 1982 as amended; the Excise Ordinance as amended; the Prize Competition Act, No. 37 of 1957 as amended; the Municipal Councils Ordinance as amended; the Urban Councils Ordinance as amended; and the Pradeshiya Sabhas Act, No. 15 of 1987.

over which the Provincial Council only had a marginal role, and which unlike the Finance Statute did not represent an assertion of autonomy by the Board of Ministers and Council.\(^{121}\)

Through the instrument of assent, the Governor is an integral part of the provincial legislative process. The detailed rules with regard to the performance of this function are provided in Article 154H.\(^{122}\) While there is emphatically no assumption underlying these provisions that the Governor must give assent automatically, the entire tenor of Article 154H suggests a framework that balances the interests the Governor is intended to oversee, with that of a reasonably expeditious statute-making process within the Provincial Council. By neither assenting nor formally withholding assent for almost four months, coupled with an unfortunate absence of courteous communication with the Board of Ministers furnishing any explanation for the delay, it is fair to conclude that the Governor established an unhealthy precedent in the Eastern Province. It is a precedent that is contrary to both the letter and spirit of the applicable constitutional provision. Together with other ongoing disagreements during this early period, this episode instituted an unfortunate ethos of distrust between the two executive actors at the very outset of the implementation of devolved government in the Eastern Province.

In addition to the financial matters, the Eastern Provincial Council has enacted two other statutes of a substantive nature: the Transport Authority Statute, No. 2 of 2009,\(^{123}\) and the Pre-School Education Statute, No. 1 of 2010.\(^{124}\) While it is to be hoped that the passage of these statutes enabling the greater exercise of provincial autonomy portend a more co-operative atmosphere between the Governor and the Board of Ministers, there are ongoing issues (for e.g., the dispute regarding the establishment of a Chief Minister’s Fund) that justify a more cautious assessment.

Moreover, what would have been the most outstanding assertion of provincial autonomy by any Provincial Council – the claiming of the provincial powers over policing and law and order by the

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122 See discussion in Ch. 3.2, above

123 Assented on 2\(^{nd}\) July 2009 (Governor’s Letter to the Chairman, Eastern Provincial Council No.G/EPC/AO/01 dated 2\(^{nd}\) July 2009). The long title of this statute states that it is consistent with the National Transport Commission Act, No. 37 of 1991. The requirement of Article 154G (8) in relation to the exercise of legislative power by Provincial Councils is that the provincial statute describes in its long title the provisions of existing central legislation with which it is inconsistent. There is no requirement that the provincial statute should mention any central legislation with which it is consistent, as long as the provincial statute concerns a subject in the Provincial Council List. Item 8 of the Provincial Council List concerns surface transport as a provincial competence. The reference in the Eastern Province Transport Statute to the National Transport Commission Act therefore seems to be out of an abundance of caution, in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p. 148, discussed in Ch. 3.3, above. Note also that in the Supreme Court determination on the National Transport Commission Bill (1991), SCSD No. 6 of 1991 (which was enacted as the National Transport Commission Act, No. 37 of 1991), reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p. 195, the provincial competence over transport expressly provided in Item 8 of the Provincial Council List was never raised.

124 Assented on 4\(^{th}\) May 2010 (Governor’s Letter to the Chairman, Eastern Provincial Council No.G/EPC/AO/01 dated 4\(^{th}\) May 2010)
enactment of a Police Statute – never came to fruition, although the Chief Minister’s office went so far as to draft legislation in October 2009. The Chief Minister has consistently stated that his administration desires the implementation of the devolved police powers. In the context of the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment relating to police having never been implemented by the central government in any Province, the enactment of a Police Statute in the Eastern Province would have constituted the basis for an assertion of these powers. Such an assertion would be nothing more than was already provided for in the Constitution in respect of police powers. However, the central government, notwithstanding previous commitments to the full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, made it clear that it was wholly opposed to devolving police powers. In that context, it became clear that to pursue legislation would place the provincial administration on a confrontational course with the central government for which, needless to say, there is little appetite.

More broadly, what this record of legislative activity in the Eastern Provincial Council reveals is that it hardly functions as a pivotal institution of post-war reconstruction, resettlement and development in the Eastern Province. There have been substantial governmental interventions in the Eastern Province since 2008, especially in the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, including roads, bridges, electrification and so on. However, much of this activity is conceived, planned and executed via central government institutions, in particular the Ministry of Nation-Building through major programmes such as Nagenahira Navodaya (Eastern Reawakening), which functions through its own presence in the Province and other central government agents such as District and Divisional Secretaries over whom the elected provincial administration has no control. Elected members of the Eastern Provincial Council and the Board of Ministers are expected to play a supporting rather than a leading, or even a consultative role in these high-visibility programmes. In other words, governmental activity in the Eastern Province is centre-led (and within that highly executive-centric) and top-down, and functions firmly within the paradigm of the centralised unitary state rather than according to a logic of devolution. Thus administrative and political practices, firmly associated with the centralisation that is characteristic of the style of President Rajapaksa’s administration, serve to deny even the limited provincial autonomy allowed by the structural framework of the Thirteenth Amendment.

What is critically important to note in terms of the provincial viewpoint in the Eastern Province is that while all this activity and investment aimed at post-war reconstruction is obviously and wholeheartedly welcomed, they are not a substitute for the equally strong desire for devolution and provincial autonomy. Ideally, the Provincial Council should be the frontline agency in the delivery of these programmes. This is not the case, and this has led to considerable disillusionment about the prospects for devolution in the future.

125 Item 1 and Appendix I of List I of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution
3.5 Conclusions

The Thirteenth Amendment framework for the devolution of legislative power to Provincial Councils was novel at the time of its introduction because Sri Lanka had never before had experience with a devolved tier of government at the provincial level. However, the implementation of devolution has highlighted several impediments. As a constitutional principle, devolution must function in tandem with the principal foundational norm of the Constitution of 1978, the unitary state, which also underpins what is structurally an exceptionally centralised system of government at the central level. The structural framework of devolution therefore is firmly subordinate to the overarching supremacy of central institutions. This is reflected in both the distribution of substantive competences (or subjects) in the three lists, as well as in the scope of the legislative and executive powers that are devolved. Central institutions have the power to intervene in the provincial sphere in not only justifiable emergency situations, but are also cast in constitutional roles which entail, indeed require, central interference in the day-to-day functioning of Provincial Councils (including in illogically minute matters such the requirement of presidential approval for the rules of procedure of Provincial Councils).

In relation to legislative power specifically, the subordinate status of provincial statutes in the constitutionally recognised hierarchy of legislation, the weakness of the concurrent jurisdiction, the Reserved List ‘national policy’ power, the Governor’s involvement in the statute-making process generally through the requirement of assent and specifically in relation to financial statutes, the lack of precision and clarity in the textual formulations of the three lists, and the refusal or failure of successive governments at the centre to implement some parts of the Thirteenth Amendment (for e.g., powers over police, state land), all contribute to a vulnerable system of devolution.

In addition, there is also the pervasive tendency to centralisation in judicial attitudes, and in the public service as well as in the broader political culture (for e.g., in the centralised internal organisation of political parties) that pre-dates devolution. These administrative and political cultures and practices have witnessed little or no change in the post-1987 constitutional context of devolution. There is no coherent pattern in the jurisprudence of the superior courts, which initially demonstrated extreme disinclination to promote and enhance devolution, but which more recently have been more willing to countenance conclusions supportive of devolution. However, due to the absence of a coherent theoretical foundation regarding devolution within the unitary state, either in the text of the Constitution or in the body of judicial pronouncements, there is no guarantee that the recent trend of ‘pro-devolution’ judicial attitudes may continue.

In relation to the Eastern Province, it is welcome that an elected Provincial Council has been constituted and is functioning. Administrative and capacity issues that are understandably present in setting up a new Council in a challenging post-war environment have been faced with a high degree of resolve by those elected to the Council and officials. However, the potential for the exercise of devolved legislative power commensurate with the central government’s stated commitment to the full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment has not been realised. In the absence of a new and more workable constitutional settlement with regard to devolution,
there are several issues that must be urgently addressed in the better implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The central government has the responsibility to ensure full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, to place the Provincial Council, if not as the primary institution, then at least as an equal partner of the centre in the delivery of reconstruction and development programmes in the Eastern Province, and to ensure that officials under its control (including Ministers and officials of central Ministries, the Governor, District Secretaries and Divisional Secretaries) exercise their functions in a manner that is consistent with the letter and spirit of devolution.
CHAPTER 4
EXECUTIVE POWER

As with the devolution of legislative powers, central institutions play a significant role in the exercise of executive powers in the provincial sphere. This is mainly through the office of the Governor, although the President also has certain direct roles. The elected part of the provincial executive is the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers. While it would seem that by virtue of being democratically elected and accountable the Board of Ministers should be the pre-eminent executive body within the Province, this is not so straightforwardly the case in the system of devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment because of the substantive (rather than merely symbolic) powers of the Governor.

The basic scope of the provincial executive power is defined in Article 154C as ‘executive power extending to the matters with respect to which a Provincial Council has power to make statutes.’ This seems like a clear-cut devolution of executive powers in relation to the subjects over which legislative power has been devolved. However, it is in the manner prescribed for its exercise, and in the institutions empowered to exercise it, that it becomes clear that the devolution of executive power does not exactly match the extent of legislative devolution, and indeed is materially a lesser extent of devolution.

As Article 154C goes on to provide, provincial executive power shall be exercised by the Governor ‘either directly or through Ministers of the Board of Ministers, or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with Article 154F.’ In terms of Article 154B (2), the Governor is appointed by the President and holds office, in accordance with Article 4 (b), during the pleasure of the President. Article 4 (b) which explicates the ways in which the sovereignty of the people of Sri Lanka enshrined in Article 3 shall be exercised, states that the executive power of the people shall be exercised by the President of the Republic. The clear implication of the reference to Article 4 (b) in Article 154B (2) therefore is that the office and powers of the Governor are an extension of those of the President. Thus the effect of Articles 154B (2) and 154C is that there is no ‘provincial executive power’ as such, but an extension of the central executive power to the Provincial Councils, in the exercise of which the Board of Ministers has a role in accordance with Article 154F. This is made clear in Articles 154F (1) and (2) wherein a distinction is made in the functions of the Governor as between those in which he should act in accordance with the advice of the Board of Ministers, and others in which he is required to act in

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126 As the Supreme Court held In re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill (1997) 2 SLR 312 at 323, the Governor exercises executive powers as a ‘delegate’ of the President. It must be noted, however, that due to the Governor’s actions being judicially reviewable (unlike the President under Article 35, the Governor does not enjoy immunity from legal action), and various judicial observations that the Governor’s powers under the Provincial Councils Act in particular are specific statutory powers and duties independent of the executive power of the state (see Podinilame v. Mathew (1996) 2 SLR 82), the nature of Governor’s powers should be considered to be both an extension of presidential power as well as including statutorily conferred specific executive functions.
his own discretion. It is expressly provided that the exercise of the Governor’s discretion shall be on the President’s directions.127

The Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act, No. 12 of 1989,128 extends executive discretions129 and rule-making powers130 conferred on central Ministers and public officers by existing laws, to the Governors, provincial Ministers, and provincial public officers. The Consequential Provisions Act only applies to laws that relate to matters in the Provincial Council List, and which were enacted before 14th November 1987 (i.e., the date on which the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act were certified). The Supreme Court has affirmed that, in terms of Articles 154G (1) and (8) and the Consequential Provisions Act, provincial executive power may be exercised in accordance with pre-existing central legislation pertaining to subjects in the Provincial Council List where a Provincial Council has not enacted its own statutes on those subjects.131

This is an ‘extension’132 of the application of the relevant laws to the provincial executive. It does not suspend the executive authority of central Ministers and public officers under the relevant category of laws. The resulting position is that both the central and provincial executives may exercise powers under these laws. The effect of the Consequential Provisions Act in relation to executive power is therefore more limited than, and not analogous to, the scope of provincial legislative power under Article 154G (8). It will be recalled that under this provision, a provincial statute on any matter in the Provincial Council List has the effect of suspending the operation of any inconsistent pre-existing central legislation.133

Notwithstanding what is provided in the Consequential Provisions Act, however, one of the criticisms made against the Thirteenth Amendment system of devolution has been that even the limited framework envisaged in the Constitution is further constrained by other pieces of

127 Article 154F (2), which has however been restrictively interpreted by the Supreme Court: Premachandra v. Jayawickrema (1994) 2 SLR 90 (SC) and Premachandra and Dodangoda v. Jayawickrema and Bakeer Markar (1993) 2 SLR 294 (CA)

128 See also the Supreme Court determination in the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Bill (1989), SCSD No. 11 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.138 in which the constitutionality of this law was decided. It is also commonly known as the ‘Consequential Provisions Act.’ It seems to have been enacted as an interim measure to facilitate the exercise of provincial executive power under pre-existing legislation, until such time as Provincial Councils were able to enact their own statutes in relation to devolved competences (Long Title). Its interim nature is further underscored by the (unusual) provision in Section 1 that its operation may be terminated by a Ministerial Order. However, it continues in force.

129 Section 2 (1)

130 Section 2 (2)


132 From a purely technical standpoint, an even narrower view of the effect of the Consequential Provisions Act is possible on the basis of its long title, which states that it is, “An Act to make Interim Provision for the Interpretation of Written Law on Matters set out in List I of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution.” It would seem therefore that the Act is merely an instruction to the courts given by Parliament that, in the interpretation of pre-existing laws falling within its ambit, they are enjoined to recognise the actions of provincial executive authorities.

133 See discussion in Ch. 3.1, above
underlying central legislation, particularly (but not exclusively) the Provincial Councils Act.\footnote{134} The validity of this criticism is amply illustrated in the additional powers of the Governor that are established by the Provincial Councils Act.

In Part III of the Act dealing with provincial finance, the role of the Governor is set out in such a way as to render him the finance minister of the Province.\footnote{135} In view of the fact that the Governor is an agent of the central government appointed by the President, and that he is not elected by the people of the Province, the vesting of financial powers crucial to the exercise of other provincial executive and legislative powers in the Governor is contrary to the principle of devolution. While of course it is the Provincial Council that has the authority to approve or reject public revenue and expenditure proposals recommended by the Governor,\footnote{136} it would be more consistent with democratic principles if the elected executive of the Province has the responsibility for public finances.

Likewise in Part IV of the Act, powers over the provincial public service is vested in the Governor.\footnote{137} Although provision is made for a Provincial Public Service Commission, this body is merely delegated with the primary powers of the Governor, which erodes its independence and the independence of the provincial public service. This enables the Governor, if he is so inclined, to indirectly control the functioning of provincial ministries notwithstanding the wishes of provincial ministers who are elected by the people and are accountable to the Provincial Council.

This system of split executive powers and responsibilities is structurally incoherent viewed against objectives such as efficiency and accountability. It is inefficient because it creates tensions within the executive between the Governor and the Board of Ministers, and undermines the smooth functioning of the provincial administration. It is problematic from the perspective of accountability because it ruptures the relationship between responsibility and accountability. The Board of Ministers is collectively responsible and answerable to the Provincial Council, but they do not have the primary responsibility for the public finances of the Province. The Governor answers to the President only, and his conduct is largely above the scrutiny of the Provincial Council, except under the special procedure for his removal.\footnote{138} However, all provincial executive and administrative actions are subject to judicial review, including under the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.\footnote{139}

\footnote{134} Other attempts, outside the Thirteenth Amendment, at ‘clawing back’ devolution by the central government includes the system of Divisional Secretaries established in 1992 by the Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act, No. 58 of 1992. Divisional Secretaries, who function within the territorial jurisdiction of the Provinces, and whose functions are an extension of presidential power and directly impinge on or replicate provincial competences, are wholly unanswerable to Provincial Councils.

\footnote{135} Sections 24, 25, 26, 28 and 30 of the Provincial Councils Act

\footnote{136} Section 26 of the Provincial Councils Act

\footnote{137} The most senior public officer of the Province, the Chief Secretary, is appointed directly by the President with the concurrence of the Chief Minister: Section 31 of the Provincial Councils Act

\footnote{138} Section 18 of the Provincial Councils Act read with Article 154B (4)

\footnote{139} Parameswary Jayathevan v. Attorney General (1992) 2 SLR 356
The structure of public administration is also another, and extra-constitutional, basis on which the effectiveness of Provincial Councils has been consistently undermined. The introduction of devolution necessitated a major restructuring of the public service in the light of a multi-level system of government, which has never been done. On the contrary, the central government has continued with pre-devolution structures, procedures and practices, and even introduced new institutions of central government power at the sub-district level (Divisional Secretaries) after the establishment of Provincial Councils which seem designed to undermine the latter.\textsuperscript{140} Aside from the role of the Governor in respect of the provincial public service, therefore, the resulting position is that the central government operates directly at the District, Divisional and Village levels through District Secretaries (i.e., the colonial Government Agents), Divisional Secretaries and Grama Niladharis, in a parallel, and often competing, administrative structure. The Provincial Councils have no comparable administrative structures at these lower levels.\textsuperscript{141}

We have seen that the devolution of legislative power has been constrained by institutional, procedural and substantive limitations in the Thirteenth Amendment. The framework for the exercise of devolved executive power is thus even more restricted under the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act, because a substantial part of executive power within the Province is exercised by an officer of the central government: the Governor.

4.1 The Governor

Article 154B (1) provides that there shall be a Governor for each Province. The Governor is appointed by the President for a term of five years, which is renewable.\textsuperscript{142} The Governor may not hold any other office.\textsuperscript{143} In terms of Article 154B (2), the Governor holds office at the pleasure of the President, which means that the President has the power to dismiss him at any time. Aside from resignation,\textsuperscript{144} the Provincial Council may also present an address to the President advising the removal of the Governor on the grounds of intentional violation of the Constitution,\textsuperscript{145} misconduct or corruption involving the abuse of his powers of office,\textsuperscript{146} or if he is found guilty of bribery or an offence involving moral turpitude.\textsuperscript{147} A resolution for the presentation of such an

\textsuperscript{140} Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act, No. 58 of 1992. See also Asoka Gunawardane Committee Report: Ch. 4

\textsuperscript{141} Although in terms of the Provincial Council List, local government authorities fall under Provincial Councils, they do not function under any administrative control of the Provincial Councils. Another complicating factor is the Decentralised Budget system under which Members of the national Parliament make decisions with regard to development programmes within their districts, administered by District Secretariats, further marginalising the Provincial Councils.

\textsuperscript{142} Article 154B (1) and (5)

\textsuperscript{143} Article 154B (7)

\textsuperscript{144} Article 154B (3)

\textsuperscript{145} Article 154B (4) (a) (i)

\textsuperscript{146} Article 154B (4) (a) (ii)

\textsuperscript{147} Article 154B (4) (a) (iii)
address must be passed by a two-thirds majority in the Provincial Council, and furthermore, such a resolution cannot be entertained by the Chairman of the Provincial Council or discussed in the Provincial Council unless notice of the resolution is signed by at least one half of the members. Thus it is not merely the case that the elected legislature of the Province has no power to remove the dominant executive officer within the Province, but all of these provisions cumulatively demand the total loyalty of the Governor to the President.

In terms of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act, the Governor is vested with powers of a general nature as well as several specified powers. Both categories of powers are present in the day-to-day administration of the Province, as well as the extraordinary or emergency circumstances for which the Constitution has made provision.

As we have seen, the general executive power at the provincial level is set out in Article 154C and Article 154F, read with Article 154B (2) and Article 4 (b). In terms of these provisions, the key to the exercise of executive power within the Province is the two distinctive methods described in Article 154C and Article 154F (1). That is, the Governor exercises executive power either directly in his discretion where he is required so to do by or under the Constitution or on the advice of the Board of Ministers. It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the circumstances in which the two methods for the exercise of executive power operate.

The term ‘discretion’ must be understood in its legal sense. It may denote an action which is taken by the Governor upon exercising a choice from a range of options available to him within the powers conferred on him by law. It may also relate to the existence of a particular factual situation in which the law stipulates how the Governor should act. An illustration of both types of situation is the provision concerning the Governor’s function in the appointment of the Chief Minister. Article 154F (4) gives him a discretion to appoint as Chief Minister the member of the Provincial Council who, in his opinion, is best able to command the support of a majority of members of that Council. In a situation where no single party or group enjoys an absolute majority, the Governor is given a legal discretion to make a reasonable choice in the appointment of the Chief Minister. By contrast, where more than one-half of the members elected to the Provincial Council would support a particular candidate, the Governor is given the power to exercise his discretion in appointing the Chief Minister.

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148 Article 154B (4) (a). For this purpose, the requisite majority is a two-thirds of the whole number of members of the Provincial Council including those not present

149 Article 154B (4) (b). For this purpose, the requisite number of signatures is of one half of the members present

150 See discussion in Ch. 4, above

151 The phrase ‘by or under the Constitution’ in Article 154F (1) is important. In addition to the powers conferred by the Constitution itself, those that are conferred by central legislation are under the Constitution. This refers to, inter alia, Article 154Q. See also the Supreme Court determination in the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Bill (1989), SCSD No. 11 of 1989, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.138 at pp.140-141.

152 The circumstances in which executive power is exercised by the Governor on the advice of the Board of Ministers is discussed in Ch. 4.2, below

153 There is notionally a third method through which the Governor is empowered to exercise his powers under Article 154C, and that is through officers subordinate to him, although in practice in a situation in which there is no Provincial Council or Board of Ministers, the Governor exercises power alone but with the assistance of officers of the public services. This is what prevailed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces after the dissolution of the North-Eastern Provincial Council in 1990. The Northern Province continues in that mode, whereas since June 2008 an elected Provincial Council has been reconstituted in the Eastern Province.
Provincial Council are from one political party, the proviso to Article 154F (4) expressly requires him to appoint the leader of that group as Chief Minister. Here he has no choice in the exercise of his discretion.\textsuperscript{154}

In the ordinary course of the administration of the Province, the Governor is required to exercise power in his own discretion (i.e., independently of the advice of the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers) in the following situations. In addition to the appointment of the Chief Minister described above, one of the most important roles of the Governor in this respect is the discretion of assent to provincial statutes. We have already considered the legislative process within the Province, whereby it was seen that the Governor’s assent was an integral element of it.\textsuperscript{155} The Governor may assent or withhold assent to a provincial statute, he may return the statute for reconsideration by the Provincial Council with or without recommendations for amendment, and he may reserve the statute for reference by the President to the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{156} Without the Governor’s assent in accordance with the procedure in Article 154H, no provincial statute may be validly enacted.

The Governor acts in his own discretion to summon, prorogue and dissolve the Provincial Council when the Chief Minister does not command the support of a majority of the Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{157} The Supreme Court has clearly held that this power is only available to the Governor when the Chief Minister cannot command a majority; he cannot exercise his powers under Article 154F (8) against the wishes of a Chief Minister with a majority.\textsuperscript{158} The Governor acts in his discretion if and when he decides to address the Provincial Council, or when he sends a message to the Provincial Council on any matter.\textsuperscript{159}

Over and above this are the constitutional functions dealing with exceptional situations in which the Governor acts in his own discretion. Article 154J concerns states of emergency and it empowers the President to give directions to the Governor as to the manner in which his executive power is to be exercised in such circumstances. Article 154L pertains to the powers of the President in the context of a failure of administrative machinery within a Province. One of the ways in which the provisions of Article 154L are engaged is when a Governor transmits a report to the President that a situation has arisen in which the administrative of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. It is implicit that the Governor arrives at such a conclusion through the exercise of his own discretion (which does not preclude the possibility that such a report to the President may also be initiated on the advice of the Board of Ministers). In terms of Article 154N, when the President has issued a Proclamation regarding a situation of financial instability in the country or in any part thereof, he may give directions to the Governor of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{154} See Premachandra v. Jayawickrema (1994) 2 SLR 90 (SC) and Premachandra and Dodangoda v. Jayawickrema and Bakeer Markar (1993) 2 SLR 294 (CA).
  \item \textsuperscript{155} See discussion in Ch. 3.2, above
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Article 154H
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Article 154B (8)
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Mahindasoma v. Senanayake (1996) 1 SLR 180 (CA); Senanayake v. Mahindasoma (1998) 2 SLR 333 (SC)
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Article 154B (10)
\end{itemize}
a Province to observe such canons of financial propriety as may be specified. In such a situation, the Governor must exercise his powers in compliance with the directions of the President.

As noted above, Article 154F (1) contemplates the possibility of additional powers and functions being conferred on the Governor other than those expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Accordingly, the Provincial Councils Act has established an array of such powers and functions for the Governor, which further consolidates his integral role in the administration of the Province.

Section 5A\[^{160}\] effectively empowers the Governor to dissolve a Provincial Council by a communication to the President in two extraordinary situations: where the Provincial Council has for all intents and purposes ceased to function,\[^{161}\] or a situation in which more than one half of its membership has expressly repudiated or manifestly disavowed obedience to the Constitution or otherwise acted in contravention of their oath of office.\[^{162}\] The Provincial Council stands dissolved upon the transmission of the Governor’s communication to the President. Clearly, the apprehension as to the existence of the factual circumstances necessitating a communication under Section 5A is a matter for the Governor’s exclusive discretion.\[^{163}\]

More generally, the Provincial Councils Act sets out a series of functions, which the Governor performs in the normal administration of the Province.\[^{164}\] These provisions of the Act relate to three broad areas: the conduct of legislative business in the Provincial Council (Part II of the Act); finance (Part III); and the direction and control of the provincial public service (Part IV).

In addition to the function of assent,\[^{165}\] the Governor makes the rules allocating business among the provincial ministries in the legislative process of the Provincial Council (other than business in respect of which he is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion).\[^{166}\]

It is with regard to the procedure for fiscal and financial statutes in the Provincial Councils that the Governor’s powers are most visible, and least compatible with democratic and devolution.

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\[^{160}\] Introduced by the Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 1990, in the aftermath of events in the North-Eastern Provincial Council discussed in Ch. 2.1 and Ch. 3.1, above. See also the Supreme Court determination in Provincial Councils (Amendment) Bill, SCM 14th June 1990, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.173

\[^{161}\] Section 5A (b)

\[^{162}\] Section 5A (a)

\[^{163}\] Moreover, Section 5 (3), also introduced by Act No. 27 of 1990, provides that where the Governor communicates to the Chairman of the Provincial Council that a member of the Provincial Council has in his opinion expressly repudiated or manifestly disavowed obedience to the Constitution in contravention of the member’s oath of office, such a member is disqualified from sitting and voting in the Provincial Council.

\[^{164}\] Sections 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 (subject to Article 154H), 28, 29 (read with Section 24 (3)), 30 (transitional provision, now lapsed), 32 and 33 of the Provincial Councils Act. See also Section 11 (c) prohibiting any discussion in the Provincial Councils of any matter concerning the discharge of the Governor’s discretion in relation to which he is by or under the Constitution required to act on his own; Section 16 vesting in the Provincial Council all contractual rights and obligations entered into by the Governor; and Section 18 prohibiting discussion in the Provincial Council of the conduct of the Governor (except in terms of Article 154B (4)), the President, a Member of Parliament, or any judicial officer.

\[^{165}\] Article 154H

\[^{166}\] Section 15 (1)
The Governor makes the rules governing all aspects of provincial finance, including the Provincial Fund and the Emergency Fund of the Province. No provincial statute involving revenue or expenditure may be introduced, moved or passed by the Provincial Council except on the recommendation of the Governor. The Governor presents the annual budget of the provincial administration (called the ‘annual financial statement’) to the Provincial Council showing the estimates of receipts and expenditure, and he must recommend all demands for grants made to the Provincial Council. While the Provincial Council has the authority to approve the annual budget, the consequent Appropriations Statute is subject to the assent of the Governor. Any demands for supplementary grants or votes on account during a financial year may only be initiated by the Governor. The Governor submits audited accounts of the provincial administration to the Provincial Council. The cumulative effect of these provisions, in short, is that the Governor is made into the ‘finance minister’ of the Province.

Similar to the financial framework, the arrangements for the direction and control of the provincial public service also place the Governor at its heart. The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution (2001), which introduced a new regulatory framework for the public service and its independence at the central level, made no express or consequential changes to the procedures relating to the provincial public service. The appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of officers of the provincial public service are vested in Governor. The Governor has the power to make rules in relation to all aspects of the public service. The Governor may

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167 Part III of the Act
168 Section 19 (5)
169 Section 20 (3)
170 Section 24
171 Section 25
172 Section 26 (3)
173 Section 27 read with Article 154H
174 Section 28
175 Section 29 read with Section 24 (3)
176 Part IV of the Act
177 The Seventeenth Amendment did make two other changes to the Thirteenth Amendment: (a) the appointment of members of the Finance Commission established under 154R was brought within the ambit of Article 41B and its schedule (Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment). More specifically, the three members appointed to represent the three major communities (the other two being ex officio) are now appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council (Section 19 of the Seventeenth Amendment); (b) the removal of the functions of the President in the exercise of provincial police powers by the substitution of the National Police Commission for those functions (Section 23 of the Seventeenth Amendment, amending Items 3, 6, 7, 9:2 of Appendix I of List I of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution). For the issues of constitutional amendment procedure arising from this, see discussion in Ch. 3.1, above.
178 Section 32 (1)
179 Section 32 (3)
delegate these powers to a Provincial Public Service Commission, \( ^{181} \) the members and chairman of which are appointed and are removable by him. \( ^{182} \) The Governor has the power to override any decision or order of the Provincial Public Service Commission. \( ^{183} \) In the light of these provisions, the legal framework for the independence of the Provincial Public Service Commission, and thereby the provincial public service, cannot be regarded as effective.

An important issue here is whether, unlike in the extraordinary situations contemplated by Articles 154J, 154L, 154N and Section 5A in which it is reasonable to presume that the Governor exercises his functions at his own discretion, the more general functions set out in the Act are also of that nature (i.e., that he is not legally required to seek or follow the advice of the Board of Ministers). A literal interpretation of the statutory provisions would seem to indicate that the Governor is not required to act in accordance with the advice of the Board of Ministers. On the other hand, a purposive interpretation of the statutory provisions, within the meaning of Article 154F (1), and consistent with democracy and devolution, suggests that the Governor should in practice act on the advice of the elected Board of Ministers. While the practical experience of Provincial Councils in the operation of the Thirteenth Amendment in the past two decades suggests that Governors have generally functioned harmoniously with their Ministers, there have been occasions in which conflicts have led to litigation. \( ^{184} \) The broader point to note in relation to this statutory framework, however, is that the provisions of the Provincial Councils Act are framed in such a way that it opens the space for the Governor, if he so desires or upon the instructions of the President, to assert his will against the wishes of the elected executive in the form of the Board of Ministers even in matters of day-to-day administration.

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\( ^{181} \) Section 32 (2)

\( ^{182} \) Sections 33 (1) and (3). For the manner in which these powers are exercisable by the Governor, see Podinilame v. Mathew (1996) 2 SLR 82. The Court of Appeal held that the powers under Section 32 are specific statutory powers established by the Provincial Councils Act, and that the executive functions set out in Articles 154B, 154C and 154F have no application to an exercise of powers under that section. This raises the question as to whether the Provincial Councils Act is an independent source of powers or whether it is a statutory extension of the executive powers vested by the Constitution. The effect of this decision insofar as the provincial public service is concerned at least is that the Board of Ministers has no right to tender advice to the Governor in the appointment of the Provincial Public Service Commission, in the exercise of his powers under Section 32. See also Bandara v. Arawwawala (1996), CA Writ App. No. 483/95, 24th May 1996 (unreported), and Ranjani Priyalatha v. Provincial Public Service Commission, Central Province (2009), CA Writ App. No. 775/07, 3rd November 2009, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.522

\( ^{183} \) Section 33 (8)

\( ^{184} \) Governors’ decisions to dissolve Provincial Councils on the instructions of the President but against the wishes of Chief Ministers enjoying majorities have been the subject of litigation: Mahindasoma v. Senanayake (1996) 1 SLR 180 (CA); Senanayake v. Mahindasoma (1998) 2 SLR 333 (SC). The courts have upheld the principle that the Governor must act according to the advice of the Chief Minister in regard to dissolution where the Board of Ministers enjoy the support of a majority in the Provincial Council, and have further, narrowed down the application of the ouster clauses in Article 154F (2) and (3). There has also been litigation on the appointment of the Chief Minister (Premachandra v. Jayawickrema (1994) 2 SLR 90 (SC) and Premachandra and Dodangoda v. Jayawickrema and Bakeer Markar (1993) 2 SLR 294 (CA); and the appointment of the Provincial Public Service Commission (Podinilame v. Mathew (1996) 2SLR 82).
4.2 The Chief Minister and Board of Ministers

Article 154F (1) provides that there shall be a Board of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head and not more than four other Ministers to aid and advise the Governor of a Province in the exercise of his functions. It further provides that the Governor shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice, except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions in his discretion. This then is the basis of the constitutional powers of the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers. The powers of the Board of Ministers are in the nature of a general duty placed on the Governor to act according to their advice, except in the specified circumstances in which he should act alone. This in effect means that in most matters of administration in the Province, the Board of Ministers are free to determine policy and make decisions, which the Governor is enjoined to execute and implement. However, it is in the scope of the discretionary powers of the Governor that substantial limitations are placed on the autonomy of the Board of Ministers. Elsewhere in the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act, reference is made to specific functions, powers and duties of the Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

The Governor appoints as Chief Minister the member of the Provincial Council who is in his opinion is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the Provincial Council, provided that where more than one-half of the members of the Provincial Council are members of one political party, he is required to appoint the leader of that group as the Chief Minister. The Governor appoints the other Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Board of Ministers is collectively responsible and answerable to the Provincial Council. The Governor is not a member of the Board of Ministers. While it is both necessary and desirable that the Board of Ministers, as the elected executive, is collectively responsible and answerable to the Provincial Council, as we have seen, the Governor not only exercises significant executive functions at his own discretion, but he is also responsible for the financial provision for the administration of the Province. Therefore, one of the major flaws in this structure is that the Governor himself is not bound by collective responsibility with the Ministers, nor is he answerable to the Provincial Council.

One of the important powers of the Chief Minister and Board of Ministers is the power to advise the Governor on the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of the Provincial Council. That the Governor should exercise these functions only on the advice of the Chief Minister, especially in relation to a decision to dissolve a Provincial Council (triggering fresh elections), is an important safeguard for provincial autonomy. However, the Governor is bound to follow the

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185 Discussed in Ch. 4.1, above
186 Article 154F (4)
187 Proviso to Article 154F (4)
188 Article 154F (5)
189 Article 154F (6)
190 Article 154B (8)
advice of the Chief Minister only when the latter enjoys the support of a majority in the Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{191} When the Chief Minister does not enjoy a majority, presumably, the Governor may act in his own discretion to summon, prorogue or dissolve a Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{192}

The Chief Minister is placed under a constitutional duty of co-operation with the Governor in terms of which he must communicate to the Governor all decisions of the Board of Ministers and any proposals for provincial legislation.\textsuperscript{193} When the Governor so requests, he must furnish any information relating to provincial administration and draft legislation,\textsuperscript{194} or submit for the consideration of the Board any matter the Governor requires to be considered.\textsuperscript{195} Once again, this buttresses the Governor's super-ordinate position in relation to the Chief Minister (and other Ministers) within the executive decision-making and policy formulation process of the Province.

By the requirement of consultation with him, or his authorisation or concurrence, the Chief Minister, nonetheless, is vested with functions in relation to three politically significant areas by the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Act: law and order and police, finance and the public service.\textsuperscript{196}

The first is the Chief Minister's role within the framework for the exercise of police powers that is set out in Appendix I of the Provincial Council List. Appendix I establishes an elaborate structure of policing, comprising national and provincial divisions, together with a National Police Commission\textsuperscript{197} and Provincial Police Commissions.

\textsuperscript{191} Article 154B (8) (d)

\textsuperscript{192} When the respective Governors dissolved the Sabaragamuwa and North Central Provincial Councils in June 2008 before the expiry of their terms, the dissolutions were challenged by members of the opposition in the two Councils in the Supreme Court. The basis for the dissolutions seemed to be that the respective Chief Ministers had lost their majorities in the Councils. On that basis, the Supreme Court dismissed the fundamental rights applications by refusing leave to proceed, and consequently the court did not make a proper determination. However, the factual situation in the two Provinces in June 2008 raised a number of important constitutional issues in the interpretation Article 154B (8), including the fact that both Chief Ministers had functioned without a majority for a period of time prior to the request for dissolution; that there did not seem to be an immediate political crisis necessitating a dissolution; and that the joint opposition had in writing informed the Governors of an opposition majority raising the possibility of an alternate administration. Thus an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court would have been beneficial. These issues are canvassed in Rohan Edrisinha & Asanga Welikala (2008) The Dissolution of the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provincial Councils: The Constitutional Issues available at http://www.groundviews.org/2008/06/18/the-dissolution-of-the-north-central-and-sabaragamuwa-provincial-councils-the-constitutional-issues

\textsuperscript{193} Article 154B (11) (a)

\textsuperscript{194} Article 154B (11) (b)

\textsuperscript{195} Article 154B (11) (c)

\textsuperscript{196} Note also that Item 9 of Appendix III of List I, on Education, establishes Provincial Boards of Education with advisory functions. The appointments to these Boards are made by the central Minister of Education with the concurrence of the Chief Minister. Similarly, Item 3 of Appendix II of List I, on Land and Land Settlement, establishes a National Land Commission with responsibility for the formulation of national policy with regard to the use of State land. Item 3:1 states that this Commission will include representatives of all Provincial Councils. On this see B. Fonseka & M. Raheem (2010) \textit{Land in the Eastern Province: Politics, Policy and Conflict} (Colombo: CPA)

\textsuperscript{197} The provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment regarding the composition of the National Police Commission have been repealed and replaced, and references to the ‘President’ in Appendix I substituted by the ‘National Police Commission’ by Section 23 of the Seventeenth Amendment. These amendments however do not impinge upon the substantive structure of devolved policing provided for in Appendix I of List I.
The Chief Minister nominates one member of the Provincial Police Commission. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) must appoint the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) in charge of the Province with the ‘concurrence’ of the Chief Minister. Where there is no agreement between the Chief Minister and the IGP in this respect, the matter is referred to the National Police Commission, which makes an appointment after ‘due consultations’ with the Chief Minister. Subject to the powers of the President in a state of emergency, the DIG of the Province is ‘responsible to and under the control of’ the Chief Minister in the maintenance of public order and exercise of police powers within the Province. Where there is a grave internal disturbance requiring the deployment of the national police within the Province, but which does not require the declaration of a state of emergency, the President does so in consultation with the Chief Minister. Where the Chief Minister seeks the assistance of the national police division in the preservation of public order within the Province, the IGP must deploy such personnel as are necessary for the purpose and place them under the control of the DIG of the Province. The Chief Minister may request the assistance of the central Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or other unit of the national police in any investigation. Where the IGP decides in the ‘public interest’ (and with the approval of the Attorney General), that an investigation requires the CID or other unit of the national police to be deployed in the Province, he must do so only after consultation with the Chief Minister. While on the face of the text these are necessary and sensible provisions in what seems to be a careful balance of functions in regard to policing and law and order between the centre and the Provinces, they have never in any Province been ever implemented.

As we saw before, the Governor is the central authority with regard to public finance in the Province. However, no sum shall be withdrawn from the Provincial Fund except under a warrant under the hand of the Chief Minister. This is the sole power expressly conferred on the elected branch of the provincial executive in relation to finance. Likewise in relation to the regulatory framework of the provincial public service in which the Governor is the central authority.

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198 Item 4 (c) of Appendix I of List I of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution
199 Item 4 (6)
200 Item 11:2 (a)
201 Item 11 (1)
202 Item 11:2 (b)
203 Item 12:2
204 Item 12:4 (a)
205 Item 12:4 (b)
206 Part III of the Provincial Councils Act; discussed in Ch. 4.1, above
207 That is, the ‘consolidated fund’ of the Province into which is paid the proceeds of provincial taxation, central government grants, loans and all other receipts: Section 19 (1)
208 Section 19 (3)
figure, a departure is where the most senior administrative officer of the Province, the Chief Secretary, is appointed by the President ‘with the concurrence of’ the Chief Minister.

4.3 The President

The President’s vicarious omnipresence in the provincial sphere is evident through the powers and functions of his agent, the Governor. However, the Thirteenth Amendment framework also provides for several situations in which the President is directly involved in the affairs of the Province, although in the main, these are exceptional circumstances.

Article 154J is an extension of the President’s powers in relation to the declaration of a state of emergency and the exercise of emergency powers thereunder, which empowers the President to give directions to the Governor as to the manner in which the latter’s executive power should be exercised during the state of emergency. More directly, the President’s power to make emergency regulations extends to any matter in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution (i.e., including the Provincial Council and Concurrent Lists), and such emergency regulations may override, amend or suspend provincial statutes. While this clearly undermines the legislative autonomy of the Provincial Councils, it is not untypical in the broader scheme of the Constitution of 1978 because emergency regulations have the same effect of overriding even the provisions of law made by Parliament (i.e., any law except the Constitution).

Article 154K, Article 154L and Article 154M relate to the failure of administrative machinery within the Province, and in effect provide for the complete suspension of devolution within a Province. This imposing power of the President is checked only by Parliament, which must approve any presidential proclamation under Article 154L. There is no constitutional procedure by which the elected institutions at the provincial level may ensure that this unilateral power is not exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or in haste.

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208 Part IV of the Provincial Councils Act, discussed in Ch. 4.1, above
210 Section 31
211 See discussion in Ch. 4 and Ch. 4.1, above
212 The two changes made by the Seventeenth Amendment to the Thirteenth Amendment both related to presidential functions. Firstly, the President’s hitherto untrammelled power to appoint the three members representing the three major communities (the other two being ex officio) of the Finance Commission established under 154R is attenuated by Article 41B and its schedule (Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment), whereby they are now appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council. Secondly, the removal of the functions of the President in the exercise of provincial police powers by the substitution of the National Police Commission for those functions (Section 23 of the Seventeenth Amendment, amending Items 3, 6, 7, 9:2 of Appendix I of List I of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution). See also discussion in Ch. 3.1 and Ch. 4.1, above.
213 Under Article 155 and the Public Security Ordinance No. 25 of 1947, both as amended. See also A. Welikala (2008) A State of Permanent Crisis (Colombo: CPA); pp.176-186, 204-205
214 Article 155 (3A) introduced by Section 5 of the Thirteenth Amendment
215 Article 155 (2)
216 Article 154L (3) and (4)
The President may hold that there is a failure of administrative machinery if any Governor or Provincial Council fails to implement a lawful direction given to them.\textsuperscript{217} On receipt of a report from a Governor, or on any other grounds, if the President is satisfied that the administration of a Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution, he may by Proclamation assume all or any of the provincial executive functions.\textsuperscript{218} While in such a context, he has no power to directly assume the legislative functions of the Provincial Council himself, he may declare that the powers of the Provincial Council are exercisable by Parliament.\textsuperscript{219} In this situation Parliament may either exercise the statute-making power in respect of the Province, or it may confer that power on the President, who may in turn, delegate that power on any other authority.\textsuperscript{220} In addition, the President is given a residuary power to take all necessary measures to give effect to the objects of his Proclamation,\textsuperscript{221} and he is only prohibited from assuming any judicial power.\textsuperscript{222}

If the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of Sri Lanka (or any part its territory) is threatened, he may make a Proclamation to that effect.\textsuperscript{223} The continuing validity of such a proclamation is subject to parliamentary approval,\textsuperscript{224} but during its operation, the President may give directions to the Governor to observe specified canons of financial propriety or to take any other measure required.\textsuperscript{225}

The Provincial Councils Act also makes reference to the President, the most important of which is that he appoints the Chief Secretary of the Province (with the concurrence of the Chief Minister).\textsuperscript{226} Rules may be made by the Provincial Council regulating its procedure generally, but such rules concerning the conduct of its business on financial statutes and the prohibition on the discussion of the conduct of the Governor require the approval of the President.\textsuperscript{227} All executive actions of the Governor, whether taken on the advice of the Ministers or in his own discretion, are expressed to be taken in the name of the President.\textsuperscript{228} Any discussion on the conduct of the President is prohibited in the Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{217} Article 154K
\textsuperscript{218} Article 154L (1) (a)
\textsuperscript{219} Article 154L (1) (b)
\textsuperscript{220} Article 154M (1) (a). A provincial statute made by Parliament, the President, or other delegated authority would continue in force until subsequently repealed or amended by a statute made by the Provincial Council: Article 154M (2)
\textsuperscript{221} Article 154L (1) (c)
\textsuperscript{222} Proviso to Article 154L (1)
\textsuperscript{223} Article 154N (1)
\textsuperscript{224} Article 154N (2)
\textsuperscript{225} Article 154N (3) and (4)
\textsuperscript{226} Section 31
\textsuperscript{227} Proviso to Section 11
\textsuperscript{228} Section 15 (2)
\textsuperscript{229} Section 18
The foregoing analysis of the institutional design of the provincial executive shows that it is both flawed from the perspective of workability, and skewed in favour of the Governor (and through him the President and central government). In order therefore to make the system work with any measure of credible provincial autonomy, the Governor and Board of Ministers must work with a considerable degree of co-operation and goodwill, and with restraint on the part of the Governor.

In the past, aside from the unusual situation in the North-Eastern Provincial Council in 1988-91, conflicts and litigation between the Governor and provincial Ministers have usually arisen in situations in which parties opposed to the government at the centre have taken control of Provincial Councils. On the other hand, executive devolution has worked best when the Governor has assumed a passive role and yielded both symbolic and substantive leadership of the administration of the Province to the Chief Minister and his Board. Most usually this has occurred when the provincial administration belongs to the same party as that in government at the centre, and/or where the Chief Minister enjoys seniority in the party and a national profile which enables him to enjoy a kind of *de facto* power superseding the Governor’s formal powers.

The lesson here seems to be that the extent of political power and influence that is available to a Chief Minister is dependent on informal networks of party politics, patronage and lines of communication to the centre, rather than the formal constitutional framework of devolution.

When as widely expected the UPFA won the elections in May 2008 for the Eastern Provincial Council, and its candidates for Chief Minister and other ministerial office took office, the expectation based on past experience was that the new provincial administration would enjoy relative autonomy and freedom of action. For a variety of political factors, this has not been the case in the Eastern Province.

The anxious and uneasy atmosphere that prevails in the relationship between the Board of Ministers and what is regarded as an obstructive Governor’s office, has both unified the determination of the Board of Ministers to implement their powers as much as they can, as it has, at the same time, created reservations and misgivings about what can be done. Opinion is unanimous among the ministers that the Governor’s behaviour is the biggest political obstacle to the exercise of devolved powers. Reasons adduced for this problem include the notion that the Governor, having been appointed prior to the establishment of the elected Provincial Council and having become accustomed to exercising power at his own discretion during that period, is unable to adapt to the new situation in which he must yield many of the functions of day-to-day administration to the Board of Ministers. Whether true or not, there is also a widespread perception that the Governor is under instructions to play such an interventionary role in the provincial administration.

The Governor clearly understands his constitutional role as the representative of the President in the Eastern Province. In his view, his appointment gives him the legitimacy to assert his powers and responsibilities rather than cede the primary role to the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers. Moreover, in his own view, the Governor’s powers are not confined to the text of the
Constitution and related legislation, but also extends to an inherent right to ‘advise and guide’ the Board of Ministers. It is from this standpoint that the Governor takes a close interest in the day-to-day administration of the Province. There are certain advantages to having an experienced administrator as Governor. For example, the exhaustive financial regulations that the Governor has promulgated for the Eastern Province are critical to ensuring proper procedure, legality and order in all matters concerned with public finance within the Province.\(^{230}\) Laudable as these initiatives are, they must facilitate and enhance rather than impede the implementation of devolution, with democratically elected institutions rather than appointed officials in control. Likewise, the Governor’s insistence that all executive and administrative action is in full compliance with applicable rules, regulations and legal provisions is per se a good thing, except when such insistence is of such a nature as to be regarded as perverse, capricious or motivated by extraneous considerations.\(^{231}\)

The points of contention are both structural and practical, the experience of the latter informing perspectives on the former. The episode with regard to the Governor’s assent to the Finance Statute set the stage for the antagonistic relationship between the Governor and the Board of Ministers, in which the perception of intransigence on the part of the Governor was exacerbated by the sense that his behaviour was also contrary to the clear postulates of the Constitution.\(^{232}\) Even if it is to be assumed that there were no mala fides or a conscious effort to obstruct the provincial statute-making process, and the inordinate delay was just the normal consequence of a dilatory bureaucratic process, it is difficult disagree with the notion that the resulting position was against the letter and spirit of Article 154H.

One of the other areas in which there have been constant disagreements has been in relation to the provincial public service, in respect of virtually every provincial ministry. As we have seen before, the framework with regard to the Provincial Public Service Commission and provincial public service in the Provincial Councils Act is one of the most unsatisfactory features of the Thirteenth Amendment scheme.\(^{233}\) It promotes the control of the provincial public service by the Governor rather than its independence, and the nature of the Provincial Public Service Commission is such that it inspires no confidence as to its impartiality and independence. It is symptomatic of the weak institutional framework that no one makes any material distinction between the Governor and the Provincial Public Service Commission in the Eastern Province. The manifest weakness of this regulatory framework has without doubt aggravated the sense of

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\(^{231}\) The deleterious controversy between the Governor and the Chief Minister with regard to the appointment of a senior advisor to the Chief Minister is a case in point. In a context where no other Chief Minister appears to be constrained by such stringent standards of economy with regard to personal staff as have been imposed here, not only the Governor’s interference in such a matter but also his absolute expectation that the Chief Minister completely capitulates to his view that the Chief Minister cannot and should not appoint for himself a senior advisor, is wholly inappropriate. Respect for the democratic mandate that the Chief Minister enjoys is critical to devolution. If the Governor needed to intervene in this matter at all, the appropriate response would have been to officially communicate his disagreement with such an appointment to the Board of Ministers, and let the matter rest there. Instead, an unseemly power struggle has ensued.

\(^{232}\) See discussion in Ch. 3.4, above.

\(^{233}\) See discussion in Ch. 4.1, above.
resentment harboured by Ministers about the Governor’s interference in such matters as appointments, transfers, extensions and recruitment. Ministers have a legitimate entitlement to the direction and control of their public officers, subject to the rules regarding their impartiality and political independence. However, a view held by many in the Eastern Provincial Council (including public officers themselves) is that there is considerable interference in the relationship between the Ministers and their officers by the Governor’s office.

In fairness, it must be recognised that corresponding to the Ministers’ sense of impotence in this regard, as elected politicians, is their lack of control over what is clearly an important source of patronage. However, to the extent that the elected component of the provincial executive is being undermined by an insidious control of public officers by the Governor, such a situation is unacceptable. From the perspective of the integrity of public institutions and good governance, therefore, it is clear that the solution does not lie in removing these powers from the Governor so as to confer them on Ministers, but to strengthen the provincial public service with a new legal framework that ensures its professionalism, dignity, integrity and independence.234

Although all the provincial Ministers are notionally members of the UPFA, the Board of Ministers is a body of composite representation. Individual Ministers represent different constituent parties within the UPFA, have different constituencies, and enjoy different relationships with the central government. In this context, the unity of purpose they have so far demonstrated arises from a shared interest in exercising devolved power in the Eastern Province, and to that extent, there is a resolve to resist what is seen as the Governor’s interference in the sphere of the elected executive. However, this very political configuration of the Board of Ministers also has several other implications for the way in which devolution works in practice. The relationships individual Ministers have with the central government, in particular with the office of the President and the Ministry of Nation-Building,235 determine the strategies they use for expediting the work of their ministries. Those Ministers who have closer relationships with the central government find it easier to resist attempts at intervention by the Governor, or to circumvent other obstacles, than others who do not. Such closer relationships may be based on personal contacts with key central government actors, or closer party political ties with the centre. Thus for example, those who have access to the President or Mr. Basil Rajapaksa, or are members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) rather than another constituent party of the UPFA, find that such connections help in overcoming legal impediments or bureaucratic barriers to the realisation of their wishes.

While it is perhaps not unusual in the broader context of the Sri Lankan political culture that provincial Ministers need to resort to such informal mechanisms in order to ensure the

234 The tension between the existing, but flawed, framework for the provincial public service in Part IV of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987, on the one hand, and the desire to prevent the politicisation of the provincial public service at the hands of the Board of Ministers, on the other, seems to have been the fundamental issue confronting the Court of Appeal in Podinilame v. Mathew (1998) 2 SLR 52. See also Bandara v. Arawwawala (1996), CA Witt App. No. 483/95, 24 May 1996 (unreported), and Ranjani Privalatha v. Provincial Public Service Commission, Central Province (2009), CA Witt App. No. 775/07, 3rd November 2009, reported in Marasinghe & Wickramaratne (2010): p.522, and discussion in Ch. 4.1, above.

235 The line Ministry of Nation-Building and its major programme, Nagenahira Navodaya (Eastern Reawakening), was throughout the period under review the most visible central government presence within the Province.
implementation of their policies, programmes, and projects, such a situation seriously undermines the collective responsibility of the Board of Ministers, as well the basic logic of devolution. The freedom of action of the Board of Ministers, even in matters in which their constitutional authority is clear, has become impaired with strategic considerations about the Governor’s likely response, or whether such actions would exceed the central government’s conception of the role of the Provincial Council (and thereby risk attracting adverse political consequences).

For example, by July 2009, the relations between the Governor and the Board of Ministers had reached such a low level that at least some Ministers actively considered moving the Provincial Council for the presentation of an address to the President advising the removal of the Governor.\(^{236}\) The Board of Ministers was divided on this, and it was felt that such a drastic measure could not be sustained without unanimity.\(^{237}\) However, the Board was unanimous in sending an official letter of complaint, signed by each of the Ministers, to the President listing the many grievances arising out of the conduct of the Governor in the period between June 2008 and July 2009.\(^ {238}\) Likewise in relation to the attempt to enact a Police Statute so as to enable the Chief Minister to commence exercising his police powers, several Ministers felt that it would signify defiance and confrontation in view of the stated position of senior central government officials such as the Defence Secretary that the central government would not countenance the implementation of the constitutional provisions concerning police and law and order.

While in one sense, this may seem ostensibly like ‘cabinet collegiality’ at work within the Board of Ministers, from a devolution and constitutional law point of view, what is interesting to note are the reasons adduced by the Ministers opposed to action likely to be received as hostile by the central government. In short, the objection was based on the fear of provoking the central government and the possibility of punitive consequences that might accrue both for the fledgling Provincial Council as well as personally for individuals seen to be causing trouble. Consistently, therefore, the political realities about the central government’s dispositions have determined the extent of the implementation of devolution, rather than what is reflected in the Constitution and the law.

In these circumstances, the constitutional framework of devolution, and the legally regulated relations between multiple levels of government for which it provides, become secondary not only to a supervening network of highly personalised political relationships, but also to constant anxieties and the need for frequent political judgements about the boundaries of the central government’s tolerance for provincial autonomy. This is a situation therefore that raises fundamental questions about the adherence to constitutional government and the rule of law, leave aside devolution. It is a situation that has caused dismay and disillusionment among members of the Provincial Council, and it creates the danger of undermining public confidence in devolved institutions.

\(^{236}\) Article 154B (4) (a). See discussion in Ch. 4.1, above.

\(^{237}\) Including for the reason that without the unanimous support of the Ministers, the majorities necessary for the legal procedure under Article 154B (4) would not be forthcoming in the Provincial Council.

\(^{238}\) There was never any clear or formal response to this from the President’s office.
4.5 Conclusions

The foregoing analysis of the constitutional and legal provisions governing the devolution of executive power shows that, in terms of scope, a lesser extent of executive powers than legislative powers are devolved under the Thirteenth Amendment. This is mainly through positing the Governor in a central position within the Province vested with executive powers of day-to-day administration. From a devolution perspective, the powers of the Governor are intrusive and unnecessary.

Moreover, the manner in which these powers have been elaborated in the Provincial Councils Act demonstrates not only an attempt to further rein in devolution, but also that they are unacceptable from the perspective of constitutional design. The provisions concerning the Governor’s powers and functions in relation to provincial finance and the provincial public service in particular have the effect of conferring power without responsibility, and the complete absence of democratic accountability for a substantial swathe of executive actions to the people of the Province via the Provincial Council.239

The Consequential Provisions Act, although enacted as an interim measure, still continues in force. It provides for provincial ministers to exercise delegated powers under pre-existing central legislation concerning matters in the Provincial Council List, together with their central government counterparts. At the time of its enactment, there was a concern expressed that this measure would serve to discourage provincial statute-making and thereby retard devolution. Although the record of statute-making in the Provincial Councils cannot be described as particularly robust, it is difficult to draw a causative connection between this and the Consequential Provisions Act; among many other factors, provincial capacity issues such as legal expertise and human resources have had and continue have a bearing on the ability of Provincial Councils to fully exercise their statute-making powers.

The case law of the superior courts in relation to devolution matters is also somewhat incoherent, although it may be said generally that, from a beginning of extreme misgivings, the courts have tended to adopt a broadly more ‘devolution-friendly’ approach in later cases. Allowing for the ebb and flow of judicial attitudes over time, however, it is fair to say that it is difficult to discern a judicially articulated and developed core of coherent constitutional principles in relation to ‘devolution within the unitary state’ in the case law of the past 27 years. Individual cases seem to have been dealt with on the facts, and the lacuna in the jurisprudence is the lack

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239 Sections 11 (c) and 18 of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987, prohibit any discussion of the Governor’s conduct in the Provincial Council. Thus not only is the Governor the agent of the central government, appointed by and reporting only to the central government, but his executive actions which concern the Province cannot even be discussed in the Provincial Council. In other words, the people of the Province have not elected him, and he is not answerable to the democratically elected representatives of the people in the Provincial Council, which cannot even discuss his conduct. Even the role of the Provincial Council in the possible removal of the Governor in terms of Article 154B (4) is subject to two key weaknesses: (a) it concerns only an extreme political situation of crisis in which the removal of the Governor becomes necessary, and in any event, even where a Provincial Council has surmounted the political and legal challenges of engaging Article 154B (4), it is entirely possible that a presentation of an address advising the removal of the Governor would be treated as purely directory by the President (i.e., precisely the same argument as has been used in the non-implementation of the Seventeenth Amendment); (b) it does nothing ensure to the more mundane accountability of the Governor to the Provincial Council for his executive actions on a day-to-day basis.
of reasoned out principles by which each case relates to others in the broader canvass of the body of case law on devolution.

More broadly, there is a pervasive assumption of central government superiority underlying this schema of executive power, which is incongruent with the spirit of devolution. In addition to the many substantive features discussed above, this is implicit in several legal provisions inviting central government or presidential involvement in the provincial sphere on what seems to be absurdly trivial matters. This structural framework is buttressed by administrative rules and practices that pre-date devolution and which have never been comprehensively reviewed and restructured to support devolved governance. Moreover, informal political practices and party political structures continue to reflect and encourage centralisation. Reforming and adapting these political and administrative practices would contribute significantly to a more meaningful implementation of devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment, until such time as constitutional changes addressing its flaws and weaknesses may be undertaken.

240 For e.g., the requirement of presidential approval for the internal rules of procedure of Provincial Councils; that all provincial executive actions are to be taken in the name of the President; the payment of provincial salaries, allowances and pensions: respectively, Sections 11 and 15 (2) of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987, the Provincial Councils (Payment of Salaries and Allowances) Act, No. 37 of 1988, and Provincial Councils Pensions Act, No. 17 of 1993. These can all be dealt with at the provincial level without necessary involvement of the centre.
CHAPTER 5

DECENTRALISATION OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE HIGH COURT OF THE PROVINCES

The Thirteenth Amendment establishes a High Court for each Province.241 The territorial jurisdiction of each High Court is the Province for which it is established.242 The Provincial High Court exercises the original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court of Sri Lanka in respect of offences committed within the Province,243 appellate and revisionary criminal jurisdiction within the Province, and other jurisdiction and powers (for e.g., appeals from Labour Tribunals and from decisions under the Agrarian Services Act, jurisdiction under the Companies Act, etc) that have been vested in it from time to time.244 The Provincial High Court also has the power to issue the writs of habeas corpus,245 certiorari, prohibition, procedendo, mandamus and quo warranto.246 The Judges of the High Courts are appointed by the President, on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission in consultation with the Attorney General.247 They are removable and subject to the disciplinary control of the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission.248 The power of transfer of High Court Judges is vested in the Judicial Services Commission alone.249

The establishment and physical location of High Courts in the Provinces together with the continuing control of the judicial branch by central institutions (i.e., the Judicial Service Commission) demonstrate that there is decentralisation of the administration of justice but not judicial devolution under the Thirteenth Amendment. The institutional framework of the courts and their powers, functions and jurisdictions would have been very different if a devolution of

241 Article 154P (1)

242 Except for the matters falling under Section 2 (3) and enumerated in the Second Schedule to the High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act, No. 10 of 1996

243 Article 154P (3) (a)

244 These additional jurisdictions and powers are set out in High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act, No. 19 of 1990, High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act, No. 10 of 1996, and High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No. 54 of 2006. High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act, No. 19 of 1990 sets out the detailed procedure in the High Court including appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The Seventeenth Amendment has conferred on the Provincial High Court the criminal jurisdiction to hear and determine the offences of interfering with the Public Service Commission and Judicial Service Commission: Article 61C and Article 111L (2), respectively.

245 Article 154P (4) (a), in respect of persons illegally detained within the Province

246 Article 154P (4) (b). These writs may be issued against any person, within the Province, exercising any power under a central law or provincial statute pertaining to a subject in the Provincial Council List

247 Article 111 (2) (a)

248 Article 111 (2) (b)

249 Article 111H (1) (a), as well as the power to make rules regarding the training of High Court Judges: Article 111H (2) (a)
judicial power comparable to the devolution of legislative power was contemplated, including in a provincial judicial service (similar to the provincial public service and the provincial police division), a less integrated appellate process, and so on.

This understanding has been upheld by the Supreme Court on several occasions. In *Madduma Banda v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services* (2003), the Supreme Court held that,

“At the time of the introduction of devolution of power in terms of the provisions of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, the intention of the legislature was to empower the provincial centres to deal with the specific subjects devolved to such centres which included not only executive and legislative power, but also to devolve judicial functions to be carried out through the newly introduced High Courts of the Provinces… Provincial Councils were established to permit the people to deal with their day to day life within the provinces itself. A tenant cultivator in any area within the country therefore should have the opportunity to challenge an order relating to the payment of agricultural rent in the High Court of the Provinces, instead of having to come to Colombo to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.”

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250 *See In Re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill* (1987) 2 SLR 312 at 323; *Nimalaratne v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services* (2000) 3 SLR 184.

251 *Madduma Banda v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services* (2003) 2 SLR 80 at 89, 90-91. Although Bandaranayake J., with Silva C.J., and Yapa J. agreeing, described the provision for the exercise of judicial power under the Thirteenth Amendment as one of judicial devolution, it is clear in the context of the substance of her opinion, that what she meant was in fact the decentralisation of the administration of justice, i.e., the physical location of competent courts in the Provinces so as to facilitate access to justice.
CHAPTER 6

THE FISCAL AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK

As discussed above, the substantive provincial competences are set out, primarily in the Provincial Council List, and secondarily over the subjects in the Concurrent List where a Provincial Council claims such competences by statute. The central government competences are set out in the Reserved List and the residual legislative power of the state is vested in that level as well. Thus the primary expenditure responsibilities of Provincial Councils are in relation to the competences in the Provincial Council List, and such other responsibilities as may be assumed by claiming concurrent competences. Powers under both the Provincial Council and Concurrent Lists, and therefore expenditure responsibilities in relation to them, are assumed when the Provincial Council legislates on any subject in the two lists. The indeterminacy of the position relating to executive powers exercised under the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act, No. 12 of 1989, results in an unduly complicated situation regarding financial responsibility.

With regard to revenue raising responsibilities, Items 33 and 36 (36:1 to 36:20) of the Provincial Council List enumerate the range of fees and taxes that may be imposed by a Provincial Council, and borrowing to the extent permitted by central legislation (Item 35). These include:

- Fees in respect of any matter in the Provincial Council List (Item 33)
- Turnover tax on wholesale and retail sales to the extent provided by central legislation (Item 36:1; Provincial Council Turnover Taxes (Limits and Exemptions) Act, No. 25 of 1995)
- Taxes on betting and lotteries other than national lotteries (Item 36:2)
- License fees and taxes on liquor (Items 36:3 and 36:19)
- Motor vehicle license fees to the extent provided by central legislation (Item 36:4)
- Dealership license fees and taxes on drugs and chemicals (Item 36:5)
- Stamp duty on the transfer of movable and immovable property (Item 36:6)
- Toll collections (Item 36:7)
- Court fines and fees (Items 36:8 and 36:14)
- Fees and charges under specified existing legislation including the Medical Ordinance; Motor Traffic Act; Fauna and Flora Protection Ordinance; Land Development Ordinance; Crown Lands Ordinance; Weights and Measures Ordinance (Items 36:9, 36:10, 36:12, 36:13, 36:15)

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252 Lists I and III of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, respectively

253 List II of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and Article 154G (10)

254 See discussion in Ch. 4, above

255 Item 31 makes provincial debt an express provincial responsibility. See also Section 21 of the Provincial Councils Act.
• Departmental fees in respect of any matter in the Provincial Council List (Item 36:11)
• Land revenue and taxes on land and buildings including state property to the extent provided by central legislation (Items 36:16 and 36:17)
• Taxes on mineral rights to the extent provided by central legislation (Item 36:18)
• Any other taxes within the Province as authorised by central legislation (Item 36:20)

Set against the provincial expenditure responsibilities, this limited set of revenue raising powers denote what is known as a ‘vertical fiscal imbalance.’ In other words, the Thirteenth Amendment devolves more competences to Provincial Councils (i.e., expenditure responsibilities) than it devolves powers of taxation and other means of income (i.e., revenue-raising powers). Since this means that Provincial Councils do not have the power to raise adequate revenue on their own to discharge the expenditure responsibilities arising from the exercise of their powers, the Constitution must provide for a system and mechanisms by which this ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ may be ‘equalised.’ This is the function of the Finance Commission established under Article 154R.

The Finance Commission also performs what is known as the equalisation of horizontal fiscal imbalances, or simply ‘horizontal equalisation.’ In any country, there are regional disparities in economic development and wealth, arising from natural or geographical, economic or political factors. In a devolved system of government, addressing these regional disparities and uneven development, so that not only support for underdeveloped areas, but also the delivery of broadly the same standard of public services across the country is ensured, requires a system of wealth-sharing between the central government and the provincial governments. Making recommendations to the President as to this ‘horizontal equalisation’ is an important function of the Finance Commission.

Article 154R establishes the Finance Commission which consists of the Governor of the Central Bank, the Secretary to the Treasury, and three other distinguished persons as members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council to represent the three major communities. That there is neither direct provincial representation nor provincial involvement in the process for the appointments to the Finance Commission is a major weakness. The term of office of members of the Finance Commission is three years. It is provided that the central government shall allocate funds adequate for meeting the needs of the Provinces from the annual budget, on the recommendation of and in consultation with the Finance Commission.

The duty of the Finance Commission in the adjustment of the vertical fiscal imbalance is to make recommendations to the President as to the principles on which funds allocated annually by the central government budget to the provincial level should be apportioned between the various

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256 Article 154R (1) as amended by Section 19 of the Seventeenth Amendment
257 Article 154R (2)
258 Article 154R (3)
Provinces. Since the entire system of devolution relies on central transfers, it would seem to make sense to have the Commission play the central co-ordination role in financial decisions regarding allocations. But in terms of the Constitution, the Commission has no role in the decisions of the central government with regard to the total allocation to Provincial Councils as a whole, but only in recommending the principles of apportionment of that sum among them. Moreover, in practice the central government does not treat the recommendations of the Commission as mandatory instructions regarding apportionment, but at best, only as guidance.

In terms of horizontal equalisation, the mandate of the Commission is to formulate the principles necessary to achieve balanced regional development across the country. In doing so, the Commission is enjoined to take into account (a) the population of each Province, (b) the per capita income of each Province, (c) the need, progressively, to reduce social and economic disparities, and (d) the need, progressively, to reduce the difference between the per capita income of each Province and the highest per capita income among the Provinces.

We have already noted the central control of provincial finances through the Governor’s powers, the procedure and restrictions regarding financial statutes, and the President’s power of intervention to prevent financial instability. The Commission’s recommendations are not justiciable, and should it arise in any litigation, it is unlikely due to the public policy and technical nature of its function, and the restrictive manner in which its is framed, that the courts would be inclined to interfere.

Taken as a whole, the constitutional and legal framework of devolution finance is one of the weakest facets of the Thirteenth Amendment scheme. There is nothing wrong per se in a system that is anchored on central transfers, provided that the mechanisms and procedures for equalisation are strong. However, the constitutional functions of the Finance Commission are inadequate for a system of devolution premised on central transfers, and as with every other aspect of implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the system of transfers is also affected by the administrative and political practices which undermine effectiveness, efficiency and devolution.

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259 Article 154R (4) (a). The Commission may also make recommendations on any other matter of provincial finance referred to it by the President: Article 154R (4) (b)

260 Article 154R (5)

261 See discussion in Ch. 4.1 and Ch. 4.3, above

262 Unlike, for example, in the case of the Governor’s power of dissolution in which the courts were willing to extend judicial review: see discussion in Ch. 4.1 and Ch. 4.2, above

263 See the reports of the respective Provincial Councils in CPA (2008) Strengthening the Provincial Council System, where a prominent ground of complaint is with regard to the fiscal and financial aspects of the Thirteenth Amendment. See also Asoka Gunawardane Committee Report: Chs. 5, 8.

264 For an overview of the issues attending the design of fiscal and financial arrangements within a devolved constitutional framework, see A. Welikala (2003) Fiscal and Financial Arrangements in a Federal Sri Lanka (Colombo: CPA)
6.1 The Framework of Public Finance in the Eastern Province

In addition to Part III of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987 (as amended by Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 28 of 1990), the comprehensive rules regarding all aspects of public finance are embodied in the Eastern Provincial Council Financial Rules (2009). These exhaustive rules provide for expenditure planning and budgeting, authority for expenditure, refunds, losses, write offs and waivers, financial management and accountability, receipts, payments, custody of money, imprests and bank accounts, accounting procedures and responsibilities, procurement, assets, stores management, printing and publication requirements, and a range of other miscellaneous matters.

The substance of these rules is not only necessary but also critical to public financial integrity and efficiency at the provincial level. However, the broader issue remains the structural one whereby the Governor functions as both finance minister as well as overseer of financial procedure within the Province. Greater financial responsibility at the provincial level would be promoted if these matters were to be regulated by statute made by the Provincial Council.

Prior to the establishment of an elected Provincial Council in 2008, the financial provision for the administration of the Province was by order of the Governor. Since then the ordinary procedure has been followed. In 2008 and 2009, the entirety of the expenditures (recurrent and capital) of the Eastern Province has been met with central transfers. With the enactment of the Eastern Province Finance Statute, No. 1 of 2008, and the establishment of the administrative machinery necessary to the exercise of tax raising and collection powers, the expenditure and income profile of the Eastern Province may change. The extent of the change, however, remains to be seen as it is dependent a variety of factors, including economic, political and administrative factors.

265 Formulated by the Governor in terms of Sections 19 (5) and 20 (3) of the Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987 on 31st December 2008, effective from 1st January 2009.

266 As provided under the Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 28 of 1990. For the last of such orders under Section 27A making provision for financial year 2008, see Governor’s Order dated 17th December 2007.


268 Block Grant for recurrent expenditure and the Criteria Based Grant (CBG) and Province Specific Development Grant (FSDG) for capital expenditure. See Governor’s Annual Financial Statement for 2009 (Governor’s Letter to the Chief Secretary No. G/EPC/B/17 dated 10th September 2008): Schedule Nos. 1 and 2.
CHAPTER 7

FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

There were several implications of the government’s statement in 2008 that it was committed to the ‘full implementation’ of the Thirteenth Amendment. Firstly, it was acknowledging the well-known fact that successive governments have not done so, and the announcement was welcome to the extent that, at least two decades after their introduction, these constitutional provisions were to be implemented and given effect in their entirety. In this of course the government was not expressing a policy choice but acknowledging the most basic of its legal duties to uphold and implement the supreme law of the land.

Secondly, when this commitment was originally articulated, it was in the nature of an interim measure – so as to implement the extent of devolution already provided in the Constitution in the North and East in particular – in anticipation of constitutional reform proposals by the APRC, and in the wider context of a new, post-war constitutional settlement for power-sharing. Since then, however, less and less has been heard from the government about the commitment to full implementation. Beyond the election and constitution of the Eastern Province (a process also expected in the Northern Province in the future), and where the experience of devolved governance has been less than ideal, no tangible changes signifying the necessary political commitment to realising devolution have been forthcoming.

Instead, not only has the central government taken a dominant role in the economic and development activities within the Eastern Province supplanting the elected Provincial Council, but senior officials including the President have in comments made to the media subsequently averred that the government is in fact not intending to concede all of the devolved powers, in particular those over police and law and order, and state land. On the other hand, there has been no official or unequivocal withdrawal of the full implementation policy either. The governing paradigm of post-war reconstruction and development appears to be premised on the notion that only the central government can effectively deliver, and there is insufficient regard to the fact that devolution and development are not mutually exclusive concepts. In the light of these issues, there is a question mark as to what the government’s policy with regard to devolution actually is.

Nonetheless, the constitutional assessment in the foregoing chapters was predicated on the full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The identification and critical discussion of the shortcomings of the system of devolution as established by the Thirteenth Amendment and the accompanying central legislation of which the main instrument is the Provincial Councils Act, serves two purposes. Firstly, it points to the pitfalls to be avoided in the design of any future
constitutional framework of devolution. Secondly, and this is the focus of this chapter, it brings to light the issues that require to be addressed in fully implementing the Thirteenth Amendment framework with a view to realising the fullest extent of devolution within its parameters.

In addition to the matters highlighted below, a more comprehensive review of the experience of devolution, akin to that undertaken by the Asoka Gunawardane Committee in 1996 is urgently needed. It should also be remembered that almost all of the issues identified by that Committee remain relevant, and much of its recommendations have not been implemented. A prospective review body therefore must be given a wide mandate to recommend necessary changes including the statutory framework of devolution, as well more generally central legislation impacting on devolution, the body of administrative rules and practices governing the operation of public administration at central, provincial and local levels, and the financial rules and procedures. In other words, a ‘comprehensive devolution audit’ must be undertaken with regard to all existing law, policy and practice, and recommendations made for amending, repealing and replacing anything that is inconsistent with the maximum level of devolution permissible under the Constitution. Needless to say, the sustained commitment of the government to introducing these wide-ranging changes is imperative. As it was observed at the outset, changes of this nature would be wholly consistent with the mandate of the President and the UPFA in terms of the Mahinda Chintana Idiri Dekma, as they do not impinge on the unitary structure of the state.

7.1 Structural Changes

For maximising the extent of devolution within the parameters of the Thirteenth Amendment, changes need to be made to the statutory structure set out in the Provincial Councils Act, as amended (and consequent amendments to other central legislation).

Substantively, the main issue with regard to the Provincial Councils Act is the centrality that it accords to the Governor in the day-to-day administration of the Province. The main focus of change in this regard must be to establish a more even balance between the Governor and the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers. It is recognised that the constitutional framework requires that certain functions are performed by the Governor, and which therefore cannot be taken away by ordinary legislation. However, there is no reason why, in relation to many other functions, a more appropriate balance cannot be struck by either removing the functions of the Governor altogether, or by making the exercise of his powers expressly subject to the advice of the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers. Amendments to the Provincial Councils Act require the following changes:

Many of the functions of the Governor and the President in Part II of the Provincial Councils Act dealing with meetings and conduct of business of the Provincial Council including those of a symbolic nature are unnecessary, except those that are required for purposes of legal rights.

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269 Section 15 (2)
and liabilities of the provincial administration through the Provincial Council. The provision requiring the President's approval for rules of procedure of the Provincial Council regarding financial matters and for prohibiting discussion on the conduct of the Governor in matters in which he acts in his own discretion is unnecessary and may be removed. There is no justification for prohibiting discussion of the Governor in the Provincial Council. There is also no reason why the Governor should make rules allocating business among the Ministers. This may be done by the Board of Ministers in consultation with the Chairman of the Provincial Council, and subject to the approval of the Provincial Council.

The powers and functions of the Governor in regard to provincial finance under Part III of the Provincial Councils Act are some of the main impediments to devolution and the promotion of greater financial responsibility and accountability at the provincial level. These powers and functions must be transferred to the Chief Minister, who may be regarded ex officio as the Finance Minister of the Province. However, the present rule-making powers of the Governor with regard to the Provincial Fund and the Emergency Fund need not be conferred on the Chief Minister, but require to be embodied in provincial statutes (i.e., a ‘provincial financial procedure statute’). To the extent any oversight by the Governor is necessary, this is afforded by the requirement of assent by the Governor to the annual Appropriations Statute (and other ad hoc supply statutes such as supplementary grants and votes on account).

The functions and powers of the Governor in relation to the provincial public service and Provincial Public Service Commission under Part IV of the Provincial Councils Act are indefensible from a good governance as much as a devolution point of view. The concern about politicisation that seems to be part of the rationale for vesting control of the provincial public service in the Governor is misplaced in that the Governor’s impartiality cannot be guaranteed, and serves to undermine the authority and autonomy of provincial Ministers in circumstances where the Governor chooses to interfere in provincial Ministries by using his powers over public officers. The independence of the provincial public service needs to be at least of the same standard as is provided at the central level, and it is possible to do this by bringing the Provincial Public Service Commission within the Seventeenth Amendment framework. This may be undertaken by ordinary central legislation under Article 41F. Moreover, the powers of the Board of Ministers in relation to provincial public officers should be made at least approximate to those exercised by the central Cabinet of Ministers over public officers under the Seventeenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Governor's powers and exclusive

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270 Section 16 (1)
271 Section 11
272 Sections 15 (c), 18. Presently this prohibition is disapplied only in the extraordinary circumstance where the Provincial Council seeks to pass an address advising the removal of the Governor to the President under Article 154B (4).
273 Section 15 (1)
274 Sections 19 (5), 20 (3), 23 (2), 24 (1), 24 (3), 25 (1), 26 (3), 28 (1), 30
275 Sections 32, 33
276 Article 55 (3)
discretions under Part IV of the Provincial Councils Act should be removed, and those functions
should be vested in the Provincial Public Service Commission, the Chief Secretary and Board of
Ministers as the case may be.

Moreover, in addition to the overhaul of rules, practices, procedures and structures in relation to
public administration and public finance (the details of which should to be recommended by a
suitable body appointed for that purpose), a matter of specific importance that must be
highlighted here is the sub-provincial level administrative structures that currently operate as
direct agents of the central government. In line with the recommendations of the Asoka
Gunawardane Committee, Divisional Secretaries and Grama Niladhari must be brought under
the provincial public service.277

Reform of the substance of the statutory powers relating to especially finance and the provincial
public service in the directions suggested here would enhance the autonomy of the elected
provincial executive substantially.

There are three possible modalities of introducing these changes to the underlying statutory
regime of the Thirteenth Amendment. The first is by way of piecemeal amendments to the
Provincial Councils Act (and other central legislation). This would address the most serious
issues requiring attention, but would not disturb the established framework too much. Secondly,
the Provincial Councils Act could be repealed and replaced with a new Act, which sets out a
fresh approach and also may consolidate consequential amendments to other central legislation
required by a new beginning. Thirdly, the most radical option is to repeal the Provincial Councils
Act, and replace it with nine different Acts, negotiated between the central government and each
Provincial Council according to the needs and preferences of each Province, and setting out,
within the outer limits determined by the parameters of the Thirteenth Amendment, a greater or
lesser degree of devolution depending on the democratic desire of each Province. A further
innovation that is possible (indeed this applies to the first and second options as well) is that any
centre-provincial autonomy agreement embodied in central legislation be made susceptible to
periodic review (for e.g., every ten years). The great attraction of this approach is that it has both
symbolic and substantive importance in placing the relationship between the central government
and each Province at a constitutional, and as close to a notion of equal partnership, as is
possible within the ultimate hierarchy necessarily dictated by the unitary state. It may be that
eventually, all Provinces end up demanding exactly the same or maximum level of powers, but
the symbolism of the approach remains.

7.2 Political and Administrative Culture

As has been repeatedly affirmed, one of the enduring barriers to the meaningful realisation of
devolution are not so much formal structures and the text of legal or constitutional provisions, as
the attitudes and dispositions of the people who implement them, especially elected political

representatives and public servants.\footnote{See for e.g., the Asoka Gunawardane Committee Report (1996): Ch.1; CPA (2008) \textit{Strengthening the Provincial Council System}} As long as there is no interest or incentive to change these attitudes, very little can be proposed by way of institutional or procedural changes that have any chance of success. Even the most acutely designed system can be denuded by apathy, hostility or incapacity, and at least part of the experience under the Thirteenth Amendment testifies to that. Dependent on leadership and commitment to change, however, the following measures are worthy of consideration.

One of the most striking features of the experience of devolution in Sri Lanka in comparison to any other system of multi-level government elsewhere, is the near total absence of co-ordination mechanisms (also known as inter-governmental relations).\footnote{See Asoka Gunawardane Committee Report (1996): Ch.7} No devolved system can work without such supporting mechanisms, which range from political bodies for the making and co-ordination of policy, to bodies that co-ordinate public administration, to highly specialised, technical bodies that support specific aspects of governance. A future review body needs to address the specific requirements in this area. The Asoka Gunawardane Committee made several recommendations on this which continue to have relevance.\footnote{Ibid}

Flowing from the absence of co-ordination and consultation mechanisms between multiple levels of government is the absence of political and administrative arrangements and agreements, which may be informal or quasi-legal in nature, that form the basis of co-operation between these levels. It is neither possible nor desirable that every detail of the functional modalities of a multi-level system should be rigidly enshrined in legal instruments, and these arrangements provide the required structure and discipline to inter-governmental relations, at the same time as remaining sufficiently flexible and amendable in response to changing exigencies of government.

While this is not the place to suggest in any specific way what these future agreements should be, it is nevertheless possible to identify broad themes on which such agreements are desirable.

A general ‘concordat on executive power’ between the central government and the provincial administrations seems advantageous for a number of reasons. First among these is that such a concordat can articulate broad principles in the exercise of governmental power as between multiple levels of government. These principles reflect political, not legal undertakings. Broadly such a concordat should seek to regularise and ensure mutual respect for constitutionally assigned spheres of activity by ensuring adherence to such principles as devolution (autonomy of the provincial sphere), co-operation, legality, transparency and democracy.

Within the broad framework of an executive concordat, it is possible to envisage further protocols or agreements between the central government and the provincial level on such matters as the exercise of concurrent legislative powers (for e.g., by the central government choosing not to exercise those powers except where there is a pressing necessity), the exercise of the discretionary powers of the Governor (excluding the transfer of other statutory functions to the Board of Ministers as proposed above), inter-ministerial working arrangements, budgetary...
procedures and allocations, and substantive policy areas including development, sectoral/industrial matters (for e.g., tourism, fisheries, agriculture, natural resources, etc).

7.3 Conclusion

The experience of Provincial Councils in the past two decades demonstrates that the full constitutional extent of devolution that is possible by an innovative and flexible approach to the implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment has not been realised. This is due to straightforward non-implementation of constitutional provisions, or because of attempts at clawing back the constitutional scheme through central legislation or administrative and political practices.

The full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment therefore requires a thoroughgoing review of these laws, policies, and practices. The possibilities and policy options that are available in this exercise have been suggested, albeit in outline, in the preceding discussion. In the final analysis, however, no amount of institutional reform is likely to succeed without the critical element of political will and commitment to making devolution work. That has been the experience in the past, and it remains to be seen, although the prospects are not especially favourable, whether this will change in the future.
Explanation of Terms

Unless it is clear from the context in which they are used that a different meaning is intended or implied, the following words are used in the sense of the definitions provided here. They follow the use of the terms in the Constitution.

Bill: A draft law before being passed by Parliament
Law: An Act of Parliament
Draft Statute: A draft provincial statute prior to enactment by a Provincial Council
Statute: A law made by a Provincial Council
Article: A provision of the Constitution (Note that some constitutional amendments also use the term ‘section’ to describe substantive provisions)
Section: A provision of an Act of Parliament or Provincial Statute
Item: An entry in any of the three lists of provincial, reserved and concurrent subjects set out as List I, List II and List III in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, including entries in Appendix I, Appendix II and Appendix III of List I
Government: The central government of Sri Lanka

Abbreviations

APRC: All Party Representative Committee
ENDLF: Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front
EPRLF: Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
IPKF: Indian Peace Keeping Force
JVP: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
SLMC: Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
SLFP: Sri Lanka Freedom Party
TMVP: Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal
TULF: Tamil United Liberation Front
UNP: United National Party
UPFA: United People’s Freedom Alliance
Acts of Parliament relating to Devolution


Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987

Provincial Councils Elections Act, No. 2 of 1988

Provincial Councils (Payment of Salaries and Allowances) Act, No. 37 of 1988

Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 55 of 1988

Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act, No. 12 of 1989

Police Commission Act, No. 1 of 1990

Agrarian Services (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 1990

High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act, No. 19 of 1990

Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 1990

Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act, No. 28 of 1990

Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 1990

National Transport Commission Act, No. 37 of 1991

Greater Colombo Economic Commission (Amendment) Act, No. 49 of 1992

Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act, No. 58 of 1992

Provincial Councils Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 1993

Provincial Councils Pensions Act, No. 17 of 1993

Irrigation (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 1994

Provincial Council Turnover Taxes (Limits and Exemptions) Act, No. 25 of 1995

High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act, No. 10 of 1996

Soil Conservation (Amendment) Act, No. 24 of 1996

Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance Act, No. 31 of 1999

High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No. 54 of 2006
Decisions of the Superior Courts relating to Devolution

Some of the cases cited below have been reported in the official Sri Lanka Law Reports, while others have so far been unreported. However, all except Greater Colombo Economic Commission (Amendment) Bill (1992) and Bandara v. Arawwawala (1996) are now conveniently reproduced in L. Marasinghe & J. Wickramaratne (Eds.) (2010) Judicial Pronouncements on the 13th Amendment (Colombo: Stamford Lake).

Agrarian Services (Amendment) Bill (1990), SCSD No. 9 of 1991
Agrarian Services (Amendment) Bill (1991), SCSD No. 2 of 1991
Alawwa v. Katugampola Multi Purpose Co-operative Society (1996) 1 SLR 278
Dhanapala v. Provincial Director of Education, North Central Province (1997) 1 SLR 400
Ghany v. Dissanayake (2004) 1 SLR 17
Greater Colombo Economic Commission (Amendment) Bill (1992), SCSD No.1 of 1992
In re Local Authorities Housing Statute of the North Central Provincial Council (1997) 3 SLR 344
In re the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill (1987) 2 SLR 312
Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission, North-Western Province (2001) 1 SLR 1
Land Ownership Bill (2003), SCSD Nos. 26-36 of 2003
Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill, SCSD No. 12 of 2003
Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill, SCSD Nos. 6 and 7 of 2008
Madduma Banda v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services (2003) 2 SLR 80
Mahindasoma v. Senanayake (1996) 1 SLR 180 (CA)
National Transport Commission Bill (1991), SCSD No. 8 of 1991
Nimalaratne v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services (2000) 3 SLR 184
Podinilame v. Mathew (1996) 2 SLR 82

Premachandra and Dodangoda v. Jayawickrema and Bakeer Markar (1993) 2 SLR 294 (CA)

Premachandra v. Jayawickrema (1994) 2 SLR 90 (SC)

Provincial Councils (Amendment) Bill, SCM 14th June 1990

Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Bill (1989), SCSD No. 11 of 1989

Ranjani Priyalatha v. Provincial Public Service Commission, Central Province (2009), CA Writ App. No. 775/07, 3rd November 2009

Ratnayake v. de Silva (1999) 3 SLR 57

Rent (Amendment) Bill (2002), SCSD No. 8 of 2002


Re Transport Board Statute of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (1990), SC (Spl) No. 7 of 1989


The Police Commission Bill (1989), SC (Spl) No. 14 of 1989

Water Services Reform Bill (2003), SCSD Nos. 24 and 25 of 2003

Weerasinghe v. Dissanayake (1997) 1 SLR 406

Wijesekera v. Attorney General (2007) 1 SLR 38

Wijewardana v. Director of Local Government (2004) 1 SLR 179
Further Reading

C. Amaratunga (Ed.) *Ideas for Constitutional Reform* (Colombo: CLD)


L. Marasinghe (2009) *The Provincial Governor: Rights and Duties under the Thirteenth Amendment* (Colombo: Sarvodaya)


J. Uyangoda & R. Edrisinha (Eds.) *Essays on Constitutional Reform* (Colombo: CEPRA)
List of Interviewees

- Hon Rear Admiral (Retd) Mohan Wijewickrama - Governor of The Eastern Province
- Hon Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan – Chief Minister, Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon MLAM Hisbullah – Former Minister of Health
- Hon. T.Nawaratnarajah - Minister of Agriculture
- Hon. M.S. Uduma Lebbe - Minister of Road Development
- Hon. Wimalaweera Dissanayake - Minister of Education
- Hon. AMM Faiz – Chairman, Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. M.K.D.S. Gunawardana – Former Deputy Chairman Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. Daya Gamage - Opposition Leader, Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. Segu Dawood Basheer - Former Opposition Leader, Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. A. Razeek Fareed - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. A. S Jawahir Saih- Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. M.A.M. Maharoof - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. W.G.M.M. Ariyavathi Galappathi - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. A.P.G. Chandradasa - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. S. Pushparajah - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. R.N. Varathan - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. S.Selvarajah - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. N. Thiraviyam - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. K.M. Abdul Razzak - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. A.M. Jameel - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. A.Parasuraman - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. S.L.M. Hassan - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. E.S. Krishnanantharajah - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. U.M.N. Mubeen - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. M.L.T. Naheem - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. A.Sasitharan - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. M.S. Thowfeek - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Hon. T.A. Masillamanie - Member of the Eastern Provincial Council
- Mr.V.P Balasingham - Chief Secretary, Eastern Province
- Mrs.N.R.Ranjini - Secretary to the Chief Minister
- Mr. K.U.K.Weerawardana - Secretary, Ministry Of Education
- Mr. V. Pathmanathan - Secretary( Acting) Ministry of Agriculture
- Mr. Sheriff - Secretary, Ministry of Road Development
- Mr U.L.A Azeez - Secretary, Ministry of Health
- Mr. Thyagalingam - Former Council Secretary, Eastern Provincial Council
- Mr. K Udage - Secretary, Provincial Public Service Commission
- Dr. R. Gnanasegar - Director of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture
- Mr Aniff Lebbe - Legal Officer, Eastern Provincial Council
PART 2 – The Eastern Provincial Council

An Assessment of a newly elected council at work

A Top Line Report

Lionel Guruge
Executive Summary

The Provincial Council system ushered in under the Indo–Lanka Agreement in 1987 introduced devolution of power to the architecture of governance in Sri Lanka as an instrument of conflict resolution in the context of the ongoing ethnic conflict. Accordingly, these top line results of surveys and focus group discussions on the Eastern Provincial Council provide an insight into the performance and perceptions of the system of provincial devolution from the perspective of the general public and political groups advocating greater autonomy, as well as the elected councillors and officials. The results indicate the level of satisfaction with the existing system, the disjunction between promise and performance, current challenges and potential for future improvement. These insights are especially useful in the current post-war context in which constitutional reform could play a further role in ensuring the transition to an enduring post-conflict situation.

Findings:

• The opinion of the general public on various governance aspects of the Provincial Council differ from the opinions of elected Provincial Councillors and officials of the institutions that are under the Provincial Council.
• There is a clear discrepancy between public expectations of services and the service provision by the Provincial Council.
• Public opinion is negligible in terms of influencing the conduct of the affairs of the province.
• International NGOs are important actors in the Eastern Province.
• There is a low level of satisfaction amongst the elected Provincial Councillors and officials with regard to the functioning of the Council.
• A considerable majority of the Tamil and Muslim communities is of the view that both land and police powers should be devolved to the Provincial Council. They view such a devolution of power as strengthening the Council.

Objectives

The Eastern Provincial Council began fully functioning soon after provincial elections held in May 2008. The provincial elections were held after 20 years and were the first for the Eastern Province alone, following the de-merger of the province from the North consequent to a decision of the Supreme Court on 16th October 2006.

The main objective of this survey is to identify the progress as well as the setbacks faced by the Council through a comparison of the perceptions of the council amongst elected councillors, officials and the public in the East.

The secondary objective is to identify the levels of satisfaction with the Provincial Council's provision of services.
The additional objectives of this survey include obtaining popular perceptions of the role of the central government in the scheme of provincial devolution as well as that of the political parties and the extent and manner in which the experience of provincial devolution has impacted demands for self-governance.

Methodology

This is a broad assessment of the Eastern Provincial Council, which uses a combination of survey methods. The assessment evaluates perceptions and attitudes of the Council’s elected representatives, officials and the general public in the East. It touches on service sectors as well.

a. The Sample

The Eastern PC sample included the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary and other Secretaries and all the Elected Provincial Councillors.

The geographic regions covered in the survey are the Districts of Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I - Sample Breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ampara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officers (Working under the EPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussions among the General Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Collection of Data

i. Interviews

Face to face interviews were conducted with the use of a structured questionnaire with 150 officials, 50 from each district (selected randomly) employed in the institutions coming under the Provincial Council. Table 1 shows the sample breakdown. Care was taken to ensure that the numbers of officers selected from each district reflect the ethnic composition of the three districts, respectively.

ii. Media Study

The media study focused on news and reports published on the Eastern Provincial Council in the main Sinhala and Tamil newspapers from 10th May 2008 up to 10th August 2009.

All Hansard reports (from 6th June 2008 to 4th June 2009) were analyzed for identification of issues discussed in the Provincial Council.
iii. Public Opinion Assessment

In addition, 72 focus group discussions with 24 groups from each district were conducted. The method of selection of participants was a combination of simple random sampling and convenient sampling.

The group discussions were conducted in the language of participants. The number of discussions held in each district was determined on the basis of the ethnic composition of the three districts.

iii-a) A special note - Interpreting the Focus Group Discussions

72 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the three districts of the Eastern Province i.e 24 per district.

It should be noted that the findings of the FGDs are not presented as being subjected to an in-depth analysis of the discussions. This is due to the nature of the rapid assessment and the need to present a quick summary of views to the reader for ready comprehension.

Thus, the FGD assessments are not presented as analytical data but only as basic numerical data.

Further, it should be stressed that if in a group discussion there was a high degree of consensus amongst the majority of the participants on any particular issue, this consensus is treated as a unified cluster of views of the said group.
Key findings

1. Attitudes on the Provincial Council

The findings show that the elected members and the officials of the PC are positive and optimistic about the Provincial Council, whilst the general public is not.

Approximately two thirds (64%) of the PC officials agree that after the election of the Provincial Councillors there is a considerable improvement in the services of the PC, while just over a third (36%) do not agree (Graph 1). The officials who ‘agree’ state that ‘the biggest change is that the public amenities provided by the PC are becoming more efficient’ (Graph 2).

In a content analysis of Hansard Records, an overwhelming 89.5% of elected councillors show a very positive attitude towards the newly established Provincial Council. The percentage of the Councillors who are not positive is 10.5%.

The majority (38 out of 72) of Focus Group Discussions from the public opinion component show that there has not been a positive change in the Provincial Council even after the public representatives were duly elected. However, 24 of the 72 FGDs stress that there is a positive change after the establishment of the Eastern Provincial Council (Graph 4). The majority in the Batticaloa District (10 Tamil group discussions), are of the view that there has been a positive change after the establishment of the Eastern Provincial Council (Table 1).

Table 1 – Is there any difference in the Eastern Province after public representatives were elected to the council?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group discussion</th>
<th>Opinion according to District and Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ampara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Negative</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed Positive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Can live freely”</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of the presence of Public Representatives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 1

Was there a considerable change in services provision to you by the PC once the representatives were elected? - (Officials)

- Yes: 64%
- No: 36%

Graph 2

If you say that there was a change in the service provision to you by the PC after the representatives were elected, then what are these changes? (Officials)

- The provision of common public services have become efficient: 40.9%
- Correct supervision & leadership from the Public Representatives for many activities: 20.4%
- Delayed or stopped work so far has resumed: 17.2%
- Provincial civil administration well established: 6.5%
- Other: 15.1%
Graph 3

The attitude of the Provincial Councilors towards the Provincial Council – (Hansard Reports Analysis)

Graph 4

Is there any change to the situation after the public representatives were elected to the Eastern Provincial Council? (Analysis of Focus Group Discussions)

- No change: 38
- Changed Negative: 2
- Changed Positive: 24
- "Can live freely": 6
- Importance of the presence of Public Representatives: 2

Pie chart showing the distribution of responses.
2. Views on Main Issues Facing the Provincial Council

i. Views of the Elected Provincial Councilors
A review of the Hansard Records does not show any single issue as ‘very important’, since most issues appear to have similar levels of importance in general. Among these issues, the highest level of attention of the elected members is drawn to the ‘Legislative powers relevant to the Provincial Council’. The Councillors have referred to this issue 10.6% of the time. The other issues are the problem of the Graduate Teachers (9.6%), Ethnic Solidarity (7.1%), Financial Provisions (7%), Security (6.6%) and the Central Government (6.1%).

What is important to note is that the large scale government development programme, “Nagenahira Navodaya” (Awakening of the East), which commenced as the war ended, is one of the least mentioned issues (0.7%). (Graph 5)

ii. Public opinion
Of the 72 FGDs, 40 highlighted ‘scarcity of the infrastructure facilities’ showing the seriousness of the issue followed by “lack of potable water” (29 groups), unemployment (24 groups), ‘lack of water and other facilities for agriculture’ (17 groups) and lack of land permits (15 groups) (Graph 6).

Lack of infrastructure facilities is underscored by all the communities surveyed — Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim - in all the three districts ‘as a problem mostly affecting’ them. (Table 2)

When comparing the above perceptions with the elected members, it is apparent that there is a disconnect between the matters addressed by the councillors at council meetings and those issues the general public think are ‘relevant’. What is interesting is that not one issue that people find relevant is reflected in the priorities of the councillors.
### Table 2 – What is the main problem in the Province?
Group Discussion View - on the basis of District and Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Sinhala</th>
<th>Tamil</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sinhala</th>
<th>Tamil</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sinhala</th>
<th>Tamil</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dearth of infra structure facilities (Roads, Drains, Electricity, Telephone)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dearth of School Teachers/Problems in Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dearth of Water &amp; other facilities for Agriculture</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Problems</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Water</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Land Permits</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings without proper Planning &amp; Standardization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood problems of the widows</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazards of Wild Elephants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5

**Main Issues of the PC as per the citizens’ opinion**
(Hansard Reports Analysis)
3. Views on Responses to the Problems of the People

The establishment of the Eastern Provincial Council was expected to lead to a situation of improved conditions for the people of the province within the framework of an orderly administrative system and elected public representation.

i. The Officials
The majority (62%) of the officials (who are working in institutions directly under the Provincial Councils) believe that the responses of the Council to the problems of the people is adequate while a little more than one third (38%) believe that such responses are not adequate. (Graph 7)

ii. Views of the Provincial Councillors
On the same issue, more than half (55.6%) of the elected Provincial councillors are of the view that the responses of the Provincial Council were adequate but close to half (44.4%) say that the responses of the PC are not adequate. (Graph 8)

iii. Public Opinion
The public opinion FGDs show that the views of the public run contrary to that of the officials and the councillors.
The overwhelming majority of FGDs (61 of 72) of the discussion groups state that they did not receive responses to their problems. In 4 FGDs, the public mentioned that “Provincial Councillors say that there are no funds for solving the problems”. (Graph 9)

As the Table 3 indicates, respondents in all three districts belonging to all the three communities are dissatisfied saying they ‘did not receive solutions to their problems from the new Provincial Council’ while the majority of the elected Provincial Councillors are ‘satisfied’ about the solutions given to the problems of the public.

Table 3 – What are the Responses of the Provincial Council to the problems?
Group Discussion Opinion according to District and Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ampara</th>
<th>Batticaloa</th>
<th>Trincomalee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Provincial</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilors have visited &amp; inquired about the problems</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received a Response</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Councilors say that there are no funds from the Provincial Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Devolution in the Eastern Province: Implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment and Public Perceptions, 2008-2010

Centre for Policy Alternatives
Graph 7

After the establishment of the PC, are the responses to citizens' problems adequate? (Officials)

Yes: 62.0%
No: 38.0%

Graph 8

Are you satisfied with the response by the PC to citizens’ issues? - (Provincial Councilors)

Yes: 55.6%
No: 44.4%
4. Views on Development Programmes

i. The Officials

One fifth (23.7%) of the officials state that development activities and the provision of infrastructure facilities initiated within the Eastern Province are “mainly carried out by special representatives of the Central Government through various ministries”. A similar number (20.4%) say that the development programmes are carried out through the collaboration of the Central Government and the Provincial Council. 15.1% are of the view that these activities are performed through the Local Government Institutions while only 11.8% of the officials state that the development programmes are conducted by the Eastern Provincial Council (Graph 10). When asked as to who should assume the main role in developmental and other activities, 44.7% of the officials state that the Provincial Council should assume the main role in such activities (Graph 11).

ii. Public Opinion

When the public perception of development programmes was surveyed through the focus group discussions, 34 groups say that such activities are carried out through the Central Government while an equal number (34 groups) state that such activities are carried out by the

Graph 9

Nature of responses of the PC to the issues (Focus Group Discussions-FGD)

- No response given: 61
- Relevant Provincial Councilors visited & Inquired: 3
- There is “a/some response”: 4
- Councilors say that there are no funds in the PC: 4
Local Government Institutions. 15 groups stress that these activities are done by the Non Governmental Institutions. (Graph 12)

As to the question of whether the beneficiaries’ opinions are obtained for development programmes the vast majority (61 groups), state that public opinion is not sought and that they are not made aware of development programmes (Table 4)

This indicates that the Provincial Council has failed to communicate accurate information on its development programmes or engaged in a participatory and inclusive process in respect of them.

Table 4 – In what ways are development and other main activities taking place in the province? (Are people aware of these activities and are their opinions sought?) – Group Discussion opinion based on District and Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ampara</th>
<th>Batticaloa</th>
<th>Trincomalee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were informed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 10

When it comes to activities such as development & provision of infrastructure facilities, which level of state administration directs them? (Officials)
Graph 11

If appropriate & efficient development is to take place within the province, who should take the lead in these activities? (Officials)

- Central Government: 24.7%
- Provincial Council: 44.7%
- Local Government Institutions: 24.7%
- Others: 6.0%

Graph 12

With the mediation/involvement of which institutions that the developmental activities are conducted in the province? (Focus Group Discussions - FGD)

- Central Government: 34%
- Local Government Institutions (other than PC): 34%
- Provincial Council: 13%
- Governor’s Funding: 3%
- NGO’s: 15%
- All Institutions: 2%
- Don’t Know: 10%
5. Views on the Role of the NGOs in the Eastern Province

i. The Officials
The majority (75%) of the officials coming under the Provincial Council state that the assistance of outside institutions is obtained for development activities in the Eastern Province. They also indicate that such assistance is mostly from the International NGOs. Officials in all the districts state that the contribution of the local NGOs is very little. 93.1% of officials in the Batticaloa district who state that the assistance of the outside institutions was obtained for development activities, say that they receive assistance from the International NGOs. (Graph 13)

A considerable proportion of officials who state that outside assistance is received for development activities say that the (main) change that such assistance has brought to the Provincial Council is in terms of helping them “to do their work with proper coordination”. This view is mostly shared by officials of Ampara (42.1%), followed by Batticaloa (37.9%) and Trincomalee (28.9%). Further, 36.8% of the officials in Trincomalee district indicate that the contributions of external institutions were made without making the people aware of it. (Graph 14)

ii. Public Opinion
The majority of the 72 discussion groups (53 groups) say that NGOs operate in the Eastern Province. However people in 7 discussion groups say that these NGOs are engaged in irregular activities. (Graph 15)
Graph 14

What is the change effect observed as a result of working with such institutions? (Officials)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Work took place but people were not aware</th>
<th>Objectives of only outside institutions are achieved</th>
<th>The PC has not been efficient enough to achieve the expected objectives utilising them</th>
<th>The PC worked well, and there was good co-ordination</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampara</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trincomale</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 15

The opinion about the NGO's - (Focus Group Discussions-FGD)

- Was operational: 53
- Irregularities took place: 7
- Presently not operational: 9
- There is no assistance from the NGO's in the Sinhala areas: 5
- Don't Know: 5
6. Views on the present functioning of the Provincial Council

i. The Officials
When public servants currently employed by the Provincial Council were asked to compare the present performance of the Council versus when it was run only by officials, a majority (59.3%) of them mentioned that they were not satisfied with the present functioning. Only 40.7% say they are satisfied with the present functioning of the Provincial Council (Graph 16). The reason mentioned by most of them is the ‘non-fulfillment by the Provincial Council of its obligations towards citizens’. 54.3% of the officials in the Batticaloa district, 43.5% in the Ampara district and 29% in the Trincomalee district are of this view. Another 43.5% in the Ampara district and 35.5% in the Trincomalee district state that the lack of adequate support from the Central Government is the reason for the unsatisfactory situation regarding the present functioning of the Eastern Provincial Council. (Graph17)

ii. Views of the Elected Representatives
The elected provincial councillors are not satisfied with the changes after the establishment of the Eastern Provincial Council. The ability of the Governor to use sole discretion in implementing decisions in Provincial Council work is a concern that has been raised by the Councillors in Batticaloa (55.6%) and Ampara (40%). Surprisingly, Trincomalee differed. Another allegation by the councillors in Trincomalee (41.7%) and Batticaloa(33.3%) is ‘having a situation of being compelled to work under the strong influences of members of parliament and ministers from the Province in implementing decisions’. (Graph 18)

When the elected provincial councillors were asked about the cooperation they receive from the PC Officials in their work/activities, more than half (54.8%) of the councillors state that they are not satisfied with the cooperation received (Graph 21). Only a small percentage of provincial councillors are satisfied with the cooperation received (8.3% for Trincomalee Councillors, 20% of Ampara and for Batticaloa it’s 0%). (Graph 18)

iii. The Officials
When they were asked whether it ‘appears to them that the work of the provincial council is planned and implemented with the collaboration of the Councillors and Officials’, 52% answered ‘yes’ and 48% of them answered in the negative (Graph 19). The reason for the lack of proper coordination in work is ‘the continuation of the same old practice of the work being done as usual through the governor’ (31.9%). Another 27.8% say that the ‘lack of determination on the part of elected public representatives in serving the public’ is the reason for this situation. (Graph 20)

Both groups -the officials and the councillors -are not satisfied with the functioning of the present Provincial Council.
Graph 16

Are you satisfied with the present functioning of the PC? (Officials)

Yes: 40.7%
No: 59.3%

Graph 17

What makes you to feel ‘dissatisfied’ with the present functioning of the PC? (Officials)

- Batticaloa:
  - Others: 17.1%
  - The Central Government does not give enough patronage: 54.3%
  - The governor does not work in a properly co-ordinated manner with the PC & other relevant persons: 43.5%
  - More attention paid to national level matters than the problems of the province: 35.5%
  - The Provincial Council does not properly fulfill its obligations towards the citizens: 29.0%

- Ampara:
  - Others: 4.3%
  - The Central Government does not give enough patronage: 43.5%
  - The governor does not work in a properly co-ordinated manner with the PC & other relevant persons: 43.5%
  - More attention paid to national level matters than the problems of the province: 35.5%
  - The Provincial Council does not properly fulfill its obligations towards the citizens: 29.0%

- Trincomalee:
  - Others: 6.5%
  - The Central Government does not give enough patronage: 25.8%
  - The governor does not work in a properly co-ordinated manner with the PC & other relevant persons: 29.0%
  - More attention paid to national level matters than the problems of the province: 35.5%
  - The Provincial Council does not properly fulfill its obligations towards the citizens: 29.0%
Graph 18

What is the change that is evident as a result of the decision implementation (process) in your Provincial Council? (Provincial Councilors)

- Batticaloa:
  - Other: 55.6%
  - Activities are performed as a result of the strong influence of the Members of Parliament (MP) & the Ministers in the Province: 33.3%
  - Planning & other essential activities take place in a non-formal way: 11.1%

- Ampara:
  - Other: 40.0%
  - Activities are performed as a result of the strong influence of the Members of Parliament (MP) & the Ministers in the Province: 20.0%
  - Planning & other essential activities take place in a non-formal way: 10.0%

- Trincomalee:
  - Other: 41.7%
  - Activities are performed as a result of the strong influence of the Members of Parliament (MP) & the Ministers in the Province: 33.3%
  - Planning & other essential activities take place in a non-formal way: 8.3%

Graph 19

Are the activities of the PC planned or implemented jointly by the public representatives & officials? (Officials)

- Yes: 52.0%
- No: 48.0%
Graph 20

The reason for the activities not being properly coordinated even after the public representatives have been elected on public vote (Officials)

- Since it takes some time for a proper political & administrative structure to be prepared: 19.4%
- Officials on their own directing the activities of civil administration in the province for a long time: 2.8%
- The lack of commitment of the public representatives towards activities such as service provision & development: 27.8%
- Conducting multiple activities simultaneously through the Governor and it has been the accepted practice: 31.9%
- Many activities of the Central Government are conducted through the Govt. Agent: 2.8%
- Other: 15.3%

Graph 21

Are you satisfied with the support you receive from the PC officials when you function as a public representative? (Representatives)

- Yes: 45.2%
- No: 54.8%
7. Views on the Provincial Councillors & the officials

i. The General Public
When people were asked about the cooperation they receive from the officials of the Provincial Council, they expressed dissatisfaction. In 42 FGD (of the 72) the majority stated that they do not receive cooperation from officials while in another 9 group discussions they mentioned that the Provincial Council officials are not close to the people. It is only in 12 group discussions that the majority of the people have mentioned that they are receiving cooperation from the officials who work in the Province. (Table 5)

When the people were asked about the relationship that the Provincial Councillors maintain with the people, the majority of FGDs (45 groups) mentioned that it is unsatisfactory. (Table 6)

Table 5 – Perceptions of the role of Officials in the activities of the Province conducted by the Council – Discussion Group view according to the District and Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ampara</th>
<th>Batticaloa</th>
<th>Trincomalee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Assistance from the Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Assistance from the Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Officers do not have an understanding of the problems in the Province</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers are inefficient</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Officers are not close to the people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is the support of the officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 – What kind of a relationship do the Provincial Councilors maintain with the people? – Group Discussion views according to District and Ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ampara</th>
<th>Batticaloa</th>
<th>Trincomalee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting with biases</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 22

Experience on how & the way assistance is received from the PC officials in activities of the Province - Focused Group Discussions (FGD)

- No assistance from the Officials: 42
- The officials do not have an understanding of the problems of the province: 4
- Officials are inefficient: 5
- Officials are not close to the people: 9
- Assistance is available from the officials: 12

Graph 23

The nature of the relationship maintained by the elected representatives with the public in the area - (Focus Group Discussions)

- Unsatisfactory: 45
- Satisfactory: 19
- Biased: 8
8. Views and attitudes about media

i. The officials
Among the officials who state that they have some interest in reading newspapers, listening to radio and watching TV, the majority (49.7%) mention that most of the reportage relating to the Provincial Council has been about news jointly involving the Central Government and the Provincial Council. One fourth (24.8%) of the officials mention that the reportage has been on incidents relating to the Chief Minister. (Graph 24)

ii. The general public
When people were asked about their awareness of the media reporting on the Provincial Council, the majority of the 72 groups (38 groups) mention that they do not have an awareness about it. 22 Group Discussions say they have some awareness. (Graph 25)
9. Views on Opportunities for Liaising with the Institutions

i. The General Public
When people are asked about the institutions they are closest to, the majority (48 FGD groups) say they are closer to the Local Government Institutions’. Respondents of 20 groups mention that they are closer to the Divisional Secretariat while another 11 groups mention that they are closer to the Grama Niladhari (Table 7).

ii. The Officials
When the officials in the Provincial Council are asked about the institution that they find easy to ‘work closer with’, the majority of them mention that they are closer to (respectively) the Local Government Institutions (Trincomalee district 30%, Ampara district 35.4%, in Batticaloa 34.6%) followed by the Divisional Secretariats (Graph 26).
Table 7 – Which institutions do people find the most accessible?
– Group Discussion view based on the District and Ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Institution</th>
<th>Ampara</th>
<th>Batticaloa</th>
<th>Trincomalee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Institution</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Secretariat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Secretariat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grama Niladhari</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Institutions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 26

The institution / office that you can work closest with... (Officials)
10. Views on the Powers of the Provincial Council

i. The Officials
Among those officials working in the Provincial Council who think that the powers of the Provincial Council are not sufficient to provide a better service to their province, close to half (48.6%) think that both police and land powers should be vested with the Provincial Council. Close to one-fifth (19%) of the officials say that the “power to receive direct foreign assistance should be vested with the Provincial Council” while 14.3% think that land powers should be vested with the Provincial Council (Graph 27).

On a district breakdown, more than two-thirds (70.2%) of officials in Batticaloa district mention that the Provincial Council should be given both police and land powers (same view in Ampara district at 40% and Trincomalee district at 24.2%). When compared with the other districts, a higher percentage of officials in the Trincomalee district (27.3%) hold the view that the “power to receive direct foreign assistance should be vested with the Provincial Council” (Graph 32). On the basis of ethnicity, more than half of Tamil (56.7%) and close to half (47.2%) of Muslim officials believe that both the police and land powers should be vested with the Provincial Council. What should be stressed here is that none of the Sinhalese officials agree to the statement that the police and land powers should to be given to the Provincial Councils. One third (33.3%) of the Sinhalese officials however support the view that the “power to receive direct foreign assistance should be vested with the Provincial Council” (Graph 33).

ii. Provincial Councillors
When the elected Provincial Councillors are asked as to whether there is an adequate power structure within the Eastern Province for satisfying the needs of the people, the majority (62.5%) of the Sinhalese Councillors agree, though considerable majorities of Tamil (72.7%) and Muslim Councillors (75%) disagree saying that there is no such power arrangement for satisfying the needs of the people (Graph 30).

iii. The General Public
The majority (41 FGD groups) of the public respondents mention that the Provincial Councils have to be further strengthened by giving them powers over land and police. (Graph 31).
Graph 27

If you think that the powers presently vested with the PC are insufficient to deliver better services to your area, then what 'additional powers' do you think the PC should be vested with? (Officials)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Powers only</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Powers only</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both land &amp; police powers</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers to directly receive foreign aid</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 28

If you think that the powers presently vested with the PC are insufficient to deliver better services to your area, then what 'additional powers' do you think the PC should be vested with? (Officials’ - Districts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Both land &amp; police powers</th>
<th>Police Powers only</th>
<th>Powers to directly receive foreign aid</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampara</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 29

If you think that the powers presently vested with the PC are insufficient to deliver better services to your area, then what 'additional powers' do you think the PC should be vested with? (Officials' Ethnicity)

- Other
- Powers to directly receive foreign aid
- Both land & police powers
- Police Powers only
- Land Powers only

Muslim: 13.9, 13.9, 47.2
Tami: 6.7, 15.0, 56.7
Sinhala: 0.0, 0.0, 33.3

Graph 30

In the capacity of an elected representative, (do you find) powers within the PC fit enough to serve the needs of the public? (Provincial Councilors - Ethnicity)

- No
- Yes

Muslim: 25.0
Tami: 27.3
Sinhala: 37.5, 62.5
Analysis of Newspaper Reportage - A Summary

1. Analysis of Newspaper Reportage

The Sinhala and Tamil language newspapers in the period 10th May 2008 to 10th August 2009 were analysed.

**Tamil Language:**
News articles referring to the Eastern Provincial Council published in the main Tamil language newspapers between 10th May 2008 and 10th August 2009 were analysed. Accordingly, the Thinakkural paper has published relatively more news items on the Eastern Provincial Council compared with other newspapers. Among these news items the weekend Thinakkural carried 49.5% while the daily Thinakkural carried 31.4% (Graph 32).

**Sinhala Language:**
The news items published on the Eastern Provincial Council in the main Sinhala Language newspapers between 10th May 2008 and 10th August 2009 were subjected to analysis. Accordingly, the daily Lankadeepa paper (32.8%) and the weekend Lankadeepa paper (28.9%) had published more news items on the Eastern Provincial Council than the other sinhala language newspapers (Graph 33).
Graph 32

Tamil media (Dailies & Weekend Newspapers) reportage on the Eastern Province (May 10, 2008 to August 10, 2009)

Graph 33

Sinhala media (Dailies & Weekend Newspapers) reportage on the Eastern Province (May 10, 2008 to August 10, 2009)
As to the content/focus of the news items relating to the Provincial Council published within the survey period, it appears that the weekend (10.3%) as well as daily papers (18.9%) allocated more space to public service aspects of the PC such as education, health, agriculture and fisheries (Graph 34).

Sinhala newspapers, too are allocating more space for reportage on public service aspects such as education, health, agriculture and fisheries (daily papers 19.3% and weekend papers 10.9%). In addition the Sinhala papers have allocated considerable space (Daily papers 10.1% and Weekend papers 18% - Graph 35) to matters such as defense, Eastern Province widows and human rights.

Graph 34

[Diagram showing Tamil media (Dailies & Weekend Newspapers) themes of reportage on the Eastern Province (May 10, 2008 to August 10, 2009)]
Views of the Governor & the Secretaries to the Ministries

1. The study on the background of the Eastern Provincial Council: (A summary of the interviews conducted with the relevant ministers and officials)

The Chief Minister, ministers and the officials have a clear understanding about the changes that have taken place in the Eastern Provincial Council within the 18 months since its establishment. They were interviewed one-on-one. The summary of the interviews is given below.

2. Views of the Governor, the secretaries to the Ministries and other main officials of the EPC- A summary:

- Grants relevant to the functioning of the Provincial Council including grants for development projects

The officials are of the opinion that although the fiscal grants which are allocated to the Provincial Council through the Finance Commission are received by the Provincial Council they are inadequate. It was revealed that several large scale development projects are operative at the moment and they are operated through the joint functioning of the government and the non governmental organizations. It is a common opinion among the officers that many problems are created due to the ways that the Treasury allocates the grants.
The recruitment of Provincial Council officers and other employees

According to the Act, the powers of appointing the officers and other employees within the Provincial Council structure are vested with the Governor. He retains authoritative power on all appointments. This controversial matter seems to be little understood among ministers.

The Board of Ministers is expected to act as an advisory committee in matters such as transferring of an officer, interdictions, terminations of service and suspensions of salary increments. Trying to influence the Governor to this end could be counter productive. Especially the lack of regard and respect on the part of the Board of Ministers towards the powers of the Governor has resulted in problematic situations. The Governor is expected to always act according to the procedures of the administrative service and to produce a positive outcome for all ethnic groups being when recruiting. The Ministers on the other hand want to give political appointments to their supporters to retain their voter base.

The relationship between the Central Government and the Provincial Council

Although the Governor manages the affairs between the Government and the Provincial Council in the appropriate manner, the relationship between the Board of Ministers and the Government has been flawed due to various reasons. While the other Provincial Councils approved the Local Government Elections (Amendment) Act, rejection of it by the Eastern Provincial Council is controversial. There are no signs of the Eastern Provincial Council accepting this in the near future.

Obtaining direct foreign financial assistance to the Provincial Council

Unnecessary problems have arisen due to the misconception that the “powers of the Provincial Council belong to the Cabinet of Ministers.”

Unnecessary interferences of the Cabinet of Ministers in the affairs of the Provincial Council.

Unnecessary problems have arisen due to the misconception that the “powers of the Provincial Council belong to the Cabinet of Ministers.”

Inter-ethnic coexistence and provincial development

Almost all the ministries are planning development projects in a way that all three main ethnic groups are able to benefit.

The relationship between the officials headed by the Secretaries to the Provincial Council Ministries and the Provincial Councillors

During the time when the Eastern Provincial Council was functioning without public representatives, the officials were able to carry out their relevant functions adequately. Problems
have been created due to certain activities of some of the elected public representatives who do not have a formal and accurate understanding about the procedures of the Provincial Councils. The main sphere where such problems arise is regarding the activities taking place outside the supervision and leadership of the Governor.

- Drafting of statutes relevant to the subjects of the Provincial Council

The drafting of statutes have been identified as a very urgent activity. Only two of them have been passed so far.

1. Statute on the finances on the Eastern Province
2. Statute on the Road Passenger Transport Authority in the Eastern Province.

The biggest challenge is the non-availability of qualified personnel in the Provincial Council. It should be stressed that the officials and the Elected Provincial councillors are extremely eager to prepare statutes on an emergency basis.

- The relationship between the Provincial Council and the outside institutions and organizations

The Governor does not take part in the activity of allocating financial grants within the Provincial Council and it is a function of the Provincial Council headed by the Board of Ministers. The final approval of the Budget is a function of the Governor. Inquiring and verifying financial transparency and accountability too, is a responsibility of the Governor. The elected Provincial Councillors are not satisfied with the Governor's role in this regard.

- The allocation of grants within the Provincial Council and the budget

The Governor does not take part in the activity of allocating financial grants within the Provincial Council and it is a function of the Provincial Council headed by the Board of Ministers. The final approval of the Budget is a function of the Governor. Inquiring and verifying the financial transparency and accountability too, is a responsibility of the Governor. The elected Provincial Councillors are not satisfied with the Governor's role in this regard.

3. Opinions of the Board of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister-A Summary

- The provisions relevant to the activities of the Provincial Council including development projects

Grants are not being received on time, and the Provincial Council has little discretion in respect of grants already received. Since the newly created Eastern Provincial Council is of very recent origin, so far a stable methodology of income generation has not been established and this clearly underscores the importance of making the funds recommended by the Financial Commission available on time.
Recruitment of the Provincial Council officers and the employees

The Governor has the power to recruit the officers and employees to the Provincial Council. This raises the question of who is finally accountable to the people about this recruitment. In conducting their affairs, the other Provincial Councils are filling the essential vacancies on time and all such decisions are taken by the Chief Minister and later confirmed by the Governor. The reason for this is that both of them are responsible for running the Provincial Council in an orderly manner. However, some ministers in the Eastern Provincial Council have so far not been given a single appointment through their respective ministries. As a result, there are hundreds of vacancies in the Provincial Council to which ad-hoc appointments need to be made. It is the duty of a minister to identify the relevant vacancies and fill them through the Secretary of his Ministry, according to the proper institutional procedures, if the PC is to function properly.

In the Ministry of Health, the following situation is found: Kadiravelu hospital, which was inaugurated recently, has all the facilities including buildings, medical equipment, and a resource considered most difficult to find, a permanent residential doctor. However, a serious problem is that the Minister is not able to recruit the staff needed for the hospital. If the people do not receive the services of this hospital, it is the elected representatives who will stand answerable.

The relationship between the Central Government and the Provincial Council

The Provincial Council has always cooperated with the Central Government on matters relevant to development or of benefit to the people of the Eastern Province. But on occasions where the powers under the Thirteenth Amendment were violated, the Provincial Council has unanimously opposed it. For instance, when a vast stretch of land in Kantale area was requested for a Central Government project, the provincial council objected to it. Further, the Local Government Elections Amendment Act is very clearly causing some injustice to the minority communities. However, when dealing with parallel Ministries, the Board of Ministers act cordially and are successful with some development projects.

Obtaining direct foreign assistance to the Provincial Council

Direct foreign assistance is of importance to the Provincial Council. Although a series of long and fruitful discussions were held with the World Bank about a large-scale health project, it was halted suddenly. If the Provincial Council is afforded the opportunity of obtaining direct foreign assistance with the knowledge and approval of the Central Government, the people of the Eastern Province will benefit.

The relationship between the Governor and the Provincial Council

There is absolutely no difficulty in extending the full support of the Provincial Council to the Governor. But this should happen only if the Governor is taking part in the activities of the Board of Ministers in a consultative and helpful manner. At one time, for more than a year, there were
unnecessary interventions that jeopardised the status of the elected members of the Eastern Provincial Council. This became worse when the budget had to be passed. The Governor acted in a very inflexible way in this matter.

- Inter-ethnic coexistence and provincial development

The Board of Ministers of the Provincial Council always acts with a good understanding of inter-ethnic coexistence as seen in the consensus often reached at the assembly level on inter ethnic issues. Furthermore when public funds are allocated to Provincial Councillors, they are often used to benefit all ethnic communities. The officials are given (clear) instructions and the plans are prepared in such a way that all three main ethnic groups receive the benefits of development.

- The relationship between the officials headed by the secretaries to the Provincial Council Ministries and the Provincial Councillors

Work is done with a good understanding between the officers of the Provincial Council and the Provincial Ministers. But some problems arise from time to time. If a systematic development process is to get under way the officials and the ministers must have a strong working relationship. But with the continuous orders and the influence of the Governor there were also occasions when the situation was complicated. Were it to be the case that officials have to always and only follow the direct orders and instructions of the Governor, there would be no need for elected members of a council, representing the peoples of the province.

- Preparation of statute relevant to the subjects of the Provincial Council

So far, two statutes have been prepared. The absence of competence and expertise in the Council in this respect is a serious problem. Another is the long and arduous process for passing them.

- The relationship between the Provincial Council and the outside institutions / organizations

Steps relevant to development, in particular, obtaining popular participation in a formal and planned manner, is essential and takes time. Presently discussions are being held with all the organizations and institutions in the province and their contributions are being enlisted. A proper understanding and working relationship has to be developed between political leaders of the province, the District Secretariat and the Divisional Secretariats, since it appears that some institutions bypass the Provincial Council in a joint development process.

- Allocation of funding in the provincial council and the budget

Funding to the Provincial Councillors has not been approved so far because the funding due from the Government has not been received on time. However a number of development projects are already in operation with funding received through parallel ministries. There is rapid progress in the development of infrastructure facilities. The Central Government has also given
the Provincial Council higher levels of funding to improve other facilities. All these developments are optimistic signs, but the issue is that Provincial Council does not still function as an independent institution, as agreed by the Board of Ministers. Discrepancies in the annual budget and the unregulated powers of the Governor were identified as a source of frustration by the Board of Ministers. The opinion of the Board of Ministers is that “delaying the Annual Budget unnecessarily and influencing it is having a negative impact on the progress of the Provincial Council.”
Respondent demographics

Table 1 - Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Provincial Councillors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>102</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>31</td>
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Table 2 - Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Provincial Councillors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>31</td>
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</table>

Table 3 - Level of Education

<table>
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<th>Level of Education</th>
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<th>Provincial Councillors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to O/L</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/L</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to A/L</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/L</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Training/ Diploma</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate and Higher than that</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4 - The Language of the Group Discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ampara</th>
<th>Batticaloa</th>
<th>Trincomalee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>
Research Team

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Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit

Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit occupies the liberal position in the pluralistic setup of the political foundations in Germany. The Foundation's work focuses on the core values of freedom and responsibility. Through its projects FNF contribute to a world in which all people can live in freedom, human dignity and peace. Together with its partners - liberal political parties, think tanks and other non-governmental organisations - FNF supports the emergence of democratic institutions based on the rule of law, and the development of a market economy. By promoting well proven liberal concepts FNF also contribute to increasing people’s opportunities to work for their own prosperity.

FNF association with Sri Lanka is over four decades old. The Foundation's work in Sri Lanka centres on:

- Promoting rule of law and economic freedom
- Training candidates, young politicians and future leaders
- Strengthening moderate political organisations in order to counteract radicalisation and polarisation of politics in Sri Lanka.

With partner, Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), FNF work on constitutional concepts for strengthening the democratic process in Sri Lanka. Through close political contacts to liberal politicians from various parties, liberal policies are introduced into the political process.

Together with the Institute for Democracy and Leadership (IDL), FNF has inspired the creation of Liberal Youth Guilds (LYGs) in the entire country during the last few years. The Guilds offer political education and motivate young adults and future politicians to organise themselves in a democratic way. Along with its partner Business Development Services (BDS) Foundation, focuses on the integration of the young generation into society and the job markets in order to support the preconditions for a democratic and civic political culture. With partner the Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry in Sri Lanka (FCCISL), FNF has established project SMED to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the Small & Medium Enterprises and to ensure their sustainability.
Centre for Policy Alternatives

The mandate of CPA, identified at its inception, is to strengthen the civil society contribution to opinion and decision making in public policy in the areas of peace and governance within a rights based framework. Accordingly, the objectives of CPA are:

1. To contribute to public accountability in governance through strengthening of the awareness in society of all aspects of public policy and implementation
2. To make inputs into the public - policy making and implementation process in the constitutional, legislative and administrative spheres to ensure responsible and good governance
3. To propose to the government and parliament and all other policy - making bodies and institutions, constructive policy alternatives aimed at strengthening and safeguarding democracy, pluralism, the Rule of Law, human rights and social justice
4. To contribute towards the conflict resolution process in Sri Lanka and the South Asian region, so as to strengthen institutions and capacity building for democratic governance in multi-ethnic and pluralist societies
5. To focus attention of the social and political consequences of development

In pursuit of the above objectives, CPA is pledged to carry out the following activities:

- Programmes of research and study and the establishment of a documentation centre on public policy
- Dissemination of research and study through seminars, conferences, publication and exchange of ideas, including the use of the print and electronic media
- Advocacy of constructive policy alternatives, lobbying of decision makers and the shaping of public opinion
- Monitoring of the executive, legislature, judiciary, media and other public institutions
- Forging linkages with local and foreign institutions with similar aims and objectives